This Week at Amtrak

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From the United Rail Passenger Alliance:

This Week at Amtrak, Vol. 8 No. 15
Volume 8, Number 15

From the Editors…

As sands through the hourglass, so are the history and future of passenger rail in America; unrelenting.

The Year Is…

“[A]s we all know, events must run their course before becoming history, so that all true history exists only by virtue of its conclusion, and begins its historical career from there.” - Anthropologist Germaine Tillion

Contemporary thinking: The belief in that which is, has always been; ergo, shall always be. Any historian worth his or her salt knows that history does not repeat itself, but does rhyme. The way it is is not the way it has always been, nor can we expect things to remain the same perpetually. Only the most indolent of our citizenry is unaware of the rapidly shifting social order now dawning on the national landscape. Therefore, let us return to where we have been in an effort to determine where we are going.*

*This newsletter contains forward-looking statements within the discretion of the prognostic abilities of the writers. Our forward-looking statements involve expectations, projections, goals, forecasts, assumptions, history, and flat-out guesses. The writers may be spot-on or completely out to lunch. Whatever the case, our readers may rest assured we will be there to document it.

The Year Is 1970

Just 245 days after man landed on the moon, the California Zephyr completed its final run on March 22, 1970. The California Zephyr was considered to be the last word in overland travel in America; perhaps the finest conveyance in the world, but now it was gone after a mere 21-year run. For most Americans this was just a passing of the torch, no different from the demise of the stagecoach or the interstate canal network, for the year is 1970; the Interstate Highway System now makes possible national travel on your schedule. Gasoline is a national-average 36 cents per gallon ($2.09 in 2011 dollars). Jobs are plentiful and so are automobiles. The only real limiting factor of mobility is one’s endurance.

The long road to this reality has been told to the point of being hackneyed. Following World War II, the nation became flush with largess by virtue of its infrastructure remaining intact. Even though the national treasury was empty as a result of the conflict, billions of dollars were “invented” to send to Europe and Japan to rebuild their societies. As a result, those billions of dollars came back to the United States in the form of orders for the material and machines necessary to rebuild. The American worker was a benefactor of this circular cash, giving the average citizen a buying potential unheard of in previous generations. It was the Federal Government which became the primary beneficiary. All of this national income resulted in higher tax revenues, and politicians were more than eager to spend it. The American population was now on a much more level plane than at any other time in human history. With no end in sight to our newfound avarice, there came experiments in socialization. One of these was the Interstate Highway System. While this was pleasing to the American public, it was a millstone around the neck of the American railroads.

With billions of dollars going to highways and roads during the 1950s and 1960s, railroads politicked and lobbied for some sort of Federal aid. They rightfully eschewed nationalization, but did hope for some funds to invest as a counter to their subsidized competition. Any dreams of subtle aid were dashed on June 21, 1970 with the catastrophic bankruptcy of the Penn Central (Transportation Company). With the proverbial lid now blown off the true railroad condition, it became apparent to all that the situation was dire; no minor injection of public funds could rectify three decades of decline.

Even before the wreck of the Penn Central, another experiment in socialization had started public investment in the Northeast Corridor. In the early 1960s, the cause of improving passenger railroading in the Northeast was championed by Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell. He had no small plans:

“The encouraging news which I bring you today is that there is a strong current of opinion within our federal government that we should go forward with the kind of development which the railroads themselves have not been able to do…there is now a school of opinion that if we are to promote such a development at all, we should not be satisfied with half-way measures limited to existing technology.” – Railway Age, October 12, 1964

In keeping with the spirit of the times, the Senator sought to spend the national largess instead of answering the very basic question, Why are the railroads, themselves, not able to make such investment?

By 1970, millions of public dollars had been invested in the Northeast Corridor. With Penn Central now a financial basket case, the Federal Government saw its investment in jeopardy. As early as 1969 there was consideration inside the Beltway as to some Federal involvement in passenger railroading. With the true situation of America’s railroads now making headlines, efforts intensified, and President Nixon signed what was then known as the Railpax legislation into law on October 30, 1970. The main reason for doing so was to forestall any more Penn Centrals around the country. Railpax was renamed Amtrak, and began direct operation of a much-rationalized passenger rail network on May 1, 1971. But with other forms of nationalized socialism taking hold around the country, a little more would not hurt, right?

The Year Is 2011

Amtrak has been a reality for 40 years. If you do not believe it, just ask it: http://www.amtrak40th.com/. Amtrak has published a book, a video, and has even commissioned a train to publicize its four decades’ longevity. It has been no small task, and much blood, sweat, and tears have been shed in the process. Even so, there are many larger questions, vastly larger than Amtrak itself, now looming on the horizon.

The seemingly inexhaustible largess of the latter half of the 20th century is gone. The age of avarice is over; the era of austerity now grips us. The question of “The National Debt,” and exactly who is responsible for it, is now a subject for debate in every corner store and boardroom. Ultimately, this is all a referendum on what role government plays and what size it needs to be in order to fulfill that role. Everything is out on the table. It is only a matter of time before nationalized passenger rail is under the microscope.

Meanwhile, America’s real railroads are no longer financial basket cases. Quite the contrary; railroads are the very model of healthy business. Again, this did not come about without much blood, sweat, and tears. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 effectively ended a bloated regulatory bureaucracy that lasted about three decades beyond its actual usefulness. Moreover, through the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s, the railroads achieved a truce of sorts with their labor organizations, resulting in a drastically-rationalized workforce. Even so, railroads hold onto their traditional role of biding their time and never forgetting the path which brought them to where they are. Eminent veteran journalist Wes Vernon, when answering the question, Freight Rail: What Recession? notes:

“Highway congestion and skyrocketing gas prices strengthen the logic of converting highway-only freight traffic to intermodal. Of the 14 million domestic truckloads moving 550 miles or more each year within the eastern half of the United States, 35 percent-or 5.1 million-have shifted to the mix of rail and highway. That means about nine million truckloads are ripe for converting to intermodal…

“What that means, in practical terms, is that the trains will likely be shipping more consumer products, from appliances to toys. Heretofore, that had been largely the predominant province of the trucks, while the freight trains primarily focused on bulk commodities such as coal and grain.” - Railfan & Railroad, August 2011

The inherent efficiency of a railroad, the thermodynamic efficiency which propelled them to success from their genesis, is once again making them the transportation mode of the future. Unfortunately, such success always comes with its detractors. Special interest groups, specifically utilities reliant upon railroads for shipment of fuels, are actively looking to re-regulate railroads for their own financial relief. The utilities, who answer to multiple state or local agencies for the setting of consumer rates, believe it easier to mandate freight rates down from the Federal level rather than push politically-unpopular higher consumer rates at the local level. Such is the result of socialization of consumer electric rates. Thus far, the railroads have been able to resist such maneuvers to set them back to the era of needless burdensome regulation. But as the era of public cross-subsidization erodes, the search for new sources of subsidy will only intensify. The railroad re-regulation battle is barely out of round one.

Meanwhile, Amtrak touts the number of riders it attracts year over year. It is expected that Amtrak will carry over 30 million passengers in 2011. Gasoline has averaged $3.50 to over $4 per gallon so far this year; for all practical purposes, this is about double the inflation-corrected price of 1970. Even so, Amtrak is a socialized government animal which looks more for “rider-voters” than customers. Even during the days of Senator Pell it was appreciated that the high density population in the Northeast would make subsidizing passenger rail politically palatable. Consequently, Amtrak has concentrated more on achieving ever-higher numbers of rider-voters than it has on efficient business acumen.

Amtrak’s formula is very simple: High-density, short-haul/low-revenue corridor trains are touted as the solution for congestion; these attract the highest number of rider-voters/constituent-subsidy. The dilution of long-distance/high-revenue trains by lower-than-historical coach fares destroys any potential meaningful revenue, but is touted as the thread of a “national network.” If coach fares were raised in line with what it costs to operate them, and the number of high-revenue cars (sleeping cars) were increased, these trains would have a chance of at least breaking even. But sleepers carry fewer passengers than coaches, thus reducing the number of rider-voters. Also, if this happened, then these trains might be turned over to private operators, and Amtrak would lose its national constituency of rider-voters. Such is the mentality of a government agency, to wit: “We have to protect our phoney baloney jobs here, gentlemen!” Governor William J. Le Petomane – Blazing Saddles.

The Year Is 2020

It has been an arduous decade; transition from a guns and butter economy to a guns or butter economy is bittersweet, at best. The American experiment of socialization has ended. The United States was born in defiance of “taxation without representation.” The belief that taxes are a necessary evil defines the American ethos; they are evil nonetheless, and as such, should always be minimized. But the largess of the latter half of the 20th century was too tempting to pass by. When said largess ended, we attempted to fill the void by massive borrowing and hoping, praying for another round of national benevolence which never came. Now the bill has come due.

