This Week in Amtrak

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This week a tale of caution, a tale of woe, a tale of passenger rail investment in our 21st Century.

Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences

Basic physics teaches us that for every action there is a reaction. The sociologists tell us such reactions may bring unintended consequences; unanticipated and potentially undesirable outcomes. It is widely held that such unintended consequences fall into one of three categories: Positive, negative, and perverse (wherein the results of the reaction are opposite to what was intended). Prominent sociologist Robert Merton cited numerous reasons for this lack of foresight, but perhaps the most dangerous in the political arena is the “imperious immediacy of interest” wherein “…paramount concern of the immediate excludes consideration of further or other consequences …”

At this time last year, passenger rail was garnering more than its usual share of the public eye. This was entirely due to the Administration’s said goal of building “High-Speed Rail” projects all around the country, even likening these to the Federal Interstate Highway program of the 1950s. As a result, many states pulled their decades-old dreams for intrastate passenger trains off their respective shelves, shook off the dust, and slapped on “High-Speed Rail” labels. One of these was the state of Ohio which wrote, in part, in its High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Application of October 2009:

"During the past 35 years, the State of Ohio has continued planning for the reinstitution of passenger train service on its Cleveland-Columbus-Cincinnati corridor and vested several state agencies with that responsibility. In 1973, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission (LSC) moved to ‘study the feasibility’ of establishing a rapid transit system connecting Ohio’s ‘major cities’ in response to the Arab Oil Embargo. In 1977, the Ohio Rail Transportation Authority (ORTA) was created by the Ohio General Assembly to continue feasibility planning. In 1979, the Ohio legislature passed a law urging neighboring states to join them in exploring the potential for the development of a regional rail system within the Great Lakes Region. Following the 1982 defeat of a statewide sales tax initiative to advance high speed rail service, ORTA was abolished and its staff moved to the Ohio Department of Transportation.

“The initiative advanced in 1991 when the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) was enacted funding safety improvements at highway-rail grade crossings on corridors that were ‘designated’ as high-speed intercity passenger rail corridors based on their present utility and their potential for future development. It was in 2000 that the FRA designated the 3C Corridor as an extension of the Chicago Hub network and included the primary points or cities along the line: Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Cincinnati.

“Subsequent and current initiatives to advance passenger rail service in Ohio have been the responsibility of the ORDC, which was established by the Ohio General Assembly in 1994. In 1996, ORDC joined the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI), which calls for the development of a ‘Chicago Hub’ a system envisioned as a 3,000-mile rail system with eight passenger corridors serving 60 million people in a nine state region. The most current Midwest Regional Rail System (MWRRS) Plan report was issued in October 2004.”

Another of these was the state of Wisconsin. Although its rail aspirations were not as long-lived as Ohio, Wisconsin did bring its checkbook. In July 2009, the state entered an agreement with Talgo America to purchase two train sets for $47 million. As part of that agreement, Talgo would establish an assembly plant within the state’s borders. In doing so it would set the standard for the Midwest. Its High-Speed plan, also of October 2009, was the guideline for reintroducing service of some 85 miles between the state capital of Madison and Milwaukee. Although tagged with the “High-Speed” label the proposed service would never have exceeded 110 mph. The plan read in part:

“WisDOT is the lead state for the [Midwest Regional Rail Initiative] and will manage the efforts of the Steering Committee to identify the preferred train set equipment type. WisDOT also is involved in the nationwide effort to identify and acquire the preferred train set equipment through their involvement in the Next Generation Corridor Equipment Committee (mandated by the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Section 3605).”

Talgo, for its part, kept its end of the bargain. They set up shop in the former Tower Automotive facility in Milwaukee with the promise of jobs in an area perpetually hit by hard times. The train sets to be delivered are of the new Talgo Series VIII, which are to be fully FRA-compliant and needing no waivers. The two sets ordered in 2009 will be placed in service on the existing Chicago - Milwaukee Hiawatha service. (The state of Oregon also ordered two sets, also to be built in Wisconsin.) It was initially hoped that two more train sets would be ordered for the expanded Madison - Milwaukee service. Ultimately, a new maintenance facility would be established in Madison.

At face value, this seemed like a good idea; a state connecting its largest city to its capital. New Mexico accomplished the same in 2008 when it connected Albuquerque with Santa Fe; however, the New Mexico Rail Runner has the look and feel of a commuter train, and has a total length of 97 miles. Recently the Commonwealth of Virginia announced its intention to connect its second largest city, Norfolk, with the state capital of Richmond, a distance of 109 miles. At no time in either case was the moniker “High-Speed” ever used or applied.

As with most parties these days, however, after the champagne stops flowing and the music stops playing, comes the stark dawn of day. The HSR party was no different. This ersatz High-Speed Rail was deemed as grossly indulgent in an era of austerity. New regimes elected to high office in Ohio and Wisconsin view HSR as too rich for their blood. Both new projects have been canceled, and the Federal monies reallocated to other states.

Talgo, for its part, will continue to hold up its end of the bargain; however, instead of filling the 125 positions originally projected, it will fill just 65. The four train sets on order for Wisconsin and Oregon will be completed by 2012. If no new orders are secured by then, the Milwaukee plant will only be used as a maintenance base for Wisconsin’s equipment. [As we go to press it has been reported Talgo shall move its operation to Illinois. Details of this shall be forthcoming.]

It was believed by many that these projects of Ohio and Wisconsin were reasonable -- and realistic -- due to their basic nature. Despite the “High-Speed” label, they were really in fact just a return to the past, with schedules that would not have been out of pace just two or three generations ago. Since these were really conventional trains and not the gold-plated fast trains of another continent, it was hoped those in charge would see past the HSR-“imperious immediacy of interest“; however, this was not to be. Even though all that glitters is not gold if it is perceived by the public to be gold, then it is a target. And whereas the call was for “High-Speed Rail” to be built around the country, it appears its collapse will doom many conventional rail projects as well. Can any other reaction be more “perverse?”

This Week in Amtrak

Image by Madbuster75 via Flickr
After a slow August in the world of passenger rail, we return to a busy soon-to-be autumn.

According to Fred Frailey in TRAINS magazine,

Union Pacific has told Amtrak that changing the Sunset Limited‘s frequency from tri-weekly to daily will cost the government-supported company about $750 million in capital improvements.

