This Week at Amtrak

FEC Depot Boca NE (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
From the United Rail Passenger Alliance:

This Week at Amtrak; Vol. 9 No. 2
Volume 9, Number 2

From the Editors…

When the parent company of a legendary railroad states its intention to operate passenger trains, it is bound to garner some attention. This week we try to find out what all the hubbub is about.

What’s all the fuss?

Last week the parent of the Florida East Coast Railway announced its intention to establish passenger train service between Orlando and South Florida. Suffice it to say, this set the world of rail travel advocacy aflutter, leading to numerous online articles, blog posts, and more than a palpitation or two. This is all the more remarkable since the FEC exited the passenger train business on July 31, 1968, thus never having become an Amtrak subscriber. Many find this hard to fathom. As historians like to point out, however, history does not repeat itself; but it does rhyme.

MORE, PERHAPS, than any other part of the United States, excepting the Great Northwest empire of James Jerome Hill, it is possible and, indeed, almost mandatory to think of Florida in terms of the personality of a truly imperial railroad builder whose equally imperial whim was the organization of a vast geography as his pleasure dome and lasting monument. Henry Morrison Flagler, a partner in Standard Oil with John D. Rockefeller who retired with an immense personal fortune in vigorous middle age and full possession not only of millions but the will to spend them grandly, was able before his death to claim Florida almost in its geographical, economic and social entirety as his own creation. Call it enterprise or call it megalomania, no Roman proconsul or magnifico of medieval Italy ever brought into being so grandiose a concept as railroading and its incidental and collateral expansion in Flagler’s Florida. - Lucius Beebe, The Trains We Rode, Volume One, Howell-North Books, 1965

The seeds of the modern era of the Florida East Coast Railway were sown toward the close of the Twentieth Century. With the loosening of Depression Era banking regulations, numerous private equity investment firms were established such as Goldman Sachs, The Carlyle Group, and The Blackstone Group. Their mission was simple: Invest their clients’ hard-earned dollars with an expectation of a return on that investment.

Fortress Investment Group was founded as a private equity firm in 1998, and is headquartered in New York City. Among their stated goals is to obtain “distressed and undervalued assets (some with limited current cash flows and long investment horizons) and tangible & intangible assets (real estate, capital assets, natural resources and intellectual property).” The expected life of these transactions is 3 to 25 years.

The Florida East Coast is much more than a railroad. There is the Florida East Coast Railway that operates 351 miles of mainline track between Jacksonville and Miami. The parent company, Florida East Coast Industries, also owned and operated Flagler Development Group, one of the premier developers in the state. Its portfolio of properties includes about 8.8 million square feet, primarily located in Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale, Orlando, and Miami. Flagler also provides construction, consulting, brokerage and property management services. The company also owns about 853 acres of entitled land in Florida and more than 3000 acres of Florida real estate in its land bank that are not yet entitled. It should be noted that of the listed Flagler prime property locations, Orlando is the only one NOT located on the railroad.

The FEC was acquired out of bankruptcy in 1961 by The St. Joe Paper Co., a legacy of the du Pont era. St. Joe controlled the FEC until 2000, when St. Joe distributed its Florida East Coast shares to St. Joe stockholders. The FEC became an independent public company, but this freedom would be short-lived.

The Staggers Act of 1980 removed much of the regulation overreach from earlier in the century, allowing the railroads to act as they were intended; as businesses. Since 1980, $480 billion has been invested by the nation’s railroads into their physical plant. With railroads now allowed to maximize the leverage of their franchise opportunities for growth became evident over the following two decades, especially to investment firms. All aspects of railroading, from manufacturers to railroads, themselves, have found favor once again with the money changers.

Fortress Investment Group’s initial foray into railroading was the acquisition of RailAmerica, a short line holding company, in February 2007. It would take RailAmerica public with an initial public stock offering in October 2009.

By 2007 the FEC was ripe and ready for a change. As a result of the protracted financial malaise gripping the entire state in the first quarter of that year, earnings suffered a drop of about 50%. Net income fell to $9.04 million compared to $18.7 million for the first three months of 2006. Revenue during the quarter dropped to $108 million from $136 million. This was attributed to a decline in revenue of $43.9 million in land sales, and a $7.3 million drop in railway revenue. To most, this would appear to be a distressed and undervalued asset; for Fortress, this was an opportunity.

On May 8, 2007, the Florida East Coast Industries Board of Directors unanimously agreed to a takeover by Fortress in a transaction valued at $3.5 billion. The Surface Transportation Board granted its blessing in September, 2007. Under the Fortress banner, the railroad and Flagler Development have been split apart; but remain as staples of their “Alternative Asset Management” portfolio.

So what’s next?

Flagler’s first hotel venture was The Ponce de Leon at St. Augustine, costing a then astronomical $1,250,000 and advertised as the finest resort hotel in the world. More investments followed in dizzying succession as Flagler, indifferent to considerations of profit or loss, began the realization of a vision which embraced all Florida as the playground of the nation with amenities of relaxation for every taste and purse. In 1893 he added a new dimension of splendor and costliness with the opening at Palm Beach of the incredible Royal Poinciana Hotel while the iron of the Florida East Coast was still sixty miles away at Fort Pierce. From then on resorts palatial and modest leapfrogged the railroad down the seacoast: Hobe Sound, Jupiter, Fort Lauderdale, Biscayne and Miami. - Lucius Beebe, The Trains We Rode, Volume One, Howell-North Books, 1965

The “playground of the nation” as left by Henry Flagler has grown up into an economic force within its own right, and is now the fourth most populous state in the union. The state’s Gross Domestic Product was $748 billion in 2010, also fourth in the nation. For Flagler, the goal was simple: the importation of vacationers (and their money) to enjoy the mild weather; but even Flagler realized that beautiful vistas and sandy beaches were worthless unless a means existed to transport people to them.

For Flagler’s successors at Fortress, the objective becomes a little more complicated. Certainly “considerations of profit or loss” weigh heavily on their minds. The true ultimate goal of Fortress (as with any similar investor) is to build the capital value of the investment to multiples of its original value; before selling out, either to a "buy-and-hold" investor (e.g., Berkshire Hathaway) or to the public in an IPO. Profits are merely the lever, not the goal.

Locked in the legacy of the FEC, Fortress has tangible and intangible assets, the value of which have always been dependant upon the ability or inability of access by the public. The future of publicly funded and maintained transportation is anemic, at best. As a property owner, Fortress has a unique advantage: It already owns a transportation company not dependant upon publicly-funded rights of way or traffic control systems.

How does one maximize leverage of the franchise to advance and tap into the state’s GDP? Port Everglades (Fort Lauderdale) and the Port of Miami are undertaking expansions which renew rail access. Even so, the fact remains that people really do live here. Flagler Development currently lists a nine-acre property consisting of five lots which “is currently entitled for 2.5 million square feet of mixed-use development.” Also from the listing:

Downtown Miami has become a vibrant urban center where a population of 71,000 swells to 194,000 during business hours. Within walking distance of Miami-Dade College, the New World School of Arts, American Airlines Arena, and the Adrienne Arsht Center for the Performing Arts, the property is also at the epicenter of Miami’s cultural district.

Ironically, this is the land which once was home to the FEC’s Miami passenger train station and tracks, which were razed in the autumn of 1963. With rail access being restored to the Port of Miami just north of this site, restoration of rail service to downtown becomes a real possibility. Could this factor into whatever Fortress has in mind for its modern-day version of the FEC?

Obviously, none of us here claim to know what the service proffered by the FEC will look like, or even if it will, indeed, transpire. That is not the point. What is relevant is that investors find railroads attractive again; and this adoration is growing. Generally, one needs to spend money to make money. Is a $1 billion investment of private capital justified to unlock the untapped/unrealized value of existing assets? The formula that made Flagler a success is still quite relevant. Fortress Investment Group may be just 14 years old, but perhaps it has figured this out.

Related articles

• Amtrak service along Treasure Coast on track if governor signs bill (tcpalm.com)
• Miami-Orlando rail service planned for 2014 (rail-usa.com)

This Week at Amtrak

System map (Photo credit: Wikipedia)I have not seen this published in a while but here is the latest copy of This Week at Amtrak from the United Rail Passenger Alliance.

This Week at Amtrak; Vol. 9 No. 1

From the Editors…

Recently, a local regional railway announced a private initiative to begin passenger train service connecting Central and South Florida. Just to be clear, we said private.