Life in 2020 is much like 1920, if not in form then certainly in function. The public does not travel as much or as far as during the “good times.” Due to expanding worldwide demand, the price of transportation fuel is now well over four times the rate of inflation. Efficiency is replacing convenience. The Interstate Highway System is being rationalized in the same manner as the railroads were during the 1970s and 1980s. Automobiles and airplanes are returning to their original positions, as toys for the genuinely rich. Just as the American public adapted to the era of cheap and abundant fuel, so they have adjusted to the era of expensive and scarce fuel seen during the early days of the Industrial Revolution. The technological salvation everyone was counting on did not pan out. Technology uses energy; it does not create energy.

It is no longer 1970. No one is trying to save the passenger train from the guilt of excess. It is no longer 2011. No one is trying to expand the passenger train solely on the basis of an imperious immediacy of political interest. Passenger rail has rebounded due to its inherent efficiency, and it is back in the hands of private industry. Thus, trains are running where they should be, and not where they cannot be justified.

Back to the Present

Saving the passenger train from the oblivion of low ridership is a battle that has been fought, won, and memorialized. Unfortunately, many passenger rail advocates are still fighting the battle to save the California Zephyr from the landscape of 1970. Yet even in today’s tight budget debates, no one of any authority is talking about discontinuing passenger trains. Quite to the contrary:

“It is time to deregulate America’s passenger rail system, and give intercity passenger rail the same opportunity for success that the freight rail and commercial truck industry have benefited from.

“We must look for more effective and innovative approaches to providing modern and efficient passenger rail service by focusing on projects that make sense, leveraging private sector investment, increasing competition, and opening the door to public-private partnerships.” – U.S. Representative Bill Shuster, Chairman of the Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee

It was not too long ago when the call to “reform Amtrak” could be heard around Washington. To those who prefer the status quo, the response was, “Define reform; what do you mean by reform?” Now the focus is shifting from reform toward an orderly dissolving of Amtrak.

For older or retired railroaders, Amtrak’s only reason for existence is an “irrational love of trains that would have us run almost empty trains over long distances simply so a foamer can stand out there and watch ‘em.” Perhaps such reasoning was justified four decades ago. Today it is well documented that those trains, especially those long distance trains, run full. They are sold out weeks before departure. This has not gone unnoticed by the private sector; higher demand means higher revenue potential. Higher revenue should translate into profitability or at the very least break-even. Amtrak, however, as a political animal focuses on “rider-voters” rather than passenger miles. Consequently, it has become the greatest of ironies that the passenger train, which was purported to be saved by Amtrak, now has to be saved from Amtrak.

Also, Amtrak has become an important conduit for tax dollars to flow into the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) pension system (of which all railroaders are members) instead of Social Security. Many of those currently employed by the railroads, as well as the retirees, fear that if Amtrak is fundamentally changed then an adverse effect on railroad retirement will occur. What is not realized is that any new passenger railroad venture established, which may augment or replace Amtrak service, will also have to be under the RRB; eventually making the system stronger, not weaker. There is also the possibility Congress may find another funding conduit for the RRB, other than through in-and-out entries in Amtrak’s corporate checkbook.

No, history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. The “good roads” crusades of the 1920s and Interstate Highway program of the 1950s happened after forgetting the lessons of the National Road debacle during the first half of the early 19th century. Now the lessons of railroad regulation/deregulation have been forgotten by many, and the results are negative.

What really is our rail future? It is not ours to see. But whatever happens, we will be writing about it.

This Week at Amtrak

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From the United Rail Passenger Alliance.

This Week at Amtrak, Vol. 8 No. 13
Volume 8, Number 13

From the Editors…

One cannot discuss Amtrak without at least a basic knowledge of the Northeast Corridor. What exactly is the NEC? In this first installment of a two-part series we examine the rise and fall of the NEC.

In the beginning

“While the mighty Pennsylvania boasted of having pushed its steel tentacles into some of the nation’s most populous cities, it could not make that claim with regard to New York City. Throughout the last years of the nineteenth century, the PRR struggled in vain to conquer the great natural barrier--the Hudson River--which lay between it and America’s largest metropolis.” - Michael Bezilla, Electric Traction on the Pennsylvania Railroad 1895-1968, Pennsylvania State University Press

To understand the United States, one must contemplate the challenges of those earliest days of the Republic. The two largest cities on the East coast, New York and Philadelphia, were a six-day journey by horse and boat for the founding fathers. Yet as early as 1811, Colonel John Stevens, the father of American railroading, petitioned the New Jersey Legislature to charter a railroad between Trenton and New Brunswick. His request was denied. His sons would build the storied Camden & Amboy Railroad in 1834 from a ferry connection in Philadelphia to a boat dock on the Raritan River in South Amboy, New Jersey. The Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad was built and fully operational in 1835. The Camden & Amboy completed a branch between Trenton and New Brunswick in 1839. That same year, the New Jersey Railroad completed its line between Jersey City and a connection with the C&A at New Brunswick, and initiated through service from the New York City area to Philadelphia. A journey that had taken six days a quarter-century before could now be completed in a matter of hours.

A similar story can be told south of Philadelphia. In 1832, the New Castle & Frenchtown Railroad commenced operation in Delaware. After numerous charters and a few false starts, numerous smaller roads were consolidated into the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad in 1836. Through service between Philadelphia and Baltimore began in 1838. By 1851, it was possible to travel from New York to Washington, DC in 12 hours via a connection with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

Following the American Civil War, railroads began their transformation from local concerns to national institutions. By and large it was these ideals that were at the heart of the war, itself. The Pennsylvania Railroad acquired control of the C&A, P&T and NJRR roads in 1871. After a battle for control with the B&O, the Pennsylvania Railroad gained control of the PW&B in 1881. As a result, the B&O would build its own line from Baltimore to Philadelphia.

What followed is a lesson in corporate overreach. There had been a proposal in the 1860s to build a "National Air Line" railroad between New York and Washington. It was supported by the then-upstart PRR, and opposed by the established B&O, which already had a line between Baltimore and Washington. After the B&O successfully fought off the "Air Line" repeatedly, it then found that the PRR was buying up the other railroads with which the B&O had been connecting for traffic between New York and Washington (the Baltimore and Potomac was the last piece, and then the B&O would be cut out). So the B&O built its own line to Philadelphia, at a time when the original B&O, and particularly the West End, were still unimproved and badly in need of investment; thus perpetuating its slide from the first-place East-West trunk line to third-place behind the PRR and NYC.

The story of the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad is somewhat more colorful. Originally chartered as a regional road to connect the farms of southern Maryland to the ports in Baltimore, it was purchased by a group of associates of the PRR in 1866. A “branch” was built in 1872 between Bowie, Maryland, and Washington, DC. In 1873, tunnels were completed in Baltimore, allowing connection between the PRR-owned B&P and the PRR-friendly PW&B. Within a decade, the PRR would control its own railroad in what was considered the most valuable stretch of real estate in the country.

North of New York the tale is equally as complex and historic. The first link was the Boston & Providence Railroad, which began operation between its namesake cities in 1835. The New York, Providence & Boston Railroad began through operation in 1837 between Providence and Stonington, Connecticut. In 1848 the New York & New Haven Railroad completed its line between New Haven, Connecticut and a connection with the Harlem Railroad to access New York. In 1858 the New Haven, New London & Stonington Railroad completed the last link, and by 1859 an all-rail route with two ferry crossings was possible between Boston and New York via four railroads. The NYP&B purchased the NHNL&S in 1864.

In 1872, the New York & New Haven combined with the Hartford & New Haven Railroad to become the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad; thus began an insatiable quest for consolidation in Southern New England. Germane to the Northeast Corridor, the NYNH&H, better known simply as the New Haven, acquired the NYP&B in 1892. The Old Colony, which had leased the B&P in 1888, was itself leased in its entirety by the New Haven in 1893. With all of its acquisitions, the New Haven controlled all rail traffic in Southern New England and in so doing then possessed three separate routes between New Haven and Boston: The Inland route via Hartford, the “Air Line” which avoided all major cities as well as the State of Rhode Island, and the Shore Line route which hugs the northern banks of Long Island Sound. Sometimes holding all the cards means control of one’s destiny; and sometimes it means too much of a good thing.

Let there be light

The New Haven was a pioneer of electric traction utilizing low-voltage direct-current applications as far back as 1895 on many branch lines. The New Haven connection to New York was then part of the New York Central System, and as a result of a horrific accident on the NYC in 1902, steam locomotives were banned by city ordinance after 1908. The New Haven would use the NYC third rail system into the city, but had much more ambitious plans for the rest of its main line. In April 1907, the first high-voltage overhead catenary was energized between the end of third-rail territory and the power plant at Cos Cob, Connecticut. By the end of that year, wires had been extended east to Stamford. In 1914, electrification had reached New Haven. Numerous branch lines for freight and passenger service were also electrified. Had economic conditions not worsened, the electrification program would have continued, possibly to Boston.