That’s almost as much as Phoenix spent building an entirely new 20-mile “light rail” system — including two large bridges and a complete modern maintenance facility and fifty computer-controlled trolley cars. We eagerly await U.P.’s wish-list. One wonders, once you spend some millions to restore a missing connection at San Antonio to eliminate back-up moves, add a couple formerly removed station tracks at places like Tucson, add a bridge here and some signals there … how do you come up with three-quarters of a billion dollars to run one train once a day?

Meanwhile, Berkshire’s BNSF issued a two-part $750 million bond, $250 million for a 10-year period at 3.616% and a 30-year $500 million part at 5.074%, both paying a premium over Treasury bonds.

In his annual letter to shareholders, Berkshire chief Warren Buffett wrote: “Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens — yes, tens — of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital…” So the same dollar figure that U.P. wants for one passenger train, it seems, is the same as BNSF’s first installment in sprucing up its entire system. Does one of those numbers seem a bit off?

Next, to Ohio, where Republican gubernatorial candidate John Kasich has “vowed to kill the 3C plan if elected.” This train, which would connect Cincinnati, Dayton, Columbus and Cleveland, is in line for a $25 million for a preliminary study. Kasich and his advisors apparently are fretting over the $400 million starting price tag, and continuing state outlays. One does wonder, where is one penny of income from Ohio’s libraries? From Ohio’s fire departments? From Ohio’s superhighways? Oh, you say they result in increased education, decreased property losses, and increased economic and social activity, right? So why do we not frame trains in the same way? What is the cost of a trip not taken…

Yet we rail advocates find ourselves in a nasty predicament. Every time good work gets done, as in Ohio, toward a new train… or in Boise… or anywhere across the country where cities and states who want better transportation, and the social and economic benefits that stem from trains… Every time new Amtrak service is proposed, the price is so high and the service to be so slim that nothing ever happens. A year ago we looked at Amtrak’s Ohio report, one of three wrong-think reports issued around that time. We saw how “Amtrak really doesn’t want to be in the passenger railroad business” and, although there were some hopeful signs in subsequent months, we seem still stuck in the same doldrums as for the past 40 years.

One correspondent writes,

Amtrak’s complaints are so ingrained in politicians’ and voters’ minds that when some good public relations is needed, the cupboard is not only bare, but snarling back at those seeking relief.

Another writes that Amtrak,

has spent most of the last forty years not only saying, but proving, that passenger rail is a fiscal sinkhole. Needless to say the green eye-shade brigade in state capitals that must produce a balanced state budget every year takes on massive new obligations only with trepidation.

Add to this carriers like Union Pacific pulling massive numbers, some might think out of a hat, but perhaps out of reasonable expectations based on past dismal performance of a government-run passenger railroad, and here we sit, stalled again.

Perhaps the most excellent description of the conundrum is Steve Forbes’ recent commentary on high-speed rail. Forbes, logically unconvinced by what trains might be able to do, looks at projects like the Acela so-called high speed train which have failed to deliver on practically any of their promises, and at the cost of billions including a hidden billion-dollar loan from Canada… and rightly asks, Where is the benefit? Forbes doesn’t see any. And without benefit, what is the point of pouring billions more dollars into it? At some point, there have to be results. Call it return on investment.

To succeed in business, to succeed in the real world, you have to become indispensable. Apple has done that. Google has done that. Some might say Amtrak seems to have concentrated on becoming irrelevant.

Perhaps the renaissance of passenger trains will have to occur from the bottom up. USA Today reports that Denver has broken ground for its commuter train to the International Airport that replaced Stapleton Field. This is to be the long-anticipated first of four commuter lines radiating from Union Station which will complement Denver’s light-rail system. The article continues,

Denver joins a growing list of U.S. airports that are trying to promote public rail transportation. Others that will be connected directly via rail in the coming years include Dallas Love Field, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, Miami, Dallas/Fort Worth, Oakland, Washington Dulles and Los Angeles.

An AP newswire story tells how even Arizona is planning on a commuter and regional train system:

“It will not be possible to accommodate growth and avoid traffic congestion by improving roadways alone, so passenger rail should become a key component of the Sun Corridor transportation system,” the draft plan stated, referring to a planning area that stretches from Prescott on the north to Nogales on the south and includes both Phoenix and Tucson.

Phoenix is seeing results with its Metro trains, with monthly averages up to 44,000 daily riders, far above the projected 26,500, and continuing year-over-year increases. With few exceptions, every city that has built a rail system in the past decades has met or exceeded expectations, and brought new development and a renewed sense of place and community pride. The cost has shown its benefit. Why should there be any different standard for intercity trains?

Finally, as promised, this on first-class accomodations.
AMTRAK SLEEPING CARS ARE THE BEST VALUE AMTRAK OWNS

Commentary by Andrew C. Selden and Randy Schlotthauer, URPA

Note: This item was on (Congressman) Eric Cantor’s list of budget cuts he wants people to vote on. Only 48% of respondents to the poll favored the idea, but on Thursday, July 22, Mr. Cantor and some of his followers appeared on the floor of the U.S. House to extol the desirability of this cut. An amendment to a pending bill was introduced to implement the idea, but was rejected 234-179. We asked Mr. Selden and Mr. Schlotthauer to comment on the reasons this idea was not a good one. – Russ Jackson

Eric Cantor: “Prohibit ‘First-Class’ Subsidies on Amtrak; Potential savings of $1.2 billion over ten years. While only 16 percent of Amtrak long-distance passengers opt for “sleeper class” travel, as opposed to coach class, federal taxpayers provide substantial extra subsidies for this first class travel. Passengers in long-distance first class travel are provided a sleeping room, many with a private toilet and shower, turn-down service, and complimentary entertainment and pre-paid food. Yet, Amtrak loses more than twice as much per passenger (an average of $396) for first class service as compared to coach class service. These losses are made up by taxpayers. This proposal would eliminate subsidies for first-class service and require Amtrak to provide any first class service at cost.”

Andrew C. Selden: The issue is the corrupt Amtrak RPS-based internal MIS/cost accounting system. Large subsidies to western sleepers are an artifact, if not an intentional distortion, caused by the system, not the business activity. We can show (and have often done so) that these sleepers are substantial net contributors of free cash flow to Amtrak, failing only to cover arbitrarily allocated shares of other system, not operating, costs, only some of which are even indirectly related to the operation of these services.

The Superliner sleeping car, measured by business economic factors like return on capital investment, load factor, revenue per dollar invested, etc., is the best thing Amtrak owns. These members of Congress should look closely at actual sleeping car fares out west, where many passengers are paying thousands of dollars for a single trip. There is NO POSSIBILITY that these fares are losing money on a direct cost basis. The catch is always to audit deeply what costs Amtrak is charging against the sleeping car revenues to determine that a loss exists in the first place. That is where the members of Congress were being conned.