A FOX rises in the East (Coast)

A wise fellow once observed that there is nothing new under the sun. It has also been said that if one wants a new idea then one should read an old book. On March 22, 2012, Florida East Coast Industries, the parent of the Florida East Coast Railway, made a significant announcement concerning its future:

Florida East Coast Industries, Inc. (FECI), the owner of Florida’s premier passenger rail corridor, is developing a privately owned, operated and maintained passenger rail service to connect South Florida and Orlando, which will be operational in 2014. By connecting the most visited city in the United States with South Florida’s business and vacation destinations, the passenger rail project, called All Aboard Florida, is designed to serve Florida’s growing number of business travelers, as well as families and tourists traveling for pleasure. - Florida East Coast Industries, Inc.

Obviously, this is a bold move for any private corporation, let alone a railroad. At the same time, all the signs were present. How did we get here?

Henry M. Flagler, Florida’s Empire Builder

One cannot know the story of Florida without knowing the story of one Henry Morrison Flagler who, in “retirement,” changed the face of the state’s tourist identity. Flagler had been visiting Florida in the winter since 1876, but it was during the winter of 1883-84 that he ventured into St. Augustine:

Arriving in the ‘Ancient City,’ Flagler found a sleepy, almost dilapidated town of about 2,500 inhabitants. While he was charmed with the climate and beauty of the old place, he found the hotel facilities quite inferior to the accommodations he and his circle of friends were accustomed to in northern cities. - Speedway to the Sunshine, Seth H. Bramson, The Boston Mills Press 1984

Flagler recognized the potential for creating an “American Riviera” along the east coast of the Sunshine State, but this would mean building hotels and resorts. These, of course, would be useless without a means of getting there. In 1885 Flagler bought the assets of the Jacksonville, St. Augustine & Halifax River Railway. In 1895 the name was changed to the Florida East Coast Railway; and in April, 1896, the railroad was extended into what was incorporated three months later as the city of Miami. All the while, he built and/or acquired hotels and resorts, many of which are still famous: The Ponce de León Hotel, the Royal Poinciana Hotel, and the Palm Beach Inn (later renamed the “Breakers”).

Like many magnates of his day, Flagler had his own share of overreach embodied by the Key West Extension, also known as the railroad that went to sea, which was completed one hundred years ago this year, in 1912; Flagler would die the following year.

Florida’s never ending boom and bust cycles

The decade after Flagler’s demise was one of (mostly) prosperity. The nation as a whole reveled in the post war euphoria, and the Florida land boom certainly did not hurt the fortunes of the railroad. By 1926 the entire railroad had been double tracked, and numerous other physical improvements had been engineered and installed. Traffic to South Florida was so intense the Seaboard Air Line established its own route to Miami, completed in 1927. Even so, what goes up eventually does come back down.

A massive hurricane in September, 1926 destroyed 60 miles of coastline, leaving 220 dead, over 6000 injured, and basically ending the land boom. The malaise of the Great Depression gripped the FEC, and the hurricane of Labor Day, 1935 wiped out the Key West Extension. The FEC had already been in receivership since 1931. In 1941 the FEC went from “receivership” to “reorganization,” slipping control from the Flagler heirs to the du Pont family.

The traffic increase of World War II did help the FEC’s fortunes. Since its chief rival had its own line to Miami, the Atlantic Coast Line’s bonds with the FEC became stronger. As the FEC became the ACL’s gateway to “America’s Playground,” the ACL moved to acquire the FEC in 1944. The ACL and the du Pont family never could see eye-to-eye, and the FEC became a holding of the St. Joe Paper Company, a Florida company which was a subsidiary of the du Pont estate.

A strike in 1963 by the clerk’s union spiraled into the loss of all union positions at the FEC. As a result, the FEC became the first railroad in the nation to have two-man operating crews and extended crew districts, something the rest of the industry would not have for two more decades.

In more recent years, the FEC was acquired by Fortress Investment Group in 2007, which also owns RailAmerica, a short line holding company. RailAmerica’s headquarters was moved to the same building in Jacksonville as the FEC; but the companies are independent. The recent slowdown in the construction industry has had a negative impact on the quarries of South Florida, once a large source of revenue for the railroad.

As anyone here in Florida can attest to, when times are good they are VERY good. But when times are bad, well, hang around here long enough and the practice of tightening one’s belt becomes second nature. The FEC knows this practice only too well.

Florida FOX

In our essay of September of last year, This Week at Amtrak documented the history of Florida’s forays into fast trains. Perhaps the most eye-catching of these iterations was the Florida Overland eXpress proposed in 1996. What was suggested then, and continues to be suggested, was a highway-railway such that the fast train would closely parallel the extant rights-of-way of major highways. For example, the latest surge was the Tampa-to-Orlando section which would have been built on the existing property of Interstate 4.

The Orlando-to-Miami section had two possible routings: Following the Florida Turnpike, or cutting East and aligning with Interstate 95. All of these latest iterations, known as Florida High-Speed Rail, went back on the shelf in early 2011.

Gene is the Man

To say that Eugene Skoropowski is no stranger to passenger trains would be a gross understatement. For this reason alone, the following news flash gained our undivided attention:

The Florida East Coast Railway has announced that it has appointed Eugene Skoropowski to senior vice president of passenger rail development. Skoropowski will report to Jim Hertwig, FEC president and CEO, and will be based out of Orlando, Florida. He will assist in the anticipated development of passenger service over the FEC between Jacksonville and Miami, which has been under consideration for several years.

Skoropowski is well known in the railroad industry for his successful management of California’s Capitol Corridor passenger rail service in partnership with Amtrak, the state of California, and Union Pacific. The 170-mile route has become the fastest growing intercity passenger route in the country. He spent the last two years as a rail consultant with international engineering firm HNTB. He has also served as director of rail projects at Fluor Corp., where he worked on passenger rail developments in Florida, Montreal, Paris, London and Amsterdam. - Trains.com, the online news page for Trains Magazine, March 5, 2012

There is one other salient qualification not mentioned in the Trains résumé: Mr. Skoropowski was the project director for the Florida Overland eXpress in 1996. Suffice it to say he has a very firm grasp of the landscape here.

What exactly the FEC has in mind should become clear in the following weeks and months, but we do get an idea from its press release:

The All Aboard Florida passenger rail project will connect South Florida to Orlando through a 240-mile route combining 200 miles of existing tracks between Miami and Cocoa and the creation of 40 miles of new track to complete the route to Orlando. - Florida East Coast Industries, Inc.

Between Cocoa and Orlando is State Road 528, which is also known as the “Bee Line” and is mostly a toll-road. This is the right-of-way which would have been utilized for the I-95 variant of the FOX. It is not much of an exercise of the imagination to see I-95 replaced with the FEC. It is also likely that the intended terminus would be Orlando International Airport, the same as FOX and later plans. There may be a current Environmental Impact Statement still in place for this option. If SR 528 is not part of the plan, then there is at least one other uninterrupted right-of-way between the Orlando and the East Coast.

Improved intrastate rail service has been on the wish list since at least 1982. With plans and revisions of plans came the nagging question: Who will pay for this? The use of public monies has been tried repeatedly, and has failed just as many times. The FEC is betting that private capital can be raised and used in conjunction with existing infrastructure to accomplish what three decades of public policy could not. The potential payoff is very real; currently over 50 million people traverse between Central and South Florida every year.

Missing, along with the public dollar, is another phantasm of political railroading: There is no reference to High-Speed Rail. The projected travel time for Orlando to South Florida is approximately three hours. This is exactly the type of high-performance rail transportation which could find its niche in the transportation market. Most important is the following railroad rule number one:

PROTECT EXISTING FREIGHT CAPACITY--the new passenger service will not affect freight capacity in the rail corridor, thereby supporting Florida’s role in international commerce and allowing more intermodal freight movements. - Florida East Coast Industries, Inc.

With the current dredging and rail access restoration at the Port of Miami, the freight channels must be kept clear. By the FEC taking the initiative and overseeing the entire operation, passenger and freight, they can make such guarantees.

For its entire life, the Florida East Coast Railway has had to fight for its life. Even when things seemed at their bleakest, it has found a way to make it through as an independent entity. It was Henry Flagler’s vision to open up the East Coast to tourism and industry. His successors are closely following in his footsteps. Hopefully the FEC will once again show the way for the rest of the industry.