For the PRR, of course, owning the premier transportation system in the country had its own responsibilities. As the final years of the 19th Century wound down, traffic on the PRR continued to grow. Even so, terminating at Harsimus Cove, like so many other roads on the Hudson River, did not meet the expectations of the “Standard Railroad of the World.” After much consideration, a plan of attack was reached in 1901 wherein the PRR would access New York and beyond. Tunneling beneath the solid rock of New Jersey’s Bergen Hill and then slogging through the muck that is the river bottom, the PRR would not just enter Manhattan, but would make the grandest statement in passenger railroading travel: Pennsylvania Station New York. It would not stop there. Working in conjunction with the New Haven and PRR subsidiary Long Island Railroad, four tunnels would connect Manhattan to the Borough of Queens and then a spectacular connection to New England via a bridge over the East River at Hell Gate.

Upon its completion in 1910, the new electric division from Manhattan Transfer, New Jersey to Sunnyside Yard in the city Borough of Queens was powered by low-voltage third-rail DC electricity as the result of the city ordinance banning steam locomotives. Even then the PRR was contemplating electrification of the railroad in a manner without the restrictions of low-voltage DC, high-voltage overhead catenary. In 1915, it electrified the Main Line between Philadelphia and Paoli. This was followed by extensions north to Trenton and south to Wilmington. In 1928, the PRR announced its intention to electrify north to New York, replacing the original third-rail system except for what was needed by the LIRR (the New Haven had extended its overhead electrification to Sunnyside Yard in 1917). Despite the Stock Market crash of 1929 and Great Depression of the 1930s, the expansion continued with plans to electrify to Washington and Harrisburg. Service to New York began in 1933, to Washington in 1935, and to Harrisburg in 1938. Much of this was underwritten by Federal loans of some $107.5 million.

It should be noted that the improvement to what would later be called the Northeast Corridor was not the only PRR plan for massive improvement. In 1905, the PRR incorporated the Pennsylvania & Newark Railroad, to build a parallel freight route from the yard at Morrisville, just south of Trenton, north; connecting to a freight yard in Newark. Work was suspended in 1916 due to wartime scarcities, and never restarted. The PRR had also planned building an entirely new mainline to the Midwest running west from Lewistown, Pennsylvania, across Ohio, and well into Indiana. This new low-grade line would have given the PRR the shortest and fastest link between New York and Chicago. For reasons left to speculation, the PRR decided to improve its line between Washington and New York. This would unwittingly set the stage for passenger railroading in the later decades of the 20th Century.

The darkest hour

By the mid 1960s, America’s railroads were in trouble. Not only was the once-mighty PRR not exempt from this pain, but in many ways was its full embodiment. The radical improvement of the 1930s which made the PRR the paragon of transportation now weighed like a millstone around its neck. Overly-burdensome regulation from early in the 20th Century had ended the PRR program of continuous self improvement. This was followed by the post-war largess manifested in the Interstate Highway program; an open-access network of asphalt and concrete, underwritten and maintained at the expense of the American taxpayer. Passenger trains had always been guaranteed enough cross revenue from freight through the rates set by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Now with freight (especially the premium carloads) leaving for the subsidized highways, there was no longer enough to go around.

For the New Haven, things were even worse. Having a dense regional railroad in a small industrial area of the country made sense before the age of subsidized roadways. With the coming of the Connecticut Turnpike and New England Thruway, the New Haven did not stand a chance.

Sowing the seeds of socialized rail transportation

In the decade of the 1960s, the economy of the country was running like a well-oiled machine. Every corner of business was garnering its share of the national largess with one notable exception: The railroads. Increase in business revenue correlated with an increase in internal revenue, and much of this went to the railroads’ new competition: Socialized transportation in the form of interstate highways and airports. Meanwhile, Japan was continuing to rebuild its infrastructure. As it did not enjoy national largess, it was imperative to make the most of what it did have by rebuilding and improving on existing technology. Thus, after rebuilding its railroads, Japan took the next logical technological step of speeding up its railroads. Its 125 mph “Bullet Trains” captured the imagination of the world, and the imagination of at least one person in the U.S. Senate. After all, that money in the U.S. Treasury was not going to spend itself.

Claiborne de Borda Pell served in the U.S. Senate representing the people of Rhode Island for six terms starting in 1961. He will always be best known as the father of the Pell Grant, which offers tuition aid for college students. Immediately following his election, he turned his attention to the possibility of high-speed trains in the Northeast. He aroused then-President Kennedy’s enthusiasm for the idea, and this led to the initiation of feasibility reports by the Commerce Department. But how to pay for it?

“Where will the money come from to build a high-speed rail line in the northeast corridor? A federal subsidy only as a last resort, said the Senator. What he favors is the creation of a public authority which could guarantee bond issues. But there are other possibilities, too: ‘I am by no means exclusively wedded to the public authority approach…one alternative which has been discussed is the formation of a public corporation…’” - Railway Age, October 12, 1964

Apparently, all the other possible options were discarded rather quickly. Following the release of the Commerce Department corridor studies in 1964, Senator Pell introduced (and Congress passed) the High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965. Signed into law by President Johnson, the Act authorized in 1965 an expenditure of $20 million, and $35 million the next year. These funds went to upgrades to the railroad right-of-way between New York and Washington, DC, as well as to the purchase of the now famous Metroliners; 50 multiple-unit cars capable of 120 mph speeds, from the Budd Company.

This was the era of “The Great Society” where all the nation's woes could be cured with copious quantities of public money. Sadly, such was the mindset of the age of avarice; throwing money at problems was much easier than solving problems. All around the country, the railroads were losing traffic to government-subsidized competition. This atrophy of traffic led to the mistaken notion that parallel railroad mergers would equate to survival, thus leading the PRR to merge with its long time rival, the New York Central, in 1968. Part of the PRR’s agreement to allow its property between New York and Washington to become a guinea pig for an imperious immediacy of political interest was the hope of a favorable decision to grant its merger. Unfortunately, in less than two years this misbegotten union called Penn Central became the single largest corporate bankruptcy in history up to that time.

Instead of addressing the continuing failing fortunes of the nation’s railroads, elected leaders of the day concentrated on one symptom: Passenger rail losses. It has been said that Americans operate in only the two modes of complacency and panic. Complacency was no longer an option. Millions of public dollars invested in the NEC faced the possibility of liquidation in bankruptcy court. Politically, this was untenable. A key reason for the 1971 formation of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, was to protect America’s investment. America’s passenger trains were now in the hands of Senator Pell’s suggested “public corporation.”

How has this public corporation fared in its governance of the NEC? This will be addressed in our next installment.

This Week at Amtrak

Image via Wikipedia
From the United Rail Passenger Alliance

This Week at Amtrak, Vol. 8 No. 12
Volume 8, Number 12

From the Editors…

Recently a prominent state rail advocacy group signed on accepting the ultimatum of a major railroad. What does this portend for the rest of the country?

Cannot Predict HSR Speed? How About a Happy Medium…

“A thousand miles seems pretty far, But they've got planes and trains and cars, I'd walk to you if I had no other way…” Hey There Delilah - Plain White T’s

Back in January of 2008, not long before the most recent resurgence and subsequent retreat of American High-Speed Rail, Rick Harnish of the Midwest High Speed Rail Association was one of the highlighted speakers at the Carmichael Conference held in St. Louis, Missouri. An interesting anecdote during his lecture told of the public’s reaction to plans for high-speed trains: “How do we get the trains we already have to run on time,” and “How do we keep the bathrooms clean.” This may lead one to wonder: Are the public’s expectations low or just realistic?

It should be noted, all hyperbole aside, that there are currently no high-speed trains in operation anywhere on the North American continent. The true definition of HSR by those who actually operate it is 250 kph (155 mph), so Amtrak’s Acela does not quite make it. But that’s okay here in the USA where our motto is, “If you don’t like what you see, lower your expectations.” Therefore, the American definition of HSR is anything faster than a bicycle going downhill. As a result there are projects ongoing to raise certain corridors up to top speeds of 90 mph or greater. The freight railroads which own the track in those corridors have their own ideas pertaining to “high speed.”

As has already been covered by This Week, Norfolk Southern’s CEO, Wick Moorman, made it clear that for his railroad “passenger train” means 79 mph, maybe 90 mph in certain circumstances. Ergo, the extension of regional trains in the Commonwealth of Virginia to Norfolk will top out at 90 mph. CSX has the same vision for passenger trains. In upstate New York, CSX has stipulated that 90 mph be the top speed for the current service running from Albany-Rensselaer to Buffalo. The government of New York State sees things quite differently, pushing to raise those train speeds to 110 mph. This is where perception meets reality; the former New York Central main line, the storied Water Level Route, is the property of Jacksonville, Florida-based CSX.

In a move to help settle this impasse, the Empire State Passenger Association agreed with CSX:

“The Empire State Passengers Association (ESPA) has endorsed 90 miles per hour as the near-term maximum speed for Amtrak’s Empire Corridor passenger trains operating on CSX’s busy freight mainline across upstate New York from west of the Capital District to the Buffalo region.”

To be sure, the ultimate goal of ESPA is to realize 110 mph trains in New York State. Still, they have wisely determined that half a loaf, paid for by someone else, is better than none. They must also be keenly aware that time is of the essence. As per the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, specifically Section 209, it is expected that individual states will be held responsible for the operating losses for such trains. If everything had gone as per the language in the PRIIA, then in October, 2013 New York State would have to buy the cow because the milk will no longer be free.