The collateral issue is the subsidy that these sleepers provide to the dining cars. FIRST, diners are indispensable to all travelers on LD trains, where the AVERAGE trip runs 15-20 hours in duration (varying by route). These people therefore (including every coach passenger) are on board over two to four meal periods (and of course some for even more). Lose the diner, and you’ll lose ALL the passengers, not just the “fat cat” families and retirees in the sleepers. The sleeper fare transfer to the diner is what keeps the diner on at all—by including meals in the sleeper fare, Amtrak guarantees a predictable base of revenue to the diner. Take away the sleepers and that fare transfer, and with the loss of sleeping car passengers (most of whom wouldn’t be caught dead making a two or three day trip in coach) and their fare transfers to the diner, the diner would have to charge obscene prices that would drive out the remaining coach passengers, and without meals over two to three day trips, no one will ride and the trains would be empty.

If Congress wants to look for subsidies to first class riders, have them divide the Acela first class revenue by its proportionate share of the annual two-thirds of a billion dollars of subsidy “invested” each year into the NEC. Those numbers are real and staggering, even though Amtrak never reports them as such.

Randy Schlotthauer: Were it not for the frightening lack of concern by our government about the concerns of citizens, not to mention their misplacing of the Constitution (I have several copies of my own that I would be happy to donate to them), this entire debate over “first class” subsidies would be so tiresome that I would not be drawn to the laptop to respond to it. Those of us that have been involved with Amtrak since THE BEGINNING (that would be before many supporters and opponents were born) have seen this windmill tilted at every year. I remember when we were desperately phoning and writing politicians, interest groups, and anybody else that would listen over a $246M TOTAL SUBSIDY that promised that the pin would be pulled on October 1, (fill in the year). This was in the good old days when there were just two types of cars: Amfleet and everything else, which wasn’t much. Though few of us at the time would have granted it, Amtrak President Graham Claytor managed to “modernize” the fleet with new equipment which in retrospect probably saved the LD trains, which we were convinced he was conspiring with THEM to eliminate.

Though designed with the promise and physical capability to deliver a high quality LD experience, through active sabotage by some crew members and a benign neglect (read: stupidity) on the part of management. None of the LD trains ever made full use of the features designed into the cars, and did not repair equipment that was damaged or stolen by passengers, crew, and the denizens of 16th St, 8th Street, and other “maintenance facilities”. As a result, even the best attempts by individual route managers to ended up flowering and then all too soon downgraded due to budget cuts that often were the disguised jealousies of other route managers. Despite the efforts of the original RailPAC-URPA group to introduce market economic laws and theories to Amtrak and it’s 485 owners, every year it was a battle for survival, with Amtrak management’s RPS accounting system proving that they could be profitable if not for those nasty LD trains.

Never was enough capacity provided to even approach break even, which was all any serious advocate discussed. If every seat in every car on every train on every day were filled at the highest tariff fare, there would still be a loss. Even Herb Kelleher (Southwest Airlines) couldn’t do anything with one triweekly plane to its largest potential markets. He recognized that planes (and trains too!) make money only if they are moving and filled with people. In fact Herb was one of Amtrak’s greatest opponents, because he knew what a well run passenger railroad could do.

So today we are discussing the proposed elimination of the First Class Subsidy, in order to “save” the railroad. First of all, the last trip I took in a Deluxe Bedroom on #3 and #4 could not be called luxury by any stretch of the imagination. Indeed, Denny’s offers superior food, service, and even entertainment (if you are at the right one at the right time of night). When you kill the sleepers you kill the diner and lounge. When you kill those, you are the Southern Pacific in the 1960′s, although this time there are not enough people that buy the line that America NEEDS Amtrak. I can build you a great case for a quality passenger rail service, including multiple classes of service. I can even build you a case of how you make it break even in 10 years. RailPAC-URPA’s Dr. Adrian Herzog did the math a long time ago, and it still works. What I cannot do is build a case to justify an Amtrak First Class Subsidy for LD trains. There is corporate culture at Amtrak that would fight any attempts to a really make things work.

This Week in Amtrak

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Volume 7, Number 13
April 22nd, 2010



A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Our desks being at last clear of the beloved IRS instruction booklets, and with last year’s tax forms safely snuggled in their bankers’ boxes, we turn now to how a few of our hard-earned dollars are — refreshingly — wisely to be spent in Ohio.


We hear this week from our Bruce Richardson who wrote the following just before (according to the Fort Wayne Journal Gazette), “Democrats on the state Controlling Board voted 4-3 along party lines to approve spending $25 million in federal stimulus money to complete final engineering and design work on” Ohio’s Three Cs corridor this Monday. This is a wise investment, giving planners the opportunity to prove the plan’s worthiness: “Future support from GOP lawmakers on the panel will be crucial. State law requires a supermajority vote for capital improvements on passenger rail development…” reports the Journal Gazette, so lawmakers will have the opportunity to weigh the merits of the complete design before committing to construction.

This is a welcome development; Mr. Richardson explains why:

Oh, Ohio.
By Bruce Richardson
It’s a mad, mad, mad world in Ohio right now for rail fans, who for decades have been agitating for the creation of the Three Cs corridor. The rail fans are “this close” to having the Three Cs corridor recreated, tying Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati together in one passenger train run after the feds opened the treasury and doled out $400 million in free federal stimulus monies to create the route.

Currently, Cleveland has dreary nocturnal service in each direction courtesy of the Lake Shore Limited and the Capitol Limited. Cleveland has a metropolitan area population of 2.25 million, yet Amtrak passengers entraining and detraining only total 39,371 for fiscal year 2009. Cincinnati fares even worse, with only three days a week nocturnal service provided by the Cardinal. Cincinnati’s metropolitan area is almost as large as Cleveland, with an area population of 2.15 million souls. Hardly anybody notices the Cardinal in Cincinnati, with only 14,777 FY 2009 passengers entraining and detraining.

Columbus isn’t even on Amtrak’s map. The metropolitan area population is 1.77 million, not a small city.

The plan is to right this wrong by creating a four round-trips day train between the three cities and Dayton, with some extra stops along the way. Here’s the problem: Ohio’s governor wants to do this, Ohio’s Department of Transportation wants to do this, and the feds want to do this. But, the majority party in the Ohio state senate doesn’t want to do this, and some members of a state commission which ultimately have to sign off on this don’t want to do it, either.