Related articles

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• Local Business Plans Miami-Orlando Train Line (miami.cbslocal.com)
• Treasure Coast train stations on hold until railway service agreements are finalized (tcpalm.com)
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This Week at Amtrak

Image by Jordi Gomara (itaca2000) via FlickrFrom the United Rail Passenger Alliance:

This Week at Amtrak, Vol. 8, No. 16
Volume 8, Number 16

From the Editors…

Now that the passenger rail future of Florida is coming into focus, This Week reviews how we got here.

A Tale of Two Rails

“High-Speed Rail-you didn’t let that stop you…Central Florida got its act together and look at what is happening–SunRail is coming.” - U.S. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood at the groundbreaking for SunRail, July 18, 2011

As most of our readers are aware, everyone involved in producing This Week at Amtrak has an inextricable link to the Sunshine State. Obviously, the passenger railroading world does not revolve around Florida. Even so, in a place where our usual entertainment is either watching one of our fellow citizens defend himself in court or watching the foreigners attempt to navigate our roads, our rail on-goings are a welcome change. In just the last year, two projects have been run through the meat grinder known as the court of public opinion. The final outcomes could not have been any different. Up until now, we at This Week have been loathe to mention SunRail and Florida HSR in the same sentence due to the mass perception that a rail is a rail. Therefore, yet again we beg the indulgence of our readers, as we take This Week back home for one more issue. The time has come to make the difference profoundly clear.

A “FOX” By Any Other Name

Florida had been seriously talking about linking some of our largest cities with high-speed trains since the energy crisis of 1973. In April 1982, Florida established a High-Speed Rail Committee to investigate the potential of HSR in the State. At the time, elected officials firmly believed such improvements would be funded by private investment; yet even, then many questions were raised:

“Are sufficient transit infrastructures available (or planned) to feed the rail system? Would tourists, many of whom now come in by car from out of State, switch modes once in Florida? Could other tourists be induced to ride the train with the current cost, service, and convenience factors provided by competing modes? Would private capital be sufficient to cover a project of that magnitude? Are there transportation alternatives that might better meet the State’s needs?” - U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-STI-222, December 1983).

It was not until the following decade that all of these efforts crystallized into the initiative to be known as the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX):

“Introducing the FOX…a fully integrated 21st century, high speed travel system combining proven European TGV train technology with American engineering, management, and construction expertise to provide Florida with a safe, reliable and environmentally sensitive world class transportation system.” - Florida Overland eXpress brochure , 21st Century Travel, May 1996

The undertaking was as grand as the times we were living in. Truth be told, the 1990s were a great time to be alive. The Northeast was in line to get high-speed trains, and it was believed Florida would come in second in this friendly race, which was more than acceptable, since we were starting from scratch.

“Florida Overland eXpress - Initial and Projected Future Routes

Our initial route responds to the State’s request and will provide service between Miami and Orlando and between Orlando and Tampa. FOX service may eventually be extended into Fort Lauderdale, downtown Orlando, and St. Petersburg. After the main portion of the system is underway, service may also be extended to Jacksonville and then to other parts of Florida.” - Florida Overland eXpress brochure, Executive Summary, May 1996

With the State of Florida continuing to grow with no abatement in sight, it seemed only natural to enhance State infrastructure to meet future demands. The initial and future route regimen was simple and attainable; and then politics intervened. Within two years, the proposed route map exploded with high-speed routes running amok through every corner of the state. This phantasm along with its bloated price tag was mercifully put out of its misery by then-Governor Bush before the end of 1998, yet this was by no means the end.

What transpired over the next 10 years is what we here refer to as “high-end entertainment.” In 2000, the voting public approved an amendment to State constitution, mandating the establishment of a system of high-speed trains. The Florida High Speed Rail Authority (HSRA) was created the following year. Although State funds for HSRA were vetoed by the Governor, Federal funds kept it afloat; efforts in planning a system continued. In 2004, the voting public approved a repeal of the high-speed train amendment, but the HSRA continued to meet, and completed the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the route between Tampa and Orlando. Ah, but now there was no more funding, and it seemed all for naught; yet, this is Florida, after all, and nothing is ever as it seems.

In 2009, the clarion call went out all over the land for High-Speed Rail. This call was answered in many corners of the country, but ultimately only two of the responses were close to plausible: California, which had its own long history of pursuing HSR; and Florida, which had its own EIS. As a result, Florida became the front runner for establishing, for the first time in the Western Hemisphere, a true high-speed railroad; even if it was only to be 84 miles long. The overall usability of the line was not the point, but rather the establishment of the ground rules for further HSR around the country.

Unfortunately, this was no longer the 1990s. Those halcyon days were long past, and the pale of a new era was only beginning to be understood by the masses. Florida, especially, was coming to grips with this new era. The 20-year boom era of about 1985 to 2005 had given way to bust and freefall. Most insidious of the boom days were the final few years, where real estate values skyrocketed on speculation, and home builders built houses for buyers who did not yet exist, but who they were sure would come. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it was plain that the prospective buyers were not coming. Millions of dollars of new building would remain vacant or sell dirt cheap. The last thing the citizenry wanted to hear about was some fancy new fast train that might put it on the hook financially for some indefinite period of time. Hunger will have that kind of affect on people. Consequently, the project went back on the shelf in 2011.

It may sound duplicitous, but the writers were in favor of the FOX back in the 1990s. It was a good idea. It was something we could afford…at the time. Was it perfect? No. It did not serve the downtown areas of the cities it was meant to connect, but the hope was that it could, someday. The Florida HSR of 2009 followed the same basic idea. Why not support it now? There was absolutely no guarantee the monies would ever be available to connect into downtown, let alone extend to South Florida. Although the landscape looks familiar, the reality is that we are in a very different place now. With these changes come shifts in priorities, if not a shift in paradigm. We most certainly have gone from thriving to survival mode, and it looks like we will be here for the duration.

Here Comes the Sun [Rail]

As early as 1989, the possibility of commuter rail had been deliberated in Central Florida. Tri-Rail had begun operation two years earlier, and one proposal was to extend Tri-Rail from South Florida to Tampa and Orlando as a way to connect the state. Soon enough, Tri-Rail was experiencing its own tribulations; thus Central Florida would be on its own, and so was formed the Central Florida Commuter Rail Authority (CFCRA).

In 1992, the CFCRA released its Project Feasibility Report which was all-inclusive of various forms of transit including light rail, commuter rail, and an increased number of buses to facilitate travel in and around the greater Orlando area. The commuter rail component received Federal authorization in 1998 as part of the Central Florida Rail System in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). In 2000, the light-rail portion was scrapped. In 2006 the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) and CSX, the owner of the existing track in Orlando, agreed on the purchase of 61.5 miles of track between DeLand and Poinciana. For $432 million, the State gets the right-of-way, and pays CSX to increase capacity on the parallel freight line through Ocala for the anticipated traffic which will now bypass Orlando.

Perhaps it was ignorance; perhaps it was an attempt to curry favor. For whatever reason, FDOT committed a huge blunder in 2008 when it entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Amtrak regarding maintenance of commuter trains at its Sanford Auto Train facility. This would come around to bite FDOT almost two years later.

With the track through Orlando to become property of a State entity, liability for an accident would now be similar to that of any other public-owned conveyance: Limited. Such capped liability would also extend to CSX and the few freight trains that would be left. This did not sit well with many, and CSX ultimately agreed to shoulder “some of the cost of the state purchasing a liability policy. We wanted to help with them buying the type of policy they would need” and “we’re doing a similar thing up in Massachusetts where there were similar concerns about the liability issue. As a matter of fact, what we’re doing in Massachusetts and Florida is identical.” - interview with CSX CEO Mike Ward, Florida Times-Union, December 16, 2009

It did seem the whole thing might come to naught in 2009. The Great Recession hit central Florida rather hard, and many questioned the wisdom of spending scarce State cash on trains. Through two sessions of the State Senate, funding for commuter rail, now known as SunRail, was not forthcoming. But remember, this is Florida and nothing is ever as it seems. For the first and last time, an overt tie was made between commuter rail and high-speed rail. The Feds told the State that if the millions of dollars made available for commuter trains were not claimed, then the State could forget the billions of dollars made available for HSR. In an amazing turnaround, the State Senate met in a special session and passed the SunRail legislation.