Asleep at the Switch

Speaking of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, formally known as Public Law 110-432/Division B, it may well be described as a train wreck in no motion. By law enacted October 16, 2008, Amtrak was required per Section 209 to “develop and implement a single, nationwide standardized methodology for establishing and allocating the operating and capitol costs among the States and Amtrak” for routes under 750 miles by October 16, 2010. Now some nine months later, no such “methodology” has been brought forward by Amtrak, although negotiations with the states are ongoing. Even so, the law is clear as to what was supposed to happen following the deadline and no agreement:

“If Amtrak and the States (including the District of Columbia) in which Amtrak operates such routes do not voluntarily adopt and implement the methodology developed under subsection (a) in allocating costs and determining compensation for the provision of service in accordance with the date established therein, the Surface Transportation Board shall determine the appropriate methodology required under subsection (a) for such services in accordance with the procedures and procedural schedule applicable to a proceeding under section 24904(c) of title 49, United States Code, and require the full implementation of this methodology with regards to the provision of such service within 1 year after the Board’s determination of the appropriate methodology.”

In other words, with no negotiated agreement in place by October 2010 there should have been accelerated implementation deadline for the Surface Transportation Board-issued standards. Instead of five years from enactment if the schedule had been followed, with the STB involved, it was supposed to be two years (the missed deadline) + 120 days (the STB decision) + one year = three years and four months vice five years. The STB was required to issue standards by mid-February 2011, to become effective and binding one year later.

To be certain, the Surface Transportation Board has more than enough on its plate these days, what with every utility in the land seemingly attempting to re-regulate the railroad industry. As such, they are more than content to sit back and watch the negotiations from afar, and will only intervene if a dispute arises between the states and Amtrak.

This is nothing we have not seen before, here at This Week. We fully expect Amtrak to come into the STB waving a tardy “agreement,” and then the STB to take the path of least resistance by adopting it. The inherent danger of such after-the-bell acceptance would be the serious legal questions about the validity of any cost standards thus generated. Any other operator seeking to bid on any route negotiated with this agreement will be free to challenge said standards simply on the basis of missing the October 2010 deadline, and the STB’s subsequent failure to promulgate standards unilaterally as specified in the PRIIA when that happened.

The Future of American Passenger Rail Corridors?

No matter how you slice it, the costs of transportation, all transportation, are going to be reallocated such that the states will have a more direct financial responsibility. The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, specifically Section 209, has a goal of establishing a uniform strategy for determining those costs of train routes 750 miles and under and then passing the bill along to the states. Translation: The federal government is getting out of the corridor business. Eventually we will see the same scenario with the Northeast Corridor.

Learning from the British experiment, the physical in-place plant should belong to a public entity; in the case of the NEC, perhaps a compact of those states. The legal foundation for such a compact already exists:

“Consent to Compacts.--Congress grants consent to States with an interest in a specific form, route, or corridor of intercity passenger rail service (including high speed rail service) to enter into interstate compacts to promote the provision of the service…” - The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, Section 410

Connecticut and Massachusetts already own all or a substantial portion of their intrastate section of the route. The states already have the bureaucratic machinery in place for their commuter services. The maintenance needs of the NEC are roughly $500 million per year, which comes out roughly to $1 million per mile. New Jersey would have the largest stake, at 58 miles. But they also have the largest NEC demand: NJ Transit. Is it any wonder that New Jersey politicians are fighting tooth and nail to keep the status quo?

The next logical step would be to bid out the premium services. If, say, an entity such as Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin Trains wins the bid, they purchase and maintain their own equipment; they pay an access fee, and the public gets to ride in the same manner as it would if it had flown. The private entity now has room to innovate within the bounds of its own equipment and on its own dime, far from the scrutiny of the budget hawks. In the real world of HSR, this is becoming a reality. In 2013 German Rail (DB) will commence HSR Intercity Express (ICE) service from Frankfurt and Amsterdam to London. The existing HSR services on the lines will continue to run. Although DB is a public entity it is improvising like a private company. This also demonstrates that HSR can be done over someone else's infrastructure, and that competing HSR services can coexist. That is about the practical extent of “privatization” in the corridor world.

This Week in Amtrak

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This Week at Amtrak Vol. 8 No. 11

Volume 8, Number 11

From the Editors…

This week we hear from Russ Jackson, Vice President of the United Rail Passenger Alliance. Russ is a retired California college instructor, former RailPAC officer and editor, and is now living near Dallas, Texas.

AMTRAK Long-Distance trains at 40

And, what they still need is more cars!

Comments by Russ Jackson

That was then: Forty years is a long time. In this report let us first take a look at where the Western long distance trains started for Amtrak, and then look at today. Charting will be for two trains that were in the Amtrak official timetable #1 for May 1, 1971, which was quickly replaced with a new one on July 12 (to view this timetable see: http://www.timetables.org/browse/?group=19710712r&st=0001); then, the May, 1991 national timetable which was in effect when this writer became editor of RailPAC’s Western Rail Passenger Review; and then we do a comparison of those past schedules with the 40th anniversary 2011 national system timetable which is available now at all Amtrak-staffed stations.

Trains 1 and 2, the Sunset Limited

We all know what the problem with this train has been and continues to be: Tri-weekly (also said as tri-weakly) service from day one, thanks to the inherited schedule from the Southern Pacific, and it continues to run today with nearly full loads despite the very bad schedule.

1971 Dp NOrl 1:00 PM; Dp Phx 10:50 PM; Ar LA 7:30 AM Su,W,F 44.5 hrs
1991 Dp NOrl 2:15 PM; Dp Phx 10:31 PM; Ar LA 7:00 AM M,W,F 42.75 hrs
2011 Dp NOrl 11:55 AM; Dp Mar 11:57 PM; Ar LA 8:30 AM Su,W,F 44.5 hrs *

1971 Dp LA 10:00 PM; Dp Phx 8:10 AM; Ar NOrl 8:00 PM Su,Tu,Th 44 hrs
1991 Dp LA 10:50 PM; Dp Phx 7:20 AM; Ar NOrl 7:50 PM Su,Tu,Th 43 hrs
2011 Dp LA 3:00 PM; Dp Mar 10:38 PM; Ar NOrl 2:55 PM Su,Tu,F 48 hrs *

*NOTE: In 2011 the trains do not go through Phoenix, a major city now without train service, and there are generous amounts of built-in recovery times throughout the route. In 1971, the schedule called for Yuma to Tucson via Phoenix to be 6 hours; in 1991, 6-1/2 hours; in 2011, 4-3/4 hours via Maricopa. If Phoenix were still on the schedule, an hour and a half would have to be added to the 2011 schedule.

Trains 3 and 4, the Southwest Chief

In 1971 timetable #1, this train had numbers 17 and 18 and was named “Super Chief-El Capitan,” continuing its inherited Santa Fe tradition.

1971 Dp Chi 6:30 PM; Ar LA 9:00 AM; daily 40.5 hrs *
1991 Dp Chi 5:00 PM; Ar LA 8:10 AM; daily 41.25 hrs
2011 Dp Chi 3:00 PM; Ar LA 8:15 AM; daily 43 hrs

1971 Dp LA 7:30 PM; Ar Chi 1:30 PM; daily 42 hrs *
1991 Dp LA 8:30 PM; Ar Chi 3:50 PM; daily 42.25 hrs
2011 Dp LA 6:15 PM; Ar Chi 3:15 PM; daily 45 hrs

* NOTE: In 1971, the train did not go via Topeka, KS, which adds one hour to the schedule.

While running times and scheduled departures have remained fairly consistent for these trains, for others they has been all over the map. Several interesting changes from 1971: Then, the Coast Starlight was the first west coast train to travel from Seattle to, first, San Diego. It ran tri-weekly north of Oakland and from Los Angeles to San Diego, but daily from Oakland to Los Angeles. In 1971 there were only two daily round-trip San Diegans between Los Angeles and San Diego; no San Joaquins, and no Capitols. Originally, the California Zephyr was scheduled to travel its current route, but when the D&RGW railroad decided to opt out of Amtrak, it ran via Wyoming, and operated daily from Chicago to Denver but tri-weekly between Denver and Oakland. The Empire Builder did not have a Portland section, and crossed the Cascades in Washington going via Yakima instead of Wenatchee. All this was accomplished using low-level cars and locomotives that were 20 years old and operating crews inherited from the freight railroads.

This is now: In the July, 2011 issue of Trains magazine, writer Bob Johnston has written a review of Amtrak’s past, dividing its history into five sections and comparing “then” to “now.” For example, section one, “Wake-up call,” says “Then: equipment had to be ordered and funded.” Sadly, “Now: equipment has to be ordered and funded.” While that is important for all parts of the system, including the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak has neglected its long distance trains badly. In his presentation to the RailPAC-NARP meeting in March, 2011, Minnesota’s Andrew C. Selden said, “Amtrak has made no significant investment in its long distance services in 20 years, and now plans only to replace its Superliner I cars, not to grow its long distance fleet or network.” Mr. Selden’s comments and data explaining all this were published in the May-June issue of the RailPAC newsletter.