The naysayers say thanks very much for the $400 million, but what about the small state matching money and funds for operating the trains? They are afraid Ohio will be in the same position as charity recipients are on that silly ABC Television reality show, Extreme Makeover Home Edition: Some goofy looking guy with bad hair who for whatever reason nobody can figure out has become a celebrity hands you a nice gift, but you can’t afford to keep it up or pay the taxes on it year after year. So, rail fans in Ohio are gritting their teeth, and can taste the new Three Cs corridor it’s so close. All of this comes down to convincing just less than a handful of people of the wonders of intrastate passenger train travel, and the Three Cs will be a reality.

The question must be asked: Has anyone educated these recalcitrant public servants about other state success stories? Have they quizzed their next door neighbors in Illinois about how successful those state trains are? Did they take a look at the country’s most important state, Virginia, and see how in just the first quarter of operations of the new Lynchburg train, the state paid no operating subsidy in the second month to Amtrak because ridership and revenue passenger miles were so successful? Did anyone consult with North Carolina, home to the country’s most enlightened state department of transportation on rail matters about how to run state-subsidized passenger trains successfully so the subsidies remain low or nonexistent? What about California, and its giant, successful state rail program?

All of this boils down to education and the proper presentation of facts. Most likely, Ohio politicians are relying on past Amtrak studies, such as last year’s Three Cs report, which predicted low ridership and high expenses, as Amtrak always does to prevent later finger pointing claiming the company was too optimistic. Instead of doing their own homework, they incorrectly relied on the work of someone else. Had they done their own homework they probably would have come up with a completely different set of numbers and been able to make far different decisions.

Another point of contention is the alleged speed of the proposed trains. The alleged forces of evil claim the overall speed is too slow for the money being spent. visions of high speed trains dance in their heads. Nobody told these folks about incrementalism, using relatively inexpensive conventional rail such as found in the Three Cs proposal as a building block and later feeder system for high speed rail.

The war in Ohio will continue until someone figures out a way to educate these politicians about the realities of passenger rail and the promise passenger rail holds for a balanced transportation system in the future. Until that day comes, Ohio will be a state of highways, not a state of transportation choices.



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This Week in Amtrak

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This Week at Amtrak; March 8, 2010

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida
32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 7, Number 8

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org .

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jack Benny, one of America's most beloved comedians and reputed tightwad extraordinaire, was perpetually 39 years old; Amtrak, this first of May, will join Mr. Benny at milepost 39. Benny's radio and television persona never sold his ancient Maxwell automobile, but Amtrak does seem to have traded in some sputtering old ideas for new ones.

First off, the news items:

* The State of Oregon reports it has purchased two new TALGO
trainsets for
service between Eugene and Vancouver, British Columbia.
* Jolene Molitoris, currently Director of Ohio Department of
Transportation, and former Federal Railroad Administration chief,
this Wednesday "gave a passionate speech about ODOT" and the
nascent 3-C (Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Cincinnati) corridor.
According to "Linking Ohio ," Ms.
Molitoris emphasized "that no corridor has ever gone from zero
passenger rail options to high-speed rail in one step. She
described projects like in Maine and North Carolina that all
started with standard speed rail before upgrading to
higher-speed." Linking Ohio, which is a project of the 501(c)3
non-profit All Aboard Ohio, noted that improving current speeds --
39 mph average, 79 mph top speed -- needs to be the first phase
"of a larger passenger rail strategy."
* And then from North Carolina comes the news, according "The
not-so-fast track for high speed rail
"
(Stateline.org, 25 February 2010), that a "$520 million chunk [of
the Federal high speed funds]... will go toward 30 specific
improvements between Raleigh and Charlotte, and another $25
million will be used to reduce [rail] congestion between Raleigh
and Richmond, Virginia... Eugene Conti, North Carolina’s secretary
of transportation, says work on the upgrades will start within a
few months. The projects include adding more double-tracking that
would allow freight and passenger trains to pass each other and
separating rails from roads. The changes are designed to cut down
on delays for both trains and auto traffic."
* On the flip side, Buena Park, California may have to demolish a
brand-new passenger station if the planned high-speed trains whiz
past there without stopping (AP story, 8 March
),
and Florida's newly-awarded high-speed train is not planned to
connect with SunRail commuter trains (cable-only local news
"channel 13" story, 5 March
;
and commentary on The Infrastructurist
).
Doesn't anyone talk to anyone else anymore?
* Saturday's Amtrak Town Hall, sponsored by TRAINS magazine
(Kalmbach Publishing Co.) was the first of its kind.
Presentations, plans, and candid discussions indicate Amtrak has
some good people who are making real progress. More on this
shortly, but one remark overheard afterward was, "For the first
time I heard discussion of 'per revenue passenger mile' rather
than just 'per passenger.'"
* And a personal note: "Gentle Readers" is how Isaac Asimov -- a
modern-day Renaissance man, author of nearly 500 books, and my
chief inspiration to learn about science, arts, literature,
history and everything -- addressed his audience, and I will
occasionally use his phrase in remembrance.

Next, some feedback --

On the PIRG report, C.B. Hall writes:

I saw the document as an expression of advocacy, not an analysis of
high-speed rail's actual prospects. Chief among the obstacles - and
an obstacle I don't recall US PIRG even mentioning - is the
likelihood of political winds shifting in Washington, DC. We now
have a national administration that is exceptionally well disposed
towards passenger rail, but that administration has less than three
years to go. We're not going to get HSR, or even a major part of it,
done by the next presidential election. What we can get done is a
foretaste of HSR can ultimately do.

The investment should go to a very limited number of corridors where
visible results can be achieved on the shortest timeline. Three
years from now, we may have a national administration that returns
non-NEC HSR funding to the $25 million or whatever it was all
through the 1990s. That likelihood will decrease, however, if in the
meantime HSR in a few model corridors is far enough advanced to act
as good advertising to the rest of the country. Otherwise, the risk
of stagnation and skepticism only grows.

Yes, Mr. Hall, the report addressed "here's what we need and how we can get there" more than it asked, "what stands in our way." Being guardedly optimistic, it exemplifies elimination of once-widespread socialist dogma which stunted rail passenger advocacy for decades. Look, if you want to start an argument, propose a project that will "reduce Global Warming." If you want to get something done, propose a project that will "reduce Pollution." Same project, but which one will get built?
Eliminate the rhetoric from passenger train advocacy and let's get people moving.