Since its inception in 1971, Amtrak has carried it own indemnification for its operations over the tracks of other railroads. Even if Amtrak experienced an accident that was completely the fault of the host railroad, Amtrak would still be responsible for settlement. So it was something of a shock (even for those of us in Florida) when Amtrak claimed, in January of 2010, that FDOT was in violation of their MOU. Despite carrying its own indemnification, it pushed for an arrangement similar to that of CSX. For whatever reason, Amtrak believed it had a stake in the game because of a 1999 agreement with CSX regarding the long-distance passenger trains that run through what was to become State-owned property. Amtrak was deluded enough to believe it held the authority to scuttle the deal. At best, if Amtrak did not wish to recognize State ownership, at jeopardy were the two long-distance trains and the Auto Train which runs North out of Sanford. This was tantamount to sticking a gun to one’s own head and demanding “Do as I say or I’ll shoot.”

It took almost all year, but in December of 2010 Amtrak dropped its opposition to SunRail following an hour-long meeting in the office of U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, with soon-to-be-Chairman of the Transportation Committee, Florida’s own U.S. Representative John Mica, in attendance. Following this calibration, Amtrak issued a statement saying it had “long supported the SunRail project.” Hopefully, going forward, FDOT and SunRail will appreciate that they had best do without Amtrak’s support.

Of course, the rest is history. On January 28, 2011, newly-elected Governor Rick Scott put SunRail on hold in order to review the project. On February 26, 2011, he cancelled Florida HSR, citing concerns over possible future operating costs. Then came July 1, 2011, and the official go-ahead for SunRail followed by the official “ground breaking” on the property of Florida Hospital. The caterers expected 300 to attend, but there were at least 400. There was one protester, who did succeed in attaining his fifteen minutes of fame.

Many pundits believed the Governor would ax SunRail, since in their eyes all rails are created equal. State supporters of HSR mounted rallies and campaigns to stop SunRail. (Most people did not notice, since the airways were saturated with the trial of one of our denizens who was found guilty of parental antipathy which, as it turns out, is not a crime.) Five days before the governor’s decision, what can only be described as an embarrassment of journalism proffered by a will-write-for-food reporter appeared in the New York Times. Although starting off with “Here in sun-parched Central Florida,” the author obviously had no clue what Floridians are really about, as evidenced by describing SunRail in these terms: “It will not link to the Orlando airport or Disney World, among the region’s biggest traffic generators.” This is a slap in the face to those of us who actually live here, and the Grey Lady owes us an apology for printing such tripe.

SunRail is not purposed for the tourists, but rather for the locals. The New York Times made no mention of Florida Hospital or Orlando Regional Medical Center, two of the biggest employers and traffic generators in the City of Orlando. Their master plans; not their plans for future development, but their actual master plans as filed to the governments per State law; are contingent on SunRail. For example, a Florida Hospital station is to be provided by Florida Hospital according to its master plan, and Florida Hospital has already provided the infrastructure for it. During the ground breaking, the hospital announced the impending construction of a new administration building to be sited next to the future station site. This is a case where it will not be feasible to just deny the commuter train and build a road, instead. The whole "Medical City" concept will have to be reconsidered, with much of it already in the ground.

Unfortunately, with all this “rail” talk, the lines blurred. Most media outlets cannot tell the difference, with one even referring to “high-speed commuter rail.” Florida HSR did do some good in that it prompted enough elected non-stake holders outside the Orlando area to vote in favor of SunRail. Ultimately, Florida HSR failed because it was the purview of out-of-state interests who, once it served its purpose of setting the new standards for domestic HSR, could easily walk away, leaving it to the locals. The questions raised nearly 30 years earlier are still pertinent and remain inadequately answered. SunRail succeeded because it is from the locals. Local stakeholders understand it will have cascading benefits on other local interests such as engineering and construction companies, all of which are eager for work in our recession-ravaged state. The locals also understand that this is their baby, for which they will be responsible. Yes, Mr. Secretary, we did get our act together. SunRail is (finally) happening.

This Week in Amtrak

Image by 棟樑‧Harry‧黃基峰‧Taiwan via Flickr

This Week at Amtrak Vol. 8 No. 5
From the Editors…

This week a post-mortem of Florida’s latest foray into High-Speed Rail.

There was no Plan B

Oh I used to be disgusted… and now I try to be amused. - Elvis Costello

On February 16, Florida's Governor Rick Scott announced that the State of Florida would not move forward with the Federal plans to build a high-speed railway between Tampa and Orlando International Airport. Similar announcements had already been made in Wisconsin and Ohio earlier this year. So what is the big deal?

Well, if one were to believe the political rhetoric that has been fired across the bow since then, one might come to the conclusion the governor has cancelled every holiday on the calendar and shot everyone’s favorite pet. The U.S. Transportation Secretary, Ray LaHood, extended the deadline for accepting the Federal monies, $2.4 billion, so as to give the state just one more last chance. On March 1, two State senators filed suit in the Florida Supreme Court, as citizens, not on behalf of the Senate, to order the governor to take the money. Right about now, Governor Scott is probably wondering if he should have stayed in his native American Midwest. Nevertheless the answer is still “no.” So what is the big deal?

The U.S. Department of Transportation was willing to let go of projects in Ohio and Wisconsin that were not really high-speed rail, but rather state-of-the-art conventional trains running at conventional speeds on improved conventional track. The HSR label was only added to offer the illusion of progress to sell this imperious immediacy of interest. However, as they were not true HSR they were expendable. The sum total of rejected Federal monies was less than half of the ultimate total offered to Florida, and was quickly dispersed to other states. Florida, it would seem, is an entirely different story.

“You recall unpleasant memories: of hours wasted in slow moving traffic; of disquieted children in the backseat of your car; of rushing to the airport to discover your flight canceled; of missing important business appointments; and of the hassles involved in moving around this great state. Those difficult days, though, remind you how fortunate you are to live in a state where logic prevailed in the mid 1990s. Relaxing into your plush, expansive seat, you sigh contentedly when an attendant brings your drink. Just before you doze off, lulled into a peace-filled rest by the train’s near-silent motion, you briefly wonder, ‘Who made all this possible?’” - Opening statement from the Florida Overland eXpress Executive Summary, 1996.

Fifteen years ago, the vision was crystal clear; a fast train connecting three of Florida’s largest metro areas in comfort and style. The planning was solid but the money was scarce, and the whole thing seemed to come to naught in 1999. Then in 2000, an amendment to the State Constitution was approved by Florida voters, and in 2001 the State Legislature enacted the Florida High Speed Rail Authority Act; however, in 2004 Florida voters repealed the 2000 amendment, citing the expense of such a project.

To say there are a tenacious few who continue to keep the flame alive for fast trains in the Sunshine State would be an understatement. Five years after the voting public made their opinion clear, a Federal initiative sought to overrule local sentiments. With a seemingly ever- larger flow of Federal monies, a scheme was hatched to invest $2.4 billion in just the 84-mile Tampa-Orlando leg of the system under the auspices of building a national network of fast trains. There was no referendum, there was no ballot initiative; just an imperious immediacy of interest from Washington, D.C. With the nation in general and the State of Florida in particular suffering the ravages of hard economic times, any infusion of cash -- from any source -- seemed like a godsend. And with other trains on the national drawing board, Florida did not feel alone. But once again there was one rather large string attached: The potential large outlay of local funds. For this reason, the governor cancelled the project. Once again money was a big deal.

High-speed trains are not evil. However, nowhere on earth do they operate in a vacuum. In France, the national railway operates everything from urban transportation to high-speed trains. While they operate around 14,000 trains every day, only a relative handful are high speed. For a high-speed train to be successful it needs feeders to connect to places where the riding public actually wants to go. As of right, now these types of networks do not exist in Central Florida.

In what may appear as a case of bitter grapes, a ridership report was released just after the project was cancelled. Picked up by various news outlets was the figure of “3.3 million annual riders” and “would have made money from Day One.” This report was produced, for $1.3 million, by the firms of Steer Davies Gleave and Wilbur Smith Associates. In March 2010 Wilbur Smith Associates along with HNTB, in a joint partnership, were selected as program manager for passenger rail in the State of Florida. Moreover, the much-touted report was nothing more than five pages of numbers, with no justification for how those figures were compiled. The reader may read into this with impunity.

The initial route of 84 miles was chosen in large part due to the relative low cost of building, possibly $3 billion if one includes moderate overruns; however, connecting Central Florida with Central Florida now seems like an oxymoron. This fact was not lost on a recent article by Michael Cooper in the New York Times, “Tampa and Orlando are only 84 miles apart, generally considered too close for high-speed rail to make sense. The train trip, with many stops along the way, would have shaved only around a half-hour off the drive. Since there are no commercial flights between the two cities, the new line would not have lured away fliers or freed up landing slots at the busy airports.”