On May 17, 2011, Amtrak CEO Joseph Boardman told the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, “You are not going to cut costs far enough on the long-distance trains to make (them) profitable.” This statement came after Amtrak’s West Coast Superintendent, William Duggan, spoke to the RailPAC meeting, revealing (with a Power Point visual) that “Sleeping car ticket revenue makes a positive contribution to Amtrak’s bottom line.” That is what RailPAC, URPA, and most objective long distance train advocates have been saying for too many years; but Amtrak has not been willing to fund additional cars that will contribute positively to that bottom line, instead choosing to invest only in corridor trains that are paid for by the states (except in the NEC). Mr. Selden says, “Amtrak is turning away boatloads of money for want of new capacity.” As RailPAC President Paul Dyson, says, “More cars on the (existing) trains means more revenue and smaller deficits. The true deficit is in management, not dollars.”

So we can all agree that adding additional high-revenue cars to existing trains, those that will run every day (including the daily Sunset Limited, eventually), is where Amtrak should be concentrating its efforts, right? RailPAC’s Noel Braymer suggests, “How about private financing (safe-harbor leasing) with a business plan to pay for them with increased revenues? With California about to order new bi-level cars how about Amtrak getting an ‘add-on’ to that order for new hulls at least.”

We must add a caution written by Mr. Selden to us, that it “will take hundreds of new cars–effectively deployed in high revenue services–to get to break-even. But, local wisdom in St. Paul is that there never will be a fourth sleeper on the Builder because the diner is swamped as it is and they couldn’t feed another carload of passengers. Personal observation is that they’re right. The diner in mid-summer (i.e., for the four peak months) is dreadful in terms of regimentation and rushed service, and stress on an understaffed crew.” After a trip on the Empire Builder, where he is a National Park Service volunteer in the Rails-Trails program, narrating the trip between Minneapolis and Wisconsin Dells, Mr. Selden wrote that “All three sleepers were all but sold out on both trains and would be sold out west of Minneapolis. Coaches were about 2/3 occupied so statistically sold-out due to down-line sales.” And this on a train that has had many on-time problems this winter and spring.

RailPAC Vice President-South James Smith returned from a round trip on the Southwest Chief from Los Angeles to Chicago and reported the same sold-out condition in May, before the official travel season begins. People want to ride… Something must be done for these western trains, besides just replacing cars one-for-one, if Amtrak really wants to grow financially and calm the criticism thrown at it. Or does it?

This Week in Amtrak

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This Week at Amtrak Vol. 8 No. 9
Volume 8, Number 9

From the Editors…

For something completely different, This Week goes to the movies, plus some observations by URPA Vice President of Corporate Communications Russ Jackson.

The Little Movie that Just Might: Atlas Shrugged, Part One

To be clear, Atlas Shrugged may not win any Academy awards. But that is not the point. The tale behind bringing Ayn Rand’s 1957 novel to the big screen is almost as long as the book itself. Loathed or loved, public sentiment is anything but neutral for Atlas Shrugged.

In this first of possibly three installments, the year is 2016 and the national economy continues to spiral downward. As a result, commercial aviation is a recent memory and all traffic, freight and passenger, must move by rail. (It is ironic that in this alternate reality all rail traffic is still in the hands of private operators.) In typical Luddite fashion, elected officials attempt to garner support for themselves while exacting a heavy burden from industry. The result? Numerous prominent businessmen vanish, following a shadow named John Galt.

From a literary standpoint, the movie succeeds. All the main points are visited: Hard work, and the virtue of the reward for such hard work, lead to progress; rewarding those who do not contribute will ultimately lead to ruin; the inequity of expecting industry to respond to critics whose sole job it is to criticize. That is not, however, the reason one goes to the movie theater.

This production was constrained by a small budget, and the results have the appearance of made-for-television instead of the big screen. The principal railroad scenes are stock footage of modern day trains and a real Union Pacific track maintenance/concrete tie crew in Indiana. The climax of the film is the completion of the rebuilding of a rail line, and the first train to ply it. Ironically, that first train is a computer-generated image which is heavily based on Amtrak’s Acela, the very epitome of government interference in railroad operations.

As a point of comparison, a rather silly movie from last year, Unstoppable, did succeed in bringing the railroad to the big screen. Although its plot was an unrealistic contrivance of unstoppable exaggerations, the moviegoer did get a first-hand look at the grit, grime and gravity of railroad life.

In Atlas Shrugged, the plot centers around three industries: The railroad, steel, and petroleum. Malevolent special interest government intrusion is hampering their efforts, but they resolve to move ahead despite this interference. The film makers concentrate on the characters and portrayal of the squeaky-clean world they inhabit. After all, why show the gritty side of industry? Interestingly, the plot of this film is not fantasy, but was once reality. Our film’s heroine, Dagny Taggart, presides over a railroad where locomotive parts are hard to come by, and some lines have track that is over a century old. Imagine Penn Central circa 1972. Imagine parked trains derailing. Now imagine direct government involvement. Hardly fantasy, these things actually happened. It was this world which led to creation of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.

Should the film makers have paid more attention to railroad details? At a screening/Q&A session arraigned by the Reason Foundation, the first two questions asked by the audience were about the railroad scenes. Not too many people have seen the inside of a steel foundry or an oil refinery, but railroads are a universal tie which binds us all, either as onetime passengers or perhaps via family connections. This preexisting subconscious familiarity with railroading is just the sort of connection needed to attract an audience.

In spite of it all, the film does work. It is rather dense, and as such will sail clear over the heads of the average moviegoer. It is a thinking movie for a thinking audience. Is the free market the answer to all our problems? Of course not; but neither is the free market so infinitely large as to subsidize everything else. Some may see this as a political statement, others as social commentary. In the words of Alfred Hitchcock, “It’s only a movie.”

Winter and the Amtrak long distance trains
Report and Comments by Russ Jackson

The western long distance trains had a rough winter in the northern two-thirds of the country. Some trains were canceled altogether for several days. Here is a rundown of some of the activity, by train, in the past few weeks. Not everything is included, but here are some highlights, using Amtrak's data. When April is figured in, things will look much worse.

California Zephyr. 45.2% on time in March, 52.5% for the last 12 months. For several days, Donner Pass was closed not only to road traffic on I-80, but also the Union Pacific main line was snowed in as drifts of over five feet of blowing snow blocked access. While there was diligence by the UP crews, there were several derailments. For the first time in many years, the rotary plows stationed at Roseville were called into service. The old heads who remember how it was up there when snows like that were more common are mostly retired, and the youngsters have never seen snow like this before. The weather is still bad, but the route is open again so that Trains #5/6 can run their regular route. Train 5, which left Chicago on April 16 on time, arrived in Emeryville 3 days later and 58 minutes early. Delays to the trains now are in southern Iowa, where flooding has occurred. For some days the trains originated-terminated at Reno, with passengers bused from California when I-80 finally opened. To see a great video of the rotary plows in operation, look at http://www.kcra.com/r-video/27364908/detail.html.

Empire Builder. 33.6% on time in March, 33.8% for the last 12 months. The Builder was the hardest hit of all the western trains. It did not run at all for many days, including the week before April 15, when it had not operated due to flooding on the BNSF in North Dakota. Before that it was winter storms, but once the snow starts to melt up in that state, Amtrak's line from Fargo to Grand Forks and west is subject to water problems. An anticipated BNSF detour line direct from Fargo to Minot had many slow orders due to high water, and was declared unusable. Amtrak has discussed permanently moving #7/8 to this alternate line, but it will bypass Grand Forks, Devils Lake, and Rugby, towns that rely on the train for service. Amtrak has said it will cost $100 million in upgrades to bridges and track in the Devils Lake area if that service is to continue. The BNSF does not use that route for freight service. It would take two "construction seasons" to rebuild, after Congress had appropriated the money. How likely is that to happen now?

Southwest Chief. 83.9% on time in March, 77.8% for the last 12 months. Not much to say here, as Trains #3/4 continued to depart on time, and arrived early at both ends more than they were late.

Sunset Limited. 88.9% on time in March, 83.1% for the last 12 months; however, problems arose when wildfires damaged a Union Pacific bridge near Marfa, Texas, on April 9, stalling the train for 18 hours; thus weather at the other extreme affected the Sunset route.

Coast Starlight. 45.2% on time in March, 65% for the last 12 months. Winter weather did have an effect on the operation of Trains #11/14, but most of the problems have come due to track work being done by the Union Pacific south of San Jose and San Luis Obispo, which has required the trains to be detoured, and has provided railfans with several chances to ride the detour route through the San Joaquin Valley. The detour began south of Emeryville at Fremont, where the trains crossed the Altamont Pass to Stockton, then traveled on the Union Pacific line south to Bakersfield, up the Tehachapis, across the famous Loop, through Mojave, Lancaster, Palmdale, and into Los Angeles. For a full description of one of the #11 detours that departed Oakland Jack London Square 30 minutes late and arrived at Los Angeles Union Station at 9:57 PM, see Chris Guenzler's picture story on http://www.Trainweb.org. Passengers going south to the Starlight's regular Central Coast stations rode buses from Oakland.