To Mr. Hall's other point, a perfect example of a results-oriented approach is the San Diego Trolley, which built its first, highly successful, line at low cost, and proved its value to the community.
North Carolina is doing the right thing already: read on.

Regarding continued expansion of passenger rail, reader Stan Probstein asks:

[W]hy does Amtrak continue to be the best kept secret for rail
travel? Why isn't Amtrak advertising on cable networks like Fox News
channel, MSNBC and CNN as well as on the broadcast networks? How can
rail travel make a comeback if new rail ridership isn't informed?

True, the only market-specific advertising ever run in Phoenix by sputtering old Maxwell-style Amtrak was in 1996 to announce the closure of Union Station and the re-routing of the Sunset Limited. However, if updated thinking as was heard at this week's Chicago's Town Hall meeting is any indication, -- Stay tuned.

Now, let's look at a hypothetical 81-mile passenger train route. By the way, that happens to be the distance from Tampa to Orlando.

Key to investing our dollars wisely, is understanding the difference between Average speed and Top speed. Trains do not accelerate like sports cars; subway trains with their powerful electric motors accelerate at about 2.5 miles per hour per second, or in the parlance of race cars, "zero to 60 in half a minute or so." A conventional diesel-electric passenger train takes perhaps two minutes from a standing stop to 60 mph. Similar figures apply to slowing down. Thus, it is far more important to eliminate slow sections of track than it is to have short stretches of theoretical high speeds.

Amtrak today operates the 81-mile Orlando-Tampa route with six intermediate stops in almost exactly 2 hours - about 40 mph average speed. Eliminating most of the stops would save perhaps fifteen minutes, but at a severe impact to ridership and to the detriment of Kissimmee, Waldo, Ocala, Wildwood, Dade City, and Lakeland.

I have here a spreadsheet with rough estimations of times for a route with one station stop and a 1/4 mile section of 10mph (like a bridge or slow curve). Plugging in some sample numbers, let's look at what happens as we increase top speed.

top speed, *59* mph: *1 hour, 27 minutes*
top speed *79* mph with curve upgrade to 30mph: *1:08* (saves *19*
minutes)
*90* mph, *1:02* (saves an additional *6* minutes)
*110* mph, *53* minutes (saves an additional *9* minutes)
*168* mph, *44* minutes (saves an additional *10* minutes)

The biggest time savings comes from increasing the top speed to 79mph versus 59mph. Beyond 90mph, we save only twenty more minutes by nearly doubling that speed. Going three times as fast (180mph vs. 60) doesn't get you there three times as fast, either: only about twice as fast, because of acceleration and deceleration.

And the cost of a 168mph railroad is far beyond a 90mph railroad. Beyond 110, trains cannot share tracks with heavy freight trains, nor can there be grade crossings, so an entirely new guideway is needed.

Removing bottlenecks is the single best thing: upgrading that one curve to 30mph saves about 1 minute; to 59mph, about 2 min. Compare two minutes savings for the cost of a single curve or bridge against 20 minutes saved upgrading 80 miles of track, and you're looking at a pretty favorable cost-benefit ratio.

The practical impact is that incremental investments up to 79mph have direct, positive impact on freight and passenger trains alike; much above 90mph starts to diminish the utility of corridors for freight; and above 110mph removes passenger trains from most existing corridors, at stratospheric costs for new rights-of-way and without the benefit to industry and jobs that accrue from better freight service.

Looking again at North Carolina, Secretary Conti says that the high-speed funds there will result in noticeable "improvements in stations, on the track and with equipment in the next couple years...
Our focus is to show progress in the immediate sense..." (stateline.org)

Amtrak of late seems to be involved with sensible projects that will get built, like North Carolina's upgrades, while also talking refreshingly favorably about intercity routes at the Chicago Town Hall. Will America's modern passenger trains finally catch their stride at Amtrak's 39th birthday? Stay tuned, Gentle Readers.

\\/
William Lindley,
Scottsdale, Ariz.

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This Week in Amtrak

Image by Patrick Rasenberg via Flickr

This Week at Amtrak; September 25, 2009



A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org





Volume 6, Number 41



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.



URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.



1) Amtrak is three for three. The third report (and, there are more to come) about the start of new service is just like the two previous reports: Amtrak really doesn’t want to be in the passenger railroad business.



The third report is a feasibility report on proposed Amtrak service for the 3-C Corridor, which encompasses Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati by way of Dayton, Ohio. The two prior reports concerned the restoration of service on the Sunset Limited route east of New Orleans, and restoration of the Pioneer route from Denver northwest to Seattle.



It’s important to note that of the three reports, this report has the best detail and lays out its arguments for implementation better than the other two reports.



Let’s start with some facts and numbers as outlined in the report.



Length of route – 255 miles



Number of freight host railroads – 3



Proposed scheduled running time, end to end – 6 hours, 30 minutes



Capital costs for infrastructure improvements – $236,200,000



Capital costs for track upgrading – $51,400,000



Capital costs for mechanical facilities – $55,000,000



Capital costs for equipment procurement – $175,000,000 or $4,380,000 per piece average



Estimated annual ridership — 478,000 passengers



Estimated annual revenue – $12,200,000



Estimated annual operating expense – $29,200,000



Estimated annual operating subsidy – $17,000,000



2) Let’s start with annual revenue. Extrapolating from Amtrak’s numbers, the average fare proposed is $25.52 per passenger, or about 11 to 12 cents per revenue passenger mile.



Why Amtrak has proposed such a low number (Even though, as said in this space many times before, conservative estimates for income and high estimate for expenses are best.) is another Amtrak mystery. Amtrak’s average revenue passenger mile income for its 26 corridor routes is 20.65 cents per mile; the figure Amtrak proposes mirrors what is earned on the Kansas City-St. Louis corridor, which has an annual load factor of only 37.4%.



A bump to 14 or 15 cents a revenue passenger mile, which still puts the corridor below other routes such as the Pere Marquette, Carolinian, Wolverine, or even the Illinois Zephyr, would generate a more realistic revenue figure of $15,000,000 or more.



Look at the consist; probably 300 seats per consist of five coaches and one food service car which also has business class seating. Using the number above, Amtrak is estimating just over 1,300 passengers per day total, breaking down to 163 passengers per each of eight departures a day. While that is a robust 54% load factor, that still falls 10% or more under most other Midwest route load factors.