Ultimately the fast train in Central Florida would have been of little to no practical use for the everyday traveler. It would have missed all of the town centers on its route, thus would not have been a catalyst for urban development or renewal. A state-of-the-art conventional train on improved extant tracks would pass through the historic town centers, would be a catalyst for development, and should cost less than a third of the now-defunct fast train. But without the “HSR” label, it is not sexy enough for consideration by those who worry about their legacy.

In retrospect, perhaps the Orlando to Miami leg of the plan should have been considered first. At 240 miles, just over two and a half times the length of Tampa-Orlando, it certainly would have cost over two and a half times as much; however, connecting Central Florida with South Florida does make sense both politically as well as financially, and it certainly would be much less expensive than the postulated $42 billion price tag for the full build-out proposed in California.

With Florida now officially out of the high-speed rail business, attention turns to California and the building of America’s first true high-speed train between the metropolises of Fresno and Bakersfield. Instead of Central Florida it will be left to the Central Valley to iron out specifications, codes, analyses, and operating procedures for all American fast trains to follow. This is probably not what the administration envisioned as the next great leap in transportation for the country.

Ultimately the administration placed all its bets on Central Florida in the belief that everyone was on the same page; that everyone believed in the concept of high-speed rail. In doing so, they never contemplated what to do if everyone was not on the same page. In short, they had no plan B. If connecting Central Florida with Central Florida seemed obtuse, then what would connecting the 35th- and 58th- largest cities in the nation seem like?

For now, those passionate purveyors of fast trains in Florida must once again close their plan books and return them to their shelves. Again, they will have to wait for the day when someone whisking along at over 150 mph will ask, “Who made all this possible?” Perhaps someday, but not today.

This Week in Amtrak

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From the Editors…

Beware the ides of… February? This week a brief of some current events.

Just How Much is that Wild Goose?

“A billion here, a billion there, pretty soon it adds up to real money.”- Senator Everett Dirksen

Just how many names can one give to a hole in the ground? What does one name a hole that does not really exist? This particular hole, meant to connect suburban New Jersey with New York City, has had many names and titles. A decade and half ago, it was known as the “Trans-Hudson Express Tunnel” (THE Tunnel) or, deridingly, as the “tunnel to Macy’s basement.” Later known as “Access to the Region's Core,” (ARC) ground was officially broken in June of 2009. On October 27, 2010, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie (New Jersey being the only state officially participating in this project) gave it a new name: Dead. Concerned that the $8.7 billion undertaking would spiral to Big Dig proportions, the governor decided the price was too rich for New Jersey’s blood. There were meetings and more meetings between Trenton and Washington, but despite Federal demand for payback of $271 million, the project was axed once and for all… or so it seemed.

On February 6, 2011, a new player, Amtrak, rode into town along with U.S. Senate representation from New Jersey. Together, they announced a new scheme to build, and a new name: The “Gateway Tunnel.” They intend to spend $50 million for more design and engineering work, with a potential cost of $13.5 billion for completion. (It would appear Governor Christie’s concerns over costs were more than prescient.)

Two days earlier, the City of New York contracted with Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc. to (quickly) study the feasibility of extending the No. 7 subway line west, under the Hudson River to NJ Transit’s station at Secaucus, New Jersey. Unlike the previous tunnel plans, this would allow riders transferring at Secaucus access to the West Side of Manhattan, Times Square, Grand Central Terminal, and Queens, without traversing an already-full Pennsylvania (Penn) Station.

Unlike the ARC, the Gateway Tunnel (actually two tunnels with one track each), proposed by Amtrak and friends, will not terminate north of Penn Station or Macy’s basement. Rather, it will run directly into Penn Station, adding to its already burgeoning passenger congestion. Currently, Penn Station handles a daily crush of some 600,000 persons. The existing century-old, twin single-track tubes handle a maximum of 23 trains per hour. It is expected the new Gateway Tunnel will allow for an additional 21 trains per hour. No source for this project's funding was cited.

Just two days later, on February 8, Vice President Joe Biden announced a new Administration initiative to spend $53 billion over the next six years on High-Speed Rail projects nationwide. The goal is to allow high-speed train access to 80 percent of the public within 25 years. Again, no source for the requisite funds was cited.

Not everyone is onboard with the immediacy of interest in “High-Speed Rail.” As has been reported in these pages before, many have advanced their political careers on “stop the train” platforms; therefore, it does not portend well that the two U.S. Representatives who declared this initiative “dead on arrival” are the House Transportation Committee Chairman and Railroads Subcommittee Chairman.

John Mica (R-Fla.) was his usual sanguine self in frankly appraising this development: “This is like giving Bernie Madoff another chance at handling your investment portfolio.” Mica is none too happy about the previous $10 billion pledged for HSR, or about the involvement of the Federal Railway Administration (FRA) in the HSR corridor selection process; and is especially displeased with the continued interference of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation. “Amtrak hijacked 76 of the 78 projects, most of them costly, and some already rejected by State agencies,” said Mica. “Amtrak’s Soviet-style train system is not the way to provide modern and efficient passenger rail service.”

Bill Shuster (R-Penn.) also had his take on this latest HSR missive: “The Administration continues to fail in attracting private investment, capital, and the experience to properly develop and cost-effectively operate true high-speed rail.” … “Government won’t develop American high-speed rail. Private investment and a competitive market will.”

To date, $271 million has already been spent. This includes $26.3 million for property acquisition in New Jersey for what was the ARC project; and $50 million has been proposed for more study of “ARC-lite.” Of the $10 billion pledged for “High-Speed Rail,” at least $1 billion has already been spent. To keep this all in perspective, Amtrak currently has on-order 70 new railcars for Eastern trains at approximately $2.3 million per each. The $1.321 billion already spent and proposed could have purchased over 500 of these railcars, expanding Amtrak's existing fleet by one-third. The problem with a wild goose chase is that regardless of the amount of money or resources expended, one still may not wind up with the goose.

An “E-Ticket Ride” to Fantasyland

Lathen, a small city of some 11,000+ souls (in 2009), may not ring a bell in the minds of those from outside the Emsland district in Lower Saxony, Germany. Yet, Lathen boasts what may be considered the world's fastest form of overland transportation. This is where ThyssenKrupp's Transrapid Maglev test track extends over 30 kilometers. If one is interested in buying one’s very own maglev transportation system, then Lathen is the place to visit. The test track was built to devise, test, improve and (most importantly) sell the concept of maglev; nothing more, nothing less. It does not see active scheduled service for the general public to ride.

The team members involved in writing, editing, and publishing this newsletter are all current or former residents of the State of Florida. As such, we have been watching intently the now almost-daily developments, with the latest incarnation of fast trains here being Florida High-Speed Rail. On February 16, newly-elected governor Rick Scott officially turned down $2.4 billion in Federal funds earmarked for the initial east-west, Tampa-Orlando route (roughly 80 miles). His reasoning for doing so included projected cost overruns and questionable ridership/revenue projections. This has become quite the firestorm in Tallahassee, and may rage for some time to come.

Governor Scott was not the only one questioning the validity of this project. At this year’s Southwest Rail Conference, one presenter succinctly pointed out that American HSR supporters were “attempting to have their icing without bothering to bake the cake.” Specifically he added, “Florida needs to mature its HSR plans.” Transporting tourists from theme parks to the beaches on the Gulf of Mexico is not a mature reason for building HSR.

When the go-ahead for High-Speed Rail projects came early last year, it was like popping the cork on a bottle of long-fermenting ideas. For Florida, it was a matter of dusting off the plans for the stillborn Florida Overland eXpress of 1996. When proponents for Florida HSR were questioned about the validity of this endeavor, the answer was curt and simple: The state already owns the right-of-way, and the environmental impact studies are complete. It is true that both of these prerequisites are a major hurdle for any project; still, is it not odd that public benefit was not one of the top two reasons for building?

Would Tampa-Orlando HSR be of anymore use to riders than the test track in Lathen? The simple reality is: No. It was not, nor was it ever meant to be, a serious contender for moving residents about the Sunshine State. As much as Lathen proved the workability of maglev, so too would Florida HSR be merely a vehicle to test and prove the feasibility of High-Speed trains in America. Every nation that has ventured into the HSR arena has had to develop its own system, with its own parameters to suit that nation's specific needs and conditions. The United States will be no different. Those involved with Florida HSR have been in talks with the FRA about requirements for vehicles traveling at hitherto-unseen speeds. As State Senator Paula Dockery said, “This was going to be a model for the nation.”