Whether Amtrak and its host railroads were "prepared" for this winter is ripe for speculation, but when a winter like this one happens it's nail biting time all along the routes. We congratulate Amtrak, the BNSF, and the UP for their diligence in restoring service in a timely manner. Lessons were learned, and it will be interesting to see how prepared they all are next winter.

Related articles

• Amtrak Losses to Widen (online.wsj.com)
• All aboard! Amtrak sees surge in ridership (msnbc.msn.com)

This Week in Amtrak

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This Week at Amtrak Vol. 8 No. 6
Volume 8, Number 6

From the Editors…

There is a lot of talk these days of “passenger rail.” This week we attempt to separate reality from hyperbole.

The Definition of Success; The Price of the Definition

“What is the value added?” or similar questions are asked whenever any enterprise considers expansion, upgrade or reorganization. In principle it is a simple exercise; will future generations see this investment of time and resources as valuable or worthless? In the mania that has defined passenger railroading for the second decade of the 21st Century, one fact has become crystal clear, and that is that very few can accurately define what the value added is for passenger trains.

This is not to say that those promoting new trains are doing so out of shear ignorance or malfeasance. Many of these efforts are well meant. This past February, the Administration called upon Congress for a $53 billion down payment on high-speed rail for the country to enhance mobility and create work-fare. The goal was to provide access to fast trains for 80 percent of the country in 20 years. The general response was “Would you like fries with that?” More recently, two actors from a period-piece cable television drama performed, in character, a skit promoting the virtues of high-speed trains. The idea, if not the allure, of sleek, fast, sexy transportation seems positive and for good reason, because it is; however, the path from the trains of today and the trains of tomorrow is not as straight, short, or simple as one would be led to believe.

All around this great land of ours there are mixed signals as to the future of new passenger trains, let alone improvement of those extant. Passenger rail went from a Washington missive to center stage in many regional elections. As a result, planned projects in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida came to naught. In California, plans are moving forward to build a high-speed railroad as far out in the country as possible so as not to attract any attention. As a result of the many rejections, once-ostracized states of the Northeast are now allowed to bid for the now unwanted Federal dollars to improve Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor.

Despite these false starts, there has been meaningful progress on many fronts for the augmentation of passenger trains. In just the last month, Washington State received its grant of $590 million for improvements between Portland, Oregon, and Seattle. In North Carolina, $461 million was received for upgrades to its Raleigh-to-Charlotte route. And in Illinois, $685 million was realized to continue improvements from Chicago to St. Louis, Missouri. Some $1.736 billion of taxpayer monies have been doled out for worthwhile projects around the country.

It is still early in the decade, but a definite trend has started to take shape regarding the future of domestic passenger trains. At one end of the spectrum, the assumed silver bullet [train] which was to herald the new era of national HSR transportation was nixed in Florida. It would have run on an independent right-of-way with no direct connection to the rest of the National system. The “3C” service cancelled in Ohio was not HSR but rather an upgrade of existing freight-only trackage, most of which has not seen passenger trains for four decades. Even with the blessing of the current owners, the enhanced track was not going to be of too much benefit to freight, as Cincinnati to Cleveland via Columbus is not a natural through-freight corridor. The stalled extension of Hiawatha service from Milwaukee to Madison, Wisconsin, also not true HSR, did plan to make use of an existing passenger route as far as Watertown. From there, a nearly-abandoned freight line would have been completely rebuilt for passenger speeds. West of Watertown, the line sees minimal traffic currently handled by a short line.

The successes seen in Washington, Illinois, and North Carolina are another matter, altogether. What do they have in common?

All are pre-existing state-supported services. Washington started daily service in 1994 using trainsets made by Talgo. The Chicago-to-St. Louis service has existed in many guises since the beginning of Amtrak, and was once home to the French-made Turbo trains. (With Talgo reportedly relocating to Illinois, perhaps the Lincoln service will see yet another iteration of exotic equipment.) North Carolina’s intrastate train service started in 1995 and utilizes its own fleet of equipment.

All are on track owned (or operated) by freight railroads. The track in Washington State is a major corridor for BNSF, linking the Pacific Northwest with Canada. Even so, they have proven time and again to be willing partners with the local authority for operating the Cascade services. In Illinois, the line between St. Louis and Chicago is Union Pacific’s shortest route between the two cities. North Carolina’s Piedmont trains utilize Norfolk Southern’s main line from Greensboro to Charlotte. This track is currently undergoing capacity expansion as part of the Crescent Corridor initiative.

All currently host long-distance Amtrak trains. In Washington State the route of the Cascades is also part of the route for the Coast Starlight. The Illinois Lincoln service also hosts the daily Texas Eagle, while North Carolina’s Piedmont shares the same track with the Crescent between Greensboro and Charlotte.

In Washington, overall track capacity will increase with completion of the Point Defiance bypass. This bypass will obviate a single track tunnel and will be used by the Cascades, local commuter, as well as long-distance trains. Union Pacific plans for increased freight traffic on the Illinois line once upgrades are complete. North Carolina will add 28 miles of double track between Charlotte and Greensboro, part of the aforementioned Crescent Corridor. The planned enhancements for all three of these routes not only aid the regional and freight trains, but also increase the viability of long-distance trains; it is like getting three for the price of one. Now that is value added!

There is virtually no end to the possible public/private synergies around the country. In Virginia, passenger service will be returned to Norfolk (using State funds). The line from Norfolk to Petersburg is the Eastern end of Norfolk Southern’s recently upgraded Heartland Corridor connecting tidewater to the Midwest. Recently, the state of Missouri applied for Federal high-speed money to increase speeds between St. Louis and Kansas City. This is the route of the State-supported Missouri River Runner, and operates over the tracks of Union Pacific. Another plan under consideration is a daily train connecting Dallas to Eastern Texas. Currently, the daily Texas Eagle runs between Marshall and Dallas; westbound in the morning, eastbound in the evening. A counterpart train would run on opposite schedules with a possible extension to Shreveport, Louisiana. This would necessitate capacity expansion on the 150-mile route also owned by Union Pacific. Enhanced service between Oakland, California and Reno, Nevada is also a possibility. Currently, the route between Oakland and Auburn sees daily service as part of California’s Capitol Corridor, including the daily California Zephyr. Pushing the corridor past Auburn to Reno, 118 miles, may require capacity expansion over famed Donner Pass; predominantly re-laying much of the second track removed prior to Union Pacific’s accession of the route in 1996.

As the nation continues to adjust from the economic correction of the last few years it is evident we are a people defined as “risk averse.” Houses are not selling even though there are those who should be able to afford such. The numerous vacant automobile dealerships that now dot the landscape are further evidence of our new-found fiscal conservatism. The progress being seen in Washington, Illinois, and North Carolina demonstrate the public will to invest in the “tried and true,” where return on investment may be easily calculated and expedited.

Of all the trains run by Amtrak, it is the long-distance fleet which has garnered consistently increasing passenger loadings despite the downturn of the economy. To those inured by the high-speed-rail mentality sweeping the nation, these “slow trains” do not fit the prepackaged ideal; however, it must be understood that no high-speed train anywhere on earth was built without something predicating it. It must also be recognized that the United States has been limping along on a skeletal passenger rail network for four decades. If there is to be a true high-speed rail network, it must be preceded by a true conventional rail network.

The simple if painful truth is that a legitimate high-speed train is not a few years or even a decade away. A genuine network of meaningful passenger trains will have to be reestablished before going any further. This is a process that could conceivably take at least a generation, and no decree of imperious immediacy can change this. The latter half of the 20th Century was defined by America’s embrace of the automobile. This did not happen overnight. The return to rail-based transportation will also be a long-term transition; perhaps too long to satisfy those overly concerned about their legacy in the annals of history.

This Week in Amtrak

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With this edition, we conclude the coverage of this year’s Passenger Trains on Freight Railroads conference presented by Railway Age magazine.

How does one brake a high-speed rail?

By Daniel Carleton

For many years, two prominent gentlemen have always been a presence at these soirées to act as guiding lights and voices of reason: Gene Skoropowski of California’s Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority, and Thomas Mulligan of Union Pacific. Today, both have retired from their long, distinguished careers; therefore, it was a real treat when they took the stage, engaging in a simulated freight/passenger negotiation session with a twist -- reversed roles. Skoropowski represented the railroad, and Mulligan the local municipality seeking to start a commuter rail service. Assisted by Kevin Sheys (Partner, K&L Gates LLP) and his two hats, the hour-long simulation was both humorous and sobering.

Many times railroads learn about plans of starting passenger service by reading about it in the newspaper. By the time they are invited to discuss the plan, the governing municipality has garnered numerous ideas about the railroad and its operations, most of which are completely erroneous. The railroad is left to quell these preconceived notions before the real discussion may begin. Any excess capacity on the railroad is owned by the shareholders. Liability costs must be borne by the new commuter entity.