Amtrak has estimated operating costs of $80,000 a day for the eight departures. Train mile costs to the host railroads will run an estimated $10,000 a day, which leave another $70,000 for maintenance, crew costs (less than $11,000 a day), reservations, station costs, and corporate overhead. At these rates, Ohio could probably do better with a non-Amtrak operator than the high costs of Amtrak operations.



As with the other two reports, Amtrak says it has no equipment available in its pool of stored and wrecked equipment to get these trains on the road, and – again – trots out the line all new equipment must be purchased with years-long lead time.



Not true. Amtrak says it needs five trainsets of five coaches, one food service/business class car, one locomotive, and one non-powered control unit for push-pull operations. All of this, says Amtrak, will cost an astounding $175,000,000, or an average of $4,380,000 per car/locomotive/unit.



In its current stored/wrecked inventory, Amtrak has 55 stored Amfleet I coaches and food service cars, and 24 wrecked cars which can be restored. That’s a total of 79 pieces of equipment, for an equipment pool need of 30 passenger cars. Amtrak also has 30 P40 locomotives in storage, and nine F40 locomotives stashed away, waiting for use. Certainly, somewhere in 39 pieces of equipment, five locomotives and five NPCUs can be found without having to buy new equipment. Even at upgrading/rehab prices of $1,000,000 per car or locomotive for 40 pieces of equipment, that’s miles and miles ahead of the $175,000,000 Amtrak says it needs for all new equipment, or, a savings of $135,000,000.



The capital costs for maintenance facilities is a little steep, too. The majority of the fleet maintenance will be done in Cleveland, with turn-maintenance being performed in Cincinnati and Columbus. Fifty-five million dollars for one enclosed shop facility and one wash facility, plus a few other goodies for the turn facilities in the two other cities is high; probably by at least 40%, unless the ground these facilities are being put on is tragically expensive.



And then, there is training, which seems to be Amtrak’s favorite category to overcharge anybody who will pay the price. Estimated road crew training for this route is an astounding $5,900,000. As with the Pioneer route similar figure, it’s impossible to imagine how training road crews for a 255 mile route could even approach even half of this figure. Amtrak is doing nothing but padding its pocket at the expense of Ohio.



3) Amtrak makes a good case for the chosen route, and it’s apparent the Ohio Rail Development Commission laid down some positive guidelines for this route study. The proposed route is one of three, and it is the shortest, most direct route from Cleveland to Cincinnati via Berea, Columbus, Dayton, and Middletown.



After departure from the existing Cleveland Amtrak Lakefront station, every inch of the route is over freight tracks which do not currently host passenger trains. Some track has speed restrictions of 15 to 25 miles per hour, and goes through a lot of congested city areas.



But, the route has a nearby population of roughly 6,900,000 residents, with a large collection of colleges and universities. The cost of improving the freight infrastructure is significant, and the cost of the coming Positive Train Control must be considered in any proposal. As with the Pioneer study, most likely the early infrastructure numbers in this report represent more of a “wish list” between Amtrak, the three host railroads, and the Ohio Rail Development Commission. As with all wish lists, when reality sets in, costs usually go down, not up.



The Cleveland Lakefront station is the only current station considered for use; it’s been so long since this Ohio route area has had passenger service, no suitable stations exist for recreating this route. When you are talking about stations, you are also talking about train platforms, parking, and waiting areas. Wisely, this report and Ohio assume if a local city wants a station stop, it will pay for the construction of a station stop, as well as on-going maintenance of the station.



One bothersome aspect of the report is the proposed station in Cincinnati. Currently, Amtrak’s Cardinal stops in Cincinnati in the dead of night for three roundtrips a week. The Cardinal uses a small part of Cincinnati’s magnificent and huge art deco station. For the 3-C service, a proposal has been made another station be created out of a riverside restaurant instead of the train going a longer distance into the Cincinnati terminal complex.



The assumption is made in the report that since the Cardinal is a nocturnal train for Cincinnati, little cross business will be created. The report seems to forget passenger train riders are an intrepid lot, and when a connection can be found – no matter how inconvenient – some riders will use it.



The argument about whether or not to use the existing station and create a second station will have to be settled by those in Ohio who will eventually be writing the check for this intrastate service. However, for all of the money which will be put into infrastructure for this route, exploring the costs of extending the route – if reasonable – into the existing Cincinnati station is a worthy goal. In the end, connectivity is everything, and optimists can hope that one day more than just a nocturnal Cardinal will be calling at Cincinnati.



An interesting note in the report, talking about the Cleveland station and proposed maintenance facilities there says, “Therefore, this study recommends the construction of a shop and repair facility in Cleveland to perform all maintenance, repairs, washing, fueling and sanding, as well as layover and turnaround servicing, for the entire fleet of 3-C cars and locomotives. This should include the capability in future years to perform heavy repairs as the equipment ages. It should be noted this facility is planned, not only for the maintenance needs of the initial 3-C Corridor, but also for the future Cleveland Hub System with passenger train service proposed to be initiated rom Cleveland to Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, and other points.”



4) This report is an expensive start for Ohio, but, costs aside, it provide a rational starting point. It will be up to the Ohio Rail Development Commission to sit down with Amtrak eye to eye and go over every costly step and find out the real costs and real revenues. It’s interesting one news report said this report represents $400,000,000 more in start-up costs than Ohio had anticipated. Ohio needs to follow the leads of California and North Carolina when negotiating with Amtrak, and figure out how much is bluff and how much is fact. California learned years ago that if it left route advertising up to Amtrak, the state’s annual share of operating costs for its corridors would sky rocket. But, if California relies on its own resources, it can influence the amount of ridership, and, conversely influence the amount of subsidy needed for some trains. Ohio needs to take note.



5) Every day’s e-mail to This Week at Amtrak is a never-ending parade of thoughts and ideas. Here’s the latest.



[Begin quote]



Hello once again URPA,



I'm glad that others share my view on letting other companies operate long-distance routes in this country. Even though a lot of people in the rail community are (deservedly) excited about the aspect of high speed rail coming to their states, they should also remember that competition also applies to the long-distance trains as well, and that pressure needs to be kept on Amtrak. After reading some of the more recent TWA articles, it's obvious to me that certain people in Amtrak's management need a wake-up call (whether it's by losing out on the majority of the HSR corridors or by watching some of its long-distance routes return to the freight railroads, something big needs to happen to shake them up). After all, the poorly handled Sunset Limited report, a failure to drastically upgrade overnight fleet, and demanding states to pay for long-distance routes have all happened on their watch.