Numerous potential companies and consortia of companies have been eagerly awaiting the expected payout to develop all the systems for such a project. Now that it appears Florida HSR has been scrubbed, those would-be builders are scrambling. Without Florida, where else will they “beta test” their product? Without Federal money, who will pay to develop new, or adapt existing, technology for use in America?

Had the Tampa-Orlando line been built, the technology would have been built, tested, redesigned, retested, ad nauseam until everything was ready for primetime; after which, maybe the second phase of Florida HSR, a north-south, Orlando-Miami route (roughly 230 miles), would have been built. Tampa-Orlando is, however, a bit of a misnomer. In reality, the Eastern terminus is not the city of Orlando, but rather the airport (which bears its name, but is nowhere near Orlando). The western end is not the beautifully-restored downtown Union Station, but rather a parking lot off the highway. The likelihood of drawing riders was about par with drawing bees with vinegar. No matter how technically successful this may have been, would the public tolerate the spending of billions more of public monies in order to go to Miami?

Universal Truths

Every project has to start somewhere; and someone has to pay for it. Whereas private dollars may combine with public monies and actually build the line on State property between Tampa and Orlando, what about the future? When the champagne stops flowing and the confetti settles, there will still be a train to run. Will those private dollars still be there to fund its operation? When all is said and done, Florida HSR is nothing more than a novelty, a $2+ billion tourist attraction for foreign and domestic visitors to gawk at before moving on to the next attraction. Speaking as a resident this very expensive, publicly-funded tourist trap is the last thing we need here.

This Week in Amtrak

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From the Editors…
Something is turning 40, and oddly enough someone wants you to know about it. This and other more somber milestones are covered this week.

Of Time and (Wall) Space

If you are not already aware, Amtrak intends to make very sure you will be: On May 1, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC) -- yes, that is still Amtrak’s legal name -- will achieve 40 years of existence. According to its internal newsletter, Amtrak Ink, there are numerous outlets planned to observe this latest milestone. There will be a commemorative book for which Amtrak has already canvassed its employees for pictures. There will also be a video by “an Emmy award-winning producer.” Also, “Beech Grove is renovating surplus equipment and restoring one F-40, one P-40, three baggage cars, and an Amfleet food service car for a special 40th anniversary `museum train' that will travel across the country to many employee locations.” Since when has Amtrak had “surplus” equipment?

One thing is for certain, this year’s Amtrak wall calendar makes the pronouncement loud for all to hear: “AMTRAK CELEBRATES 40 YEARS OF SERVICE.” Superimposed over a map of the original route structure are over a dozen snapshots from those early years of “rainbow consists” and '70s fashion sense. The lovely Patty Saunders is captured in her go-go boots and early Amtrak uniform. The first Amtrak-painted locomotive is seen in a one-of-a-kind design of black with a wrap-a-round pointless-arrow logo. (Mercifully, that was not repeated.)

It is a wonder to contemplate the journey of the last four decades; yet, this wall hanging of 24 by 33 inches is quite the reminder of an uncertain era not that long ago. On the original system map, in the lower left corner of the montage, is the directive, “Service from Fort Worth to Houston will be shifted from Temple route to Dallas route as soon as possible after May 1, 1971.” Imagine, direct service between Houston and the Dallas-Ft. Worth metroplex. In the lower right of the map is seen the line and station stop for Wildwood, Florida. Just above that, between snapshots of the original Metroliner and a bedraggled Coast Starlight, is the line depicting the service we once enjoyed between Chicago and Florida. Today both of those are distant memories, as service to the Sunshine State has been continuously marginalized over 40 years. Was it something Florida said?

Perhaps most telling is the stylized logo all the way in the lower corner of the montage. As a depiction of motive power progress, five caricatures are arrayed from left to right, displayed in five different paint schemes. On the left is an Amtrak-painted GG-1 electric, internationally recognized as the finest example of electric traction ever to see service under wire. Designed by the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1934, the GG-1 fleet would serve her masters and successors until the 1980s. On the right of the lineup is depicted an Acela Express train, the antithesis of the GG-1.

On this calendar, Amtrak touts itself as “America’s Railroad,” but wait -- there is a picture used in the ad campaigns from its formative years, showing an employee (not a model) standing between the gauge of the rails, holding a large-scale replica of a passenger rail car. The tag line for the ad was the vow to “make the trains worth traveling again.” In 1971, the year the NRPC (now Amtrak) was created, the trains already were worth traveling. Crowds showed up to ride in the peak of summer, 1971; then again in winter, 1971-72. Amtrak did not have the wherewithal to keep up with such demand. When the railroads, in their original role as sole source contractors, did what they could to keep up, the pushback to stop doing that came from inside -- Amtrak! It was a downhill slide from there. After 40 years of false starts and unfulfilled promises, is it not time to hold Amtrak to its word?

In Memoriam

As we muddle our way through the winter season, we wish to pause for a moment to reflect on the lives of three men who, in their own separate ways, left their mark on American railroading:

Eugene K. Garfield worked for the Johnson Administration in the 1960s as Assistant to the Secretary of Transportation, Alan S. Boyd, in the then newly-minted U.S. Department of Transportation. It was during his tenure that a feasibility study for an auto-ferry service between the Northeast and Florida was conducted, and concluded that the service would be potentially profitable but best left for the private sector. After returning to the private sector in 1968, Garfield set about making that study a reality, and from 1971 to 1981 he ran the private Auto-Train Corporation. The original Auto-Train eventually succumbed to financial troubles and the infrastructure was purchased by Amtrak. Garfield died at the age of 74 on December 26, 2010, in Hollywood, Florida. Reflecting on his life reminds us that the entrepreneurial spirit in transportation in not dead, but merely dormant, in a generation that has been taught otherwise.

James A. (Jim) Boyd was a prolific railroad photographer and writer. Much more that just the average railfan, Boyd worked for the Electro-Motive Division of General Motors as a field service representative. In 1972, Boyd began his long association with Carstens Publications, eventually becoming editor of Railfan (later Railfan & Railroad) magazine from 1974 to 1998. Additionally, he authored many Trains magazine articles as well as dozens of books. Boyd brought a sense of discipline and decorum to the railfan ranks. His guiding influence will be sorely missed. Boyd died at the age of 69 on December 31, 2010, in Newton, New Jersey.

Robert G. (Bob) Lewis was that rare, perfect blend of knowledgeable railfan and professional railroader. Between 1934 and 1941 he worked for the Pennsylvania Railroad, and briefly for the Bessemer & Lake Erie. Following the war and a brief return to railroading, he joined the Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation. He worked in various editor positions for Railway Age magazine until 1956, when he was named Magazine Publisher. He retired in 1995, but maintained the title of Director of Special Projects. All through his professional travels, he had his camera with him, and amassed an impressive collection of photographs of America’s railroads.

Bob died at the age of 94 on January 5, 2011, in Ormond-by-the-Sea, Florida, but not before this author had the opportunity to meet him at the High-Speed Ground Transportation Association convention in 1996. Lewis was as congenial and approachable as anyone could be.

Later, as a result of merciless prodding by his former co-workers, a number of his photos were published in book form in Off the Beaten Track -- A railroader’s life in pictures (Simmons-Boardman, 2004). Having obtained a copy, this author made an appointment to stop by and garner an autograph. The welcome was warm and sincere. The meeting was as touching as it was informative. Lewis said the real reason behind starting the publication of International Railway Journal in 1961 was just to have an excuse to travel the world. We discussed the issues of the day including, of course, what to do about Amtrak.

With the completion of these distinguished runs the sun shines less brightly over the railway; reminding us of our own finite existence and the need to make our remaining days count. All too soon, the weeds will overgrow and obscure our tracks.

Stardards and Livable Communities

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In my last posting I referred to this article:

Confessions of a recovering engineer

One of the things you get out of the article is the problem with standards. Now standards are needed but there is many times that so called standards get in the way of providing livable, pedestrian and bicycle friendly communities.

A example of an organization sticking to its 'standards' and not paying attention to the big picture is down in Miami with FloridaDot and Brickell Avenue.

FDOT Continues to Play Pedestrian Russian Roulette on Brickell Avenue

Pedestrian Hit Near Brickell Avenue, Mayor Regalado and Commisioner Gimenez Support Ped-Friendly Streets; FDOT Still Says No

Brickell in the area in question is home to several high rises both office and residential but FDOT standards dictate that the street is designed to speed cars through the area thus putting pedestrians in danger by high speed automobiles in the area. A bus stop with a shelter has been taken out by speeding drivers on more than one occasion.