The current Amtrak rates for track access to preexisting routes do not apply, and actual access fees will be some $7-10/train mile. Non-railroad capacity studies are “not worth the paper they’re printed on.” Railroads are receptive to incentive payments for service, but not penalties. Ultimately, the right business deal is needed to make such service a reality.

Martin Schroeder of American Public Train Association (APTA) addressed the gathering on safety standards development. Currently, APTA has over 200 standards in publication, and they are recognized by numerous professional and government agencies. The result of this proactive effort has been minimization of government regulation and an educated influence on the final outcome of said regulation. Fixed standards equal reduced liability for those adhering to them.

Alan Zarembski, President of Zeta-Tech Associates, spoke to us about engineering hurdles required for higher-speed corridors. Anyone looking to build or upgrade track for high- or higher-speed trains needs to enlist Zarembski’s expertise. Through numerous charts and graphs, he illustrated requirements for making a higher-speed corridor, as well as conflicts between the needs of freight and passenger trains.

Simply put, passenger track is expensive. For instance, a #20 turnout (a broad track switch) costs about $100-120K. A #30 turnout (an even broader switch) costs over $250K. In the U.S., track maintenance dollars are spent on rails and ties; in Europe, the resources go into right-of-way surfacing. When asked about the failures of concrete ties in the U.S., he stated that since the 1970s over 300 million concrete ties have been installed, and about 5-10% of these have suffered chemical degradation.

Rodney Case presented an outsider’s view of European freight and passenger operations. Europe does, indeed, have a mixed-operation network, and private investors are showing up in the European Union. He concluded by asking aloud if projects such as Access to the Region’s Core and East Side Access would not be fundamentally more attractive if jointly constructed to accommodate freight across Manhattan. He also asked, Why does the U.S. rail industry approach the government and stakeholders in such a fragmented approach?

Thomas Mulligan graciously received this year’s Graham Claytor Award for Distinguished Service to Passenger Transportation. A self-effacing man, he humbly summarized his railroad carrier. Early on, one of his superiors once declared him ambidextrous; he could not take shorthand with either hand! The ovation Mulligan received was well deserved, and we wish him the best that retirement can offer.

Over lunch, casual conversation turned to some quite shocking and virtually unmentioned facts about Positive Train Control (PTC). Overall PTC will make transit times longer. How can this be? Was not one of the touted benefits of PTC higher speeds? It was explained this way: Suppose a train is entering a 40 mph curve. Currently, the engineer may enter the curve at 41-42 mph with no discernable difference in train operation. This will not be possible with PTC. The train will have to be at 40 mph (or less) entering the curve, or there will be a penalty. That conversation ended with, “We’re still working on the algorithms.” It would appear Casey Jones truly is dead.

There was a panel discussion on U.S. high-speed rail initiatives. The panel Chair was Al Swift, former Representative from Washington State, who started the discussion with the admonition, “Advisory committees are there to be ignored.” He later made the salient point that we use the term “High-Speed Rail” indiscriminately, and we need to make some agreement on what it means. Art Guzzetti of APTA made the point that ARRA was a “jobs bill” and not a rail program. Currently, most intercity rail work is building back to a state of good repair and capacity expansion. Of note, one of the scheduled panelists, Drew Galloway of Amtrak, could not attend (as he was attempting to save the ARC program).

During the question/answer period, this author inadvertently kicked the hornet’s nest. The point was made that all true High-Speed Rail programs around the world began as augmentations or replacements of existing conventional rail systems. The two true HSR programs proposed in this country, Florida and California, are not replacing existing conventional corridors. Without a pre-existing rider base to naturally migrate from an existing service to an improved service, any new-start HSR service may not meet preconceived notions for ridership.

Would not such a failure on the national stage have long-lasting negative impact on operation/expansion of passenger rail in the U.S.?

There was a pregnant pause. A stunned backlash followed. One of the panelists responded, “I’m just a consultant.” The sternly-worded formal answer, from someone actively working on the Florida project, defended his efforts with the standard line, pointing to existing state-owned right-of-way and choice of station location as being surrounded by nothing but parking lots. The existing renovated station in downtown Tampa is purportedly unsuitable, as there is currently nothing near it.

The final presentation was an update on the higher-speed initiatives in Illinois. This primarily focused on the upgrade between Chicago and St. Louis, where speeds of 110 mph will be recognized. By that time, the majority of attendees had vacated, starting their way back from whence they came. How many traveled by train?

Epilogue

It has been less than two months since the conference, and yet it seems everything has changed. In the elections of last month many candidates ran, at least in part, on a platform of ‘stopping the train.’ Higher-speed plans in Wisconsin and Ohio may be cancelled. Even the true HSR project in Florida is in question. It would appear at least at this early date that passenger railroading in America has had yet another false start.

The first exposure this author experienced with passenger rail and politics was the High-Speed Ground Transportation Association convention of 1996. The crowd was huge. The air was electric. We were going to set the world on fire. Amtrak had officially signed to buy the American Flyer (later Acela) trainsets for the Northeast, and Florida was to get the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX). Before the end of the decade, the FOX was cancelled and Acela suffered setback after infamous setback.

Yet it is the same people from back in 1996 who have been coming again and again to Washington, and to similar meetings around the country. Now, with a probable payout for the first time in 14 years, they were practically tripping over one another to sell their wares. After 14 years, their angst is entirely understandable; so when the long-awaited call for “shovel ready” HSR projects came, about the best Florida could come up with was a dust-covered plan for the FOX.

But this is not 1996. The paradigm has most definitely changed. Is this really the best idea for denizens of the Sunshine State? The new anti-rail sentiment now threatens the future of SunRail, the Orlando area commuter rail system. Is the audacity of HSR such that it may endanger all potential rail projects in Florida? Instead of asking these and other questions, those would-be builders of HSR are running ahead full throttle. Their actions border on malicious compliance. High-Speed Rail is not the devil incarnate, as some politicians would contend; however, all successful HSR programs follow successful conventional passenger rail programs. This is something this country has not enjoyed for almost a half century.

Just as a baby learns to crawl before walking, we the people must learn (or re-learn) the basics of passenger railroading before contemplating moving forward. It is a generational arrogance that believes elementary steps may be skipped, yet viable results still be achieved. Seldom does arrogance go without receiving its due reward.

This Week in Amtrak

Image via Wikipedia

Volume 7, Number 17
June 14th, 2010


A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America's foremost passenger rail policy institute



Jacksonville, Florida USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org . http://www.unitedrail.org

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Positive news for commuter operations, and ponderings on the future of high speed and intercity operations. But let us begin with two brief preludes; first, a short poem, called a "Grook" by its author, Danish poet and philosopher Piet Hein.


Thoughts on a Station Platform

It ought to be plain
how little you gain
by getting excited
and vexed.
You'll always be late
for the previous train,
and always in time
for the next.

A second lead-in: a note on why we are all here. Marcus Garnet, of Transport Action Atlantic in Canada, writes in a Progressive Railroading internet journal ,

What is commonly overlooked, is that time spent on a full-service
long-distance train is also available for other purposes, including
overnight sleep, meals, work, meetings, socializing or simply the
enjoyment of scenery. Overnight train travel serves a transportation
function, but also offers a total experience, especially for those
who are able to afford a bedroom. These passengers do not just
travel on the train, they live on the train. Whether for tourists or
traveling Canadians, this is a vital market distinction from other
land transport modes.

Mr. Garnet sums up many of our feelings and motivations for being passenger train advocates. Yes, trains are a vital part of our national infrastructure, but we want trains because of what they do for us personally, what they do for our friends and families and neighbors, what they do for our economy and our ecology. Trains are special and we need many more of them.

One last item, from the Inbox: Reader Ole Amundsen wrote in regard to the referenced article on VIA Rail Ocean Train Service:

The comments around this exceptional piece of work seem to be
getting at the heart-wood of the rail passenger conundrum in this
country. My positions come from being 70 years of age, nurtured by
an old school conservative view of individual responsibility,
educated in business and economics, and experienced in national
agendas...

When Amtrak was started, I was only interested in getting the
/Montrealer/ re-instated so I could avoid driving from my new home
in Vermont to family in Connecticut. It is easy to look back and say
Amtrak should have been done differently: it has performed the task
of "place holder" for passenger rail but that is about it. Those
were dark days for railroads, but we are now in a very different
world: then I paid 16 cents a gallon for fuel oil to heat my drafty
Vermont farm house! Today, we have 75 million boomers aging out;
they control about 75% of the nations wealth, they love to travel,
they are fit but getting more prone to medical situations, they have
"done it all" and want to continue to have adventures, they enjoy
creature comforts and are enjoying being grandparents. This is not a
market block to be ignored, it is not solely a market for "luxury
train travel;" it is a major component of the traveling public which
does not opt for speed alone, but which prefers reasonable mode
frequency, reasonable adherence to published schedules, reasonable
and clean accommodations, reasonable food, accessible and
accommodating equipment and a minimum of hassle...