Division B, Title II, Section 214 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 says:



(a) In General – Within 1 year after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, the Federal Railroad Administration shall complete a rulemaking proceeding to develop a pilot program that –



`(1) permits a rail carrier or rail carriers that own infrastructure over which Amtrak operates a passenger rail service route described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of section 24102(5) or in section 24702 to petition the Administration to be considered as a passenger rail service provider over that route in lieu of Amtrak for a period not to exceed 5 years after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008.



Now, with all the talk about whether Amtrak is really disinterested in operating long-distance trains in the long-term, why don't some of the friendlier host railroads contemplate bidding for some of the overnight routes? Pullman may be gone, but the hosts could talk to a manufacturer like the revived Colorado Rail Car company about acquiring some real dining cars and sleepers.



At last year's Railway Age conference, railroad author Frank Wilner advocated returning intercity passenger trains to the freight companies because he thought that “a sound business model” would win over anti-Amtrak politicians in Congress (Source: January 2009 Railfan & Railroads). While it sounds tempting, I’m not sure that all passenger routes can be returned to the host railroads. Instead, I propose that the hosts talk to the likes of Herzog, First Group America, and some of the foreign bidders for HSR and get them to run the trains. I would definitely like to see routes like the Crescent and Silver Star be supplemented with daytime counterparts so I don't have to go from the Carolinas to Atlanta or Florida in the middle of the night.



The hosts would work out a three or four-way partnership with each other and the new entity operating the route (for example, a daily Sunset Limited could have an agreement with BNSF, CSX, Union Pacific, and First Group America) as a way of avoiding the problem of changing trains. Meanwhile, BNSF could run the Southwest Chief by itself and add routes and branches like a spur to Phoenix (a similar situation would apply to Norfolk Southern with the Crescent).



One more thing, the Auto Train concept could be added to other markets by the host railroads (after all, those empty auto racks currently seen on freight trains could be very useful). It may not have been feasible to have a Midwest-Florida Auto Train route 26 years ago, but if gas ever returns to September 2008 levels, it would be more than practical for the Auto Train concept to be extended to other parts of the country.



– Anonymous



P.S. Based on the discussion in the URPA Intranet group during the Labor Day weekend, states like Florida should contact Veolia or any of the companies which fail to get HSR bids to operate conventional speed routes as a precursor to high speed service.



[End quote]



6) Coming in the next issue of TWA: William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona has more thoughts on the future of passenger rail.







If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to



freetwa@unitedrail.org



You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from twa@unitedrail.org; we are unable to go through any approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.



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Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA’s web site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be found.



URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.



J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org

This Week in Amtrak

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

This Week at Amtrak; September 22, 2009



A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org





Volume 6, Number 40



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.



URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.



1) Now, there is no doubt. Amtrak doesn’t want to be in the passenger railroad business. Last week Amtrak released a requested study on Ohio’s “3 C” corridor, which runs from Cleveland to Cincinnati via Columbus and Dayton. And, Amtrak released a preliminary draft for discussion for the much-awaited Pioneer route restoration between (Chicago), Denver, and the Pacific Northwest. The part of the route from Chicago to Denver would travel over the existing California Zephyr route, but from Denver westward it would be a restored route.



We will examine each proposal, with the Ohio examination coming in the next issue of This Week at Amtrak, but it’s clear Amtrak is pricing the costs of these routes so high it’s trying to discourage backers and political entities along the route it really doesn’t want to create or restore either of these routes, much in the vein it did with the previous Gulf Coast report earlier this summer.



Yes, of course, any good businessman makes a presentation which is conservative on sales projections, and high on costs. That way, when things work out like they are supposed to beyond the projections, there are no nasty little surprises. But, Amtrak has gone to such extremes in both of these instances, one can only begin to guess at the metrics Amtrak used to create these studies. Good business sense certainly never came into play when putting these studies together.



One consistent component of these two studies and the previous Gulf Coast study is Amtrak expects individual states to pony up money for these trains, and doesn’t seem to assume any responsibility for being a national passenger train operator, which transcends state boundaries.



2) To read the Pioneer preliminary report asking for comment before final submission to Congress on October 15th is to truly understand corporate shallowness.



For years, Amtrak has gotten away with running the Empire Builder with a Portland, Oregon section separate from the Seattle section by splitting and joining the train in Spokane, Washington. Just as Amtrak does also with the Boston section of the Lake Shore Limited separate from the New York City section, nearly a complete train is operated, minus a dining car. Both of these operations miss a huge revenue producing opportunity for a full, second frequency to operate over the majority of the route.



Time and again, we know a second frequency on any route not only boosts ridership, revenues, and revenue passenger miles significantly, but it also spreads the infrastructure costs such as stations over two trains instead of one.



The Silver Meteor and Silver Star on the Right Coast travel nearly identical routes between New York City and Miami, with the Star diverting from the Meteor’s route to traverse the old Seaboard Air Line Railroad route via Raleigh, North Carolina and Columbia, South Carolina, and also call at Tampa, Florida. Less than four hours is added to the running time of the Star versus the Meteor, and the payback for that is reflected in two million additional revenue passenger miles generated for the Star over the Meteor’s performance.



The Silver Meteor generated in Fiscal Year 2008 $30,538,800 in revenue, 194,454,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 319,800 souls an average length of trip of 608 miles. The Silver Star generated $28,111,900 in revenue, 196,924,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 367,100 passengers an average length of trip of 536 miles.



The Empire Builder generated $59,389,600 in revenue, 409,480,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 554,300 passengers an average length of trip of 739 miles. The Lake Shore Limited generated $24,212,000 in revenue, 152,329,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 345,600 passengers an average length of trip of 441 miles.



You can easily see the strength of both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and it’s also easy to imagine if the Portland section of the Empire Builder became the Western Star as its own, second frequency all the way to Chicago how much fiscal strength and transportation output it would generate, as would a second frequency of the Lake Shore Limited into Boston serving the same purpose.



So, Amtrak’s plan for the possibility of a restored Pioneer to is add three cars to the California Zephyr between Chicago and Denver, consisting of a coach, coach/baggage, and sleeper. In Denver, a dedicated diner/lounge and separate locomotive would be added to the minuscule consist and form the Pioneer to the Pacific Northwest, terminating in either Portland or Seattle (Seattle being the better option of the two.).



Amtrak projected ridership and revenue for the Pioneer is too small, too. As said above, while being conservative in projections is the best method, Amtrak projections tend more to fatalism than objectivity.