Brickell Avenue Bus Stop Gets Taken Out Again

It was pointed out a couple of times while I a was at Railvolution that the "black book" for traffic engineers goes against making streets more pedestrian and bicycle friendly.

We saw one example of that in the Portland suburb of Hillsboro. The Transit Oriented Development of Orenco is bisected by Cornell Road. While the road is essential at the present time to make the retail component of the complex successful, there was much controversy surrounding the road.

The traffic engineers wanted to make the road three lanes which of course equates to a very pedestrian hostile environment. After all, there is a direct correlation to the number lanes and the speeds along that stretch of road. After going back and forth the traffic engineers finally accepted two lanes in each direction with a center turn lane.

However, the speed limit is still 35mph (which few drivers observe), making it hostile for residents to get from the apartment, condo and MAX station across Cornell to the main retail component of the complex. In fact Cornell has become a barrier just like a freeway between to the two sides of the development.

The standards of traffic engineers are not the only ones that become a barrier to more effective transit development. While not written in law, the 'standards' fire departments become a hindrance to effective livable communities. There standards say that they should be able to turn around one of their fire trucks in the street.

At one time most fired departments had a variety of vehicles but due to escalating cost and limited tax income, fire departments have the most part standardized on one size of fire truck (although fire departments often times still have some specialized equipment). Standardization has lead to the standard truck being the largest size necessary so they have a large turn radius. This results in fire departments fighting more pedestrian friendly streets in order to have plenty of room to turn their large fire trucks.

There are more examples such as school districts and other government agencies that have policies that keep us from building more livable cities. We need to start changing these standards if we are going to have a chance at more livable communities.

Related articles

• The Florida State DOT vs. Livability (streetsblog.net)
• A Former Traffic Engineer on the Industry's Perverse Standards (streetsblog.net)

High Speed Rail

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Over the last two years since the election of President Obama, the big rage has been high speed rail. The administration has been very supportive of rail and has been pushing special funding for projects including ones in Florida and California. Even Utah Transit Authority joined a coalition that supports high speed rail in several western states.

However, after the recent elections several states that were on the fast track for rail improvements now have governors that are putting the breaks on those systems including Wisconsin and Ohio. In addition the ARC tunnel from New Jersey into Manhattan has been canceled by the new governor of New Jersey.

The question we have to ask is if these high speed rail projects are the best way to spend our money.

I am going to say that some of these projects just do not make that much sense. A perfect example is the project between Tampa and Orlando. As was mentioned in a previous issue of This Week In Amtrak, this route is only 81 miles. While the current Amtrak service is not that fast, you also have to take into consideration that the some of the current Amtrak route has severe speed restrictions.

It would cost substantially less to upgrade the existing rail line and provide additional trains in the market. Not only would the construction cost be substantially less but the cost to operate the system would be substantially less.

What many people do not take into consideration is the cost of maintaining the high speed network. While cost increases the higher the speed, the cost goes up exponentially once you reach the 110mph mark.

Wisconsin is another example of spending money for the sake of so called high speed rail. The proposal was to spend $800 millions dollars to build a line that would run at a maximum speed of 110mph. While some upgrade of tracks are needed especially near Madison where most of the tracks are relatively slow speed freight racks.

However, the question needs to be asked, would you see that much more ridership with the train operating at 79mph than you will at 110mph? For the relatively short distance of the route would the increase speed have enough increase in ridership to justify the increased cost of the speed increase?

Let me make it clear, I believe that rail service is and will be successful. California and Washington are two examples showing that rail passenger service can be a success. What I question is spending huge sums of money in areas that probably do not call for that kind of investment.

Look at the investment that California is looking to make in high speed rail. Could the money be more effectively used by upgrading the existing rail networks, getting rid of slow spots, fixing bottlenecks, removing dangerous grade crossings than investing in all new infrastructure?

However, I do see one spot where investment is needed in a new rail line and that is between the Los Angeles area and Bakersfield. Currently there is no viable rail route between the two cities. A new route would could not only benefit rail passenger service but could also benefit Union Pacific and BNSF by giving them an alternative to the only rail route south of Bakersfield through the Tehachapi area

I support an effective rail passenger system in the United States which we do not have right now. However, we need to walk before we can run and when it comes to rail passenger service we are not even crawling in the United States yet.

This Week in Amtrak

Image by jiadoldol via Flickr

Volume 7, Number 12


A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This week we look first at Amtrak’s slow pace, then at continued nationwide wrong-think surrounding Amtrak’s new venture into high speed rail; and we wrap up with a guest commentary by our Andrew C. Selden.

“In the unlikely event of a cabin depressurization, oxygen masks will appear overhead. Reach up and pull the mask closest to you, fully extending the plastic tubing, fasten the straps, and begin breathing normally… If you are seated next to a small child or someone needing assistance, secure your own mask first, then assist the child.”

— Airplane safety announcement

Consider a dramatization of the above starring Amtrak’s Joseph Boardman as the passenger, and network expansion as the child. Faced with the upcoming depressurization of its system through aging equipment, Amtrak is now in the process of securing its own mask with an equipment order. This is no little feat, but Congress still holds the strings. The mask isn’t even on yet, and as the air drains away, what are the prospects for the little form in the next seat?

Readers of This Week have had plenty to say about Amtrak’s progress, or lack thereof. Charles McMillan wrote:

I just finished reading your March 31st issue and I have just visited the two universities in Montana, Meeting with Faculty/Students/Staff and interested local citizens who want to see the restoration of the North Coast Hiawatha reinstated. In fact the consensus is to pretty much take the bull by the horns and get America back to the forefront of technology and world leadership in all areas of Science and Business. They are very adamant about this!

Their desire for Amtrak to get off of this NEC mentality and get a nation wide rail passenger system in place is unparalleled. They are disgusted with Joe Boardman and the attitude of the present board of directors in this regard, because they see no real growth on the part of Amtrak in the form of expanding routes around the country. They keep asking “how much growth in ridership can Amtrak realize just by operating their present routes without adding more trains,coaches or service”? “Can’t they (Amtrak) see that expansion is the key to real growth.” These are some of the thoughts of the general public and our Univesity system students.

We are continuing to garner support for this N.C.H. train all across the northwest including Minnesota.

Jerry Sullivan echoes a sentiment of frustration at,

Amtrak’s absolute refusal to restore the Sunset, or even a connecting train, to Florida. The only train I rode regularly was the Sunset prior to August 2005, and I have not been on a train since, except for excursions. Amtrak has become irrelevant; although I despise flying, Southwest Airlines is now my forced choice until Amtrak gets off their backside on the Sunset issue.

Until last year’s flawed Gulf Coast report is revisited and corrected, and until enough new — not just replacement — equipment is available, probably nothing will happen. Amtrak may be the only company whose product is desperately wanted by everyone but refuses to offer more of it.

As to markets and expansion, Christopher Parker noted, in reference to the speed comparison table:

[At that time,] top speeds were held by limiteds that were mostly overnight sleepers, a market [ceded] to the airlines… You should be comparing today’s trains to the stopping [all-stop local] trains of old. The other factor is we live in a more open and safety conscious world – routine disregard of speed limits is impossible now, as are top speeds over 79mph without automatic train-stop.

I wonder if railroads had the regulative freedom to run very fast if the fate of the passenger train would have turned out differently. Speed makes a huge difference in staying competitive. With some exceptions (IC), today’s top speeds aren’t much different.

True, after a number of accidents fifty years ago, legislation was passed that did limit train speeds. Modern safety devices warrant revisiting those speeds, as does the pending implementation of Positive Train Control, along with satellite, GPS, wireless technology, and computer control. There must be an equilibrium point of higher speeds versus construction and maintenance costs. How to implement a mixing of relatively high speed passenger trains in an era of double-stack containers and long unit coal trains is no easy task, but a worthwhile one. Mr. Parker suggests, that with good track and “cheap technology to detect open switches, dark territory should be good for 70-79 mph.”

And while railroads no longer have the monopoly on business travel, but European experience suggests there is plenty of market here for a slogan like “we are your rolling hotel.” A businessman at a conference in Phoenix could have a late dinner, board the midnight sleeper, and be in downtown Los Angeles by morning in plenty of time for a 9am meeting. Mr. Parker responds, “Let’s start by getting sleepers back on the [Washington-Boston] Night Owl or whatever they call it now.” Could not be repeated across the country?