My friend, the late Paul Weyrich, had all the conservative
credentials a person could have; and he was a strong voice for
passenger rail and trolley ("light rail") as well as integration of
inter- and intra-urban service. This problem, this opportunity, must
be addressed without falling back on old reasons not to, and [there
must be a way we can] come together with fresh ideas on how to
really run the railroad.

Now, on to the news.

The /San Mateo County Times/ reported on 27 May that

Caltrain officials have convinced federal safety authorities to
allow quick European-style electric trains to zip from San Francisco
to San Jose... common in Europe, the smaller electric trains... [had
been considered] unsafe. But after three years of tests and
research, Caltrain will become the first railroad in the nation to
use the technology after being granted a waiver... [this] will
essentially be a pilot operation for the trains, called electric
multiple units. If successful, commuter railroads and planned
high-speed rail networks throughout the nation would have access to
cheaper, greener and faster trains...

Even with several restrictions, the advent of modern equipment used successfully and safely for years elsewhere around the globe is a huge step forward for the implementation of regional rail lines around and between American cities.

For those who saw the Ayn Rand quote last week as being "the politics of the past," we turn to Paul Merrion 's article in Chicago Business this June 10th , regarding high-speed rail (emphasis mine):

In a move that reportedly "stunned" the rail industry, the Federal
Railroad Administration last month proposed stiff terms for the
grant agreements that railroads must sign with states to get funding
to upgrade their rail systems... Among other things, *the FRA said
railroads must be required to pay, without limit, for any further
improvements or fixes needed to meet on-time performance goals* set
out in the grant agreements, or else pay back the federal
grants.Even Boston-based non-profit, National Corridors Initiative
Inc., a high-speed rail advocacy group, questioned whether that is
feasible."While the objective of these guidelines --- to protect the
taxpayer against the (mis)use of their money when federally assisted
railroad projects are built --- is a valid one, the prescriptive,
punitive nature of the proposed FRA regulations are and will be
non-starters for any normal businessperson who has to carefully
assess projects for risks to his company, or face the wrath of his
stockholders," the group said in a statement on its Web site...

The FRA holds over the railroads, not just the billions in high-speed rail grants effectively controlled by Amtrak, but also the impending imposition of Positive Train Control (PTC), a worthwhile safety and capacity improvement but one that will cost billions and take years. It is still not certain how much of PTC the railroads are expected to shell out of their own pockets. Is the Obama administration seriously going to require the railroads to pay /any/ price so Amtrak can operate its government-funded high speed trains?

In parallel developments, concerning the Gulf oil spill, "Obama said he had no interest in undermining the value of BP" (Reuters story , 12 June 2010), but meanwhile "U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Friday BP should be subjected to unlimited liability costs and should pay all damage claims" (Reuters story , 11 June 2010). How can one impose unlimited liability without undermining industry? What person or corporation in their right mind would continue operating under those conditions?

(Caution: Ayn Rand reference follows; the timid may avert their gaze.)

In /Atlas Shrugged/, Rand populates her dystopia with officials who do not understand how the world works. Rand's bureaucrats have only ever ridden, as a Mr. Guthrie would put it, "their fathers' magic carpet made of steel," never seeing the engineering brain-power and the technical muscle-power behind a railway, imagining that trains function by magic, that oil pumps itself, that commerce and industry exist in a mythical land of everlasting continuation unaffected by taxes, regulation, and legislation. Rand posits a government whose popular and well-intentioned enactments "for the public good" strangle commerce and industry, slowly as a gentle flurry at first, finally escalating to a murderous avalanche.

Arthur Laffer explained in the /Wall Street Journal/
one June 6th why this neverland of perpetual sameness does not exist:

People can change the volume, the location and the composition of
their income, and they can do so in response to changes in
government policies... It has always amazed me how tax cuts don't
work until they take effect. Mr. Obama's experience with deferred
tax rate increases will be the reverse. The economy will collapse in
2011.

Dire predictions of impending doom aside, will the Obama administration, having already started down the dystopian road (One of the characters in Rand's 1957 book asks, When they nationalized health care, did anyone ask what the /doctors/ wanted?), truly enact scorched-earth policies in one economy sector after another? If so, look for oil and rail executives to be among the first to relocate to Galt's Gulch.

Back in the high speed arena,

Amtrak announced it is reorganizing and establishing a new
department to pursue opportunities to develop new intercity
high-speed rail service in select corridors around the country...

"Amtrak is the unparalleled leader in high-speed rail operations in
America today and we intend to be major player in the development
and operation of new corridors," said President and CEO Joseph
Boardman...

-- Amtrak press release, 22 March 2010


Aside from the omission of a word (does Amtrak intend to be /*a*/ major player, or /*the (only*/) major player?), does it not sound as if Amtrak might be jockeying for a near-monopoly in high speed rail? Will we see a resuscitation of the dead corpse of its former monopoly over all intercity trains, moved to HSR? Prior to the passage of S.738, the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, U.S. Code: US Code, Title 49, section 24701(b) read (emphasis mine):
"Except as provided in section 24306 of this title, a person may provide intercity rail passenger transportation over a route over which Amtrak provides scheduled intercity rail passenger transportation under a contract under section 401(a) of the Act *only with the consent of Amtrak*."

The "monopoly clause" indeed prevented state agencies as well as private companies from even talking to railroads about running passenger trains.
Would Amtrak have approved trains like New Mexico's RailRunner?
Doubtful. Certainly not in the short time it took from its announcement to the first cue for the "Meep-meep!" of the RailRunner departure door chimes.

That provision having been rescinded, will the liability issue now be how private operators are forced out of business?

Perhaps echoing liability concerns voiced frequently by North
America's Class I freight railroads, Amtrak President and CEO Joseph
Boardman has cited similar concerns "emerging as a significant
obstacle to the improvement of existing passenger rail service and
the development of new, including high speed and intercity corridor,
passenger rail service in the United States."

Boardman, in a five-page letter to four congressional leaders dated
Feb. 26, says in part, "The core of the problem is the unwillingness
or inability of a growing number of entities, including states and
other public bodies, to enter into the kind of agreements for risk
allocation ... and/or to purchase insurance at all or at sufficient
levels ..."

"Moreover, the attitude from a number of private parties and state
entities alike seems to be that Amtrak, in significant part because
of its federal funding, should assume the greater share or risk of
liability." That, Boardman warned, could curtail or terminate
state-supported services Amtrak currently provides...

-- Railway Age, 2 March 2010


Airlines are feeling a similar pinch. According to Susan Stellin in the /New York Times/ , this 7 June, reporting from the first meeting of the Future of Aviation Advisory Committee, air travel will look much different within half a decade.
Small cities will continue to lose air service, or at best will have ever-fewer flights at ever-higher prices, while some large cities with aggregated volume will see volumes above today's and low prices from further rate wars.

...Glenn Tilton, United's chairman, stated it more bluntly: "There
are clearly going to be winning cities and losing cities," he said,
addressing the fact that the industry cannot sustain service to
destinations that don't have the passengers to fill planes...

High speed trains have the same problem as airplanes: They just do not serve enough places. California's governor Schwarzenegger has proposed running a "high speed lite" train before he leaves office. Here is what Noel Braymer of RailPAC has to say in a letter to the /Los Angeles Times/:

According to the letter signed by the Governor, it looks like there
are plans to run rail service between Los Angeles and San Diego by
November in about 2 hours. It looks like the new train would only
have 3 stops at Los Angeles, Anaheim and San Diego. Just dropping
the six other intermediate stops would save 30 to 36 minutes on the
current schedule of 2 hours 40 minutes.

Generally express trains are not successful. By skipping stops such
trains also loses the business from those stations. Amtrak has tried
several express trains and they have all failed. A local example of
this was the /San Diegan Metroliner/ which ran for about a year
starting in September of 1984. It rarely carried more than a busload
of passengers. It lost the traffic the other trains carried from the
skipped stations. There was only one train a day leaving Los Angeles
for San Diego in the morning and returning in the afternoon. Saving
10 minutes wasn't worth the extra money for passengers if the return
train ran at an inconvenient time. Another problem with the
Metroliner was most cities with train stations lost a train to run
this new train. Many of these cities had gone to great trouble to
build new or rebuilt their stations and had not been consulted about
this decision. These cities were not happy...

Precisely this same scenario is playing with the English Javelin trains, the California HSR project, the Florida HSR, and soon coming to a minor city near you whose airport terminal will lose scheduled flights.

Looking back to Mr. Garnet's thoughts about the vital market distinction of rail, clearly the nation's towns and smaller cities, the ones left without air service, and nowadays without even bus service or anything at all, are the market for regular passenger trains. Even fifty or a hundred years of mangled government transportation policy cannot hide the basic utility and need of trains over cars and airplanes. The difficulty will be to create something that works more like a free market, replacing today's lack of choice or hope for too many towns and people.

The way forward involves tort reform, reasonable liability caps, and getting government back to /governing/, not operating, passenger trains. The same prescription holds for the freight railroads, the oil industry, even our highway and airway systems. This involves the dreaded "C" word -- Change -- and nobody much likes change; not lawyers, not unions, not management, not stockholders, and certainly not government.

We had better get started quickly.

\\/
William Lindley

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