Amtrak has produced four options for restored Pioneer service, Option 1 being a Salt Lake City-Seattle choice, with 102,000 passengers and $11.6 million in revenue projected.



Option 2 is a Denver-Seattle choice, with 111,000 passengers and $13.1 million in revenue projected.



Option 3 is a Salt Lake City-Portland choice, with 82,000 passengers and $7.6 million in revenue, and Option 4 is a Denver-Portland option with 95,000 passengers and $9.2 million in revenue projected.



Option 2 is consistently the best choice, even though through Amtrak’s projections it also has the greatest cost. Option 2 restores service over Union Pacific’s fabled Overland Route through Wyoming, which would bring service to another state currently without passenger rail benefits.



Much of Amtrak’s projections are based on ridership and revenues from the former Pioneer, which ceased operations in 1997. In FY 1992, Pioneer ridership peaked at 156,000 passengers a year. Amtrak states in its preliminary report it expects lower ridership because of stiffer airline competition in the region. Amtrak likes to sell itself short with silly statements like this; it never seems to understand the uniqueness of its own product and the desirability of its product among all classes of travelers.



Amtrak is projecting per mile passenger revenue of 12.2 cents, which would place it only above the Sunset Limited, with revenue of 12.1 cents per passenger mile. It’s a mystery why Amtrak would use this number, since the California Zephyr generates 14.5 cents per passenger mile, the Southwest Chief 13.3 cents per passenger mile, and the Empire Builder 14.5 cents. Why there is any presumption of such a low passenger mile figure can only be explained that Amtrak doesn’t want this train to come back.



The 111,000 figure for ridership is easily low by 25,000 passengers, but, if a second frequency all the way from Chicago to Denver and then a single frequency to Seattle was used because it is a better choice, then a ridership figure of 250,000 to 300,000 is more likely. Yes, this would require more equipment, but, that’s the cost of having the burden of meeting consumer demand.



When you couple realistic passenger mile revenue of 14.5 cents per passenger mile as is found on the California Zephyr with the ridership of a second frequency, suddenly the Pioneer is not only a good idea, but a great idea. Perhaps Amtrak doesn’t want to do this because it is afraid of a new service being successful? After all, it’s very difficult for Amtrak today to hide the outright success of its long distance trains, so adding another train would just add to Amtrak’s problems of explaining why long distance trains always work better than state supported corridor trains with greater transportation output and greater efficiencies in every area.



Training and personnel preparation is another area where Amtrak’s proposal seems to be from outer space. Amtrak wants to budget $6.6 million for crew training for Option 2. Why? Perhaps, Amtrak is considering taking kindergarten students and paying for their entire education (including advanced university graduate studies degrees) and, a lifetime later, making them train and engine crew members. The Pioneer is proposed to operate over a route that is already a freight railroad route; there is no blazing of trails going on here. Between Portland and Seattle, the route is an existing Amtrak route, so it’s just a matter of adding more crew to the crew base, not creating an whole new cadre of employees. As far as the portion of the route between Denver and Portland, it is not rocket science to recruit and train railroad employees. Amtrak has obviously based its numbers of taking raw employees off the street and turning them into railroaders, and then doubling that cost for a final project figure. In the real world, that is not only unrealistic, but just silly.



On the subject of equipment, Amtrak says it doesn’t have enough equipment on the wreck line it could fix, or other cars in storage to get this service moving. It wants (like in the Gulf Coast report) up to four years to develop and build new equipment, at a cost of $123 million for an expected need (for the too short consist) of 27 cars and locomotives, total. That breaks down to over $4,500,000 for each piece of equipment. Perhaps they are projecting all of this equipment will be made of gold and platinum? This figure is way too high, plus, a few pieces of equipment could come from Amtrak’s wreck line at a much lower price for rehabilitation instead of new build. Amtrak says it needs to buy four new locomotives in this equipment group, but it has seven wrecked P42s in its inactive fleet, plus 30 stored P40s, and nine stored F40s. There are other bits and pieces of Superliner equipment Amtrak has that could easily supplement this equipment request without having to buy everything new.



The report goes on and on in this vain vein. Probably, the numbers Union Pacific Railroad have submitted for track upgrades are a good starting point for a wish list, and it would help all parties concerned for some infrastructure improvement on the line.



As far as station costs are concerned, Amtrak worries greatly about taking some existing buildings and having to upgrade them for Americans With Disabilities Act compliance. While this has great merit, it always seems to be Amtrak’s default position on any new project; it doesn’t have the money to spend for ADA compliance. After over a decade without service, many of the route stations have either been removed or converted to other purposes. There will be a great need for new station facilities. However, this is a reasonable expense for cities and towns that wish to have passenger rail service to share the expenses. If they want passenger rail service, provide the portal for that, just like for airlines.



Amtrak says it will need $469,800,000 to restart Pioneer service, with Denver as the jumping off point. The majority of that is $324,100,000 for track and signals, including the coming need for Positive Train Control.



An educated guess says this cost is $150,000,000 too high, including unrealistic training, equipment, and new station costs. By the time a realistic number is agreed upon between Amtrak and the Union Pacific Railroad, that $469 million should be closer to $320,000,000.



Ridership, revenue, and revenue passenger mile projections are tremendously under-represented, and operating expenses are tremendously over-represented. When the true figures meet in the middle, farebox recovery should be in the 50% or higher range (As opposed to Amtrak’s guess of 28%).



So, at this point, if you’re an elected official of any of the states hoping for a restored Pioneer, what do you do? Amtrak wants $469 million in start-up costs, and then it expects ongoing subsidies to run a train that is positioned in the most expensive way it can be to drain government treasuries.



Here’s an idea. Let Amtrak submit its grossly flawed report, with all of the figures as gospel. Then, spend some more money and some more time (After all, Amtrak wants four years or more to restore this service, so to them time is not a factor.), and find a credible passenger rail consulting firm to create a real route analysis, using real world numbers, and then take that report and beat Amtrak over the head with it until it comes to its senses and becomes realistic on what it will take to restore the Pioneer as part of its long distance system.



3) Here is the most compelling part of the Amtrak Pioneer report.



[Begin quote]



These projections reflect the fact that all or virtually all of the equipment required for Pioneer restoration would have to be purchased new. Despite growing ridership, Amtrak’s long distance equipment fleet is smaller now than it was when the Pioneer operated. Due to funding constraints, Amtrak has not ordered any new long distance equipment since the early 1990s, and most of the “Heritage” cars built for other railroads that Amtrak acquired at its formation have been retired due