Amtrak’s newest focus is on high speed rail. As yet they have little involvement in most of the pending projects, so let us see the fine mess they are getting into.

Over the last few weeks we have compared Wisconsin’s pragmatic expansion approach to Florida’s Bullet Train That Doesn’t Connect (Daniel Carleton, 23 March 2010). We will look at Colorado’s venture into high speed rail in a moment, but first consider the California high speed project, which started some years ago along the lines of the Florida fiasco. Each refinement, we are pleased to report, generally tended toward a more logical approach. Maglev was eliminated in favor of compatible steel-wheel technology, permitting shared rights-of-way and stations. Nevertheless, room for improvement still exists in the “Plays well with others” department:

In a letter dated 23 March 2010, the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) ask the California High Speed Rail Authority (CAHSRA) to please revisit and consider “a rational shared use option in the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment of the CAHSRA project… In November of 2009, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued its first High Speed Passenger Rail Safety Strategy which provides a strategy for the development of shared use corridors. We believe this safety strategy has direct applicability to” the L.A.-Anaheim corridor and they point out that “reports prepared by the CAHSRA staff and consultants did not contemplate any discussion of the rationalization of passenger services in the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment… [part of] the second busiest passenger rail corridor in the nation… we would like to make these services more coordinated and integrated.”

One could well read this as a formal, polite way of saying, “You’re doing it wrong,” and one does wish that high speed trains, where they are built in this country, integrate with local trains and transit as well as they do in Germany, for example. In Germany they have even figured out how to run a streetcar into a regular train station, where you might see one on the platform alongside an ICE high-speed train. If the Germans can master the engineering and those safety features to give easy cross-platform transfers, why can’t we?

Meanwhile at the northern end of that California corridor, the San Francisco Chronicle reported on April 3rd that Caltrain, facing “plummeting sales tax revenues and shrinking ridership” could be forced “to eliminate its midday, night and weekend service, and return to its roots as a commuter-only railroad.” Yet an article there the previous day noted of the new High Speed project, “New numbers put the price of the Anaheim-to-San Francisco segment alone at $42.6 billion.”

Why are we spending millions on high-speed rail studies to the detriment of existing services? Why are we further planning new trains that will hurt, instead of complement, the few successful ones we have spent decades building? Cannot even railroad people work together or has too many years of fighting the highway lobby fractured the passenger train industry?

Colorado is poised to make the same mistake. Railway Track and Structures on March 30th reported,

A study of possible high-speed, intercity rail for Colorado has found that lines between Fort Collins and Pueblo and between Denver International Airport and Eagle County have the best “operating and cost-benefit results” of the options evaluated… The full system carries a $21.1-billion price tag, but Harry Dale, chairman of the Rocky Mountain Rail Authority, which produced the study, said the rail system would probably be built in phases…

The feasibility study… took 18 months to complete and cost $1.4 million… “It might be 10 to 20 years before we actually build anything,” [Dale] said…

The study identifies a $3.32-billion rail segment from DIA to downtown Denver and then south to Colorado Springs as a likely first phase [,which Dale said] would not compete directly with [the] Regional Transportation District’s planned East Corridor commuter train that will link the airport and Denver’s Union Station.

“This [HSR] is not meant to be fare-subsidized,” Dale said of the proposed high-speed rail system. “Average speeds must be superior to travel by car, or nobody will ride. There have got to be time savings to make it worthwhile.”

Does it not matter that almost every new well-planned light-rail and regional-rail system in the West has met, exceeded, or far exceeded ridership expectations? Why spend money planning a second “high speed” system paralleling a regional train we haven’t even built yet? Why do we keep having to fight the superfast fallacy? Frequency, dependability, and the matrix of connections are what attract people to trains — not high speeds. Dr. Adrian Herzog’s Matrix Theory, despite being proven repeatedly, continues to be ignored.

— William Lindley, Scottsdale, Ariz.

p.s., Mr. Selden’s guest commentary follows.

Why Joseph Boardman Can’t Succeed
By Andrew Selden

Joe Boardman is a fine fellow, and an experienced rail administrator, but his tenure is doomed to be another failure as CEO of Amtrak, for the simple reason that his strategy for the company is to pour ever more capital and effort into the exact same business strategies and plans that have failed the company consistently for four decades. This is evidenced by Amtrak’s latest strategic “plan” released late this winter.

“Amtrak Planning” has come to be as much of an oxymoron as “Amtrak Accounting.” Key elements of the latest plan:

Upgrade interiors and add WiFi on Acela trains, with leather seats, new tray tables and improved at-seat power outlets.
NEC infrastructure enhancements such as a new Niantic River drawbridge in Connecticut, new power supply equipment for New York – Washington, new switches at Chicago Union Station, new car shops at Los Angeles, station renovation at Wilmington, Delaware, fire safety improvements in the Hudson River tunnels, car renovation at Beech Grove, NEC track and wire maintenance, etc.
Study its “poorest performing long-distance routes” to identify possible changes. These routes include the Sunset Limited, Eagle, Cardinal, Capitol Limited and California Zephyr. (No mention of chronically underperforming short routes.)
Expand state-funded short corridors.
Install PTC on Amtrak-owned track.
Increase security.
Replace large parts of the company’s locomotive and car fleet.
Now, this all sounds wonderful, and many observers leapt on the last item as proof that “Amtrak was home free and the Age of Aquarius was upon us.” No one paused to ask, “With the U.S. trillions of dollars in debt and piling on new debt just as fast as we can sell bonds to the Chinese, how is Amtrak going to pay for all this?”

Even worse, no one seemed to notice that Amtrak’s plans were nothing more than a reshuffle of the same tired 40-year-old business plan that has put Amtrak into a financial black hole. (Amtrak’s net loss worsened again last year, proving once again that the billions “invested” so far into the NEC, Acela, and all the other infrastructure projects has produced a negative rate of return on investment.) No one asked: “Based on 40 years of consistent failure and steadily worsening financial results, why should we continue pouring billions of new dollars of federal support down the same old black hole?”

This ultimately is why Mr. Boardman cannot succeed: recycling failed business strategies is not “planning.” Doubling the bet on a losing position is a poor strategy.

When Amtrak released its wish list of new engines and rolling stock in March, it took independent analysis by URPA professionals to point out that the “new fleet” strategy reflected a net shrinkage of lift capacity in the national system.

But, there may be a growing awareness inside Amtrak that they are missing out in their long distance markets. At an Amtrak conference in Chicago in March, some interesting ideas were surfaced. A URPA attendee reported:

“Amtrak made official their intent to restructure the Sunset and Texas Eagle routes by operating a daily Los Angeles-San Antonio-Chicago train with a connecting San Antonio-New Orleans train. Amtrak has divided their 15 long-distance trains into three groups of five. The five worst performers – including the Sunset and Eagle – will be addressed this year, the middle five in 2011, and the five best – such as the Empire Builder and Southwest Chief – will be tweaked beginning in 2010. The undesirability of tri-weekly service on any route was noted.

“Amtrak seems to be grasping – and willing to emphasize publicly – the importance of their long distance trains. One of the slides in a presentation : ‘Long Distance Trains are Fundamental to Amtrak’s Mission and Future.’ The slide’s charts showed that long distance trains provided 15 percent of Amtrak’s riders, but 24 percent of revenue, and 39 percent of Amtrak’s train miles but 46 percent of passenger miles.”

As promising as this is, it still fails to reflect any understanding of how explosive growth could be if Amtrak were to address two simple questions:

What would long distance ridership, passenger miles and revenue be if Amtrak actually added capacity to existing trains, especially in peak periods? Long distance capacity and available seat miles have been flat, if not down, for two decades. Since these trains run nearly full much of the year, no growth is even possible without added capacity.
What would long distance ridership, passenger miles and revenue be if Amtrak better interconnected its routes, so that its trains could serve hundreds of new origin-destination city pairs? Examples: extend a Missouri state corridor train to Omaha, to connect St. Louis, Kansas City and intermediate points to the Central Transcontinental Corridor – Denver, Salt Lake City, Reno, Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay area; or, drop a coach and sleeper from the Chief, at Barstow, to run over Tehachapi Pass to Bakersfield, connecting to a San Joaquin, linking the entire Southwest Transcontinental Corridor to the Central Valley and the San Francisco Bay area.
Even if one assumes that these new services perform no better than the known performance of the existing trains, these small increases in operations, by opening up many hundreds of new long distance city pairs, will triple output, and revenue. Now there is a capacity issue, and a growth strategy, all in one.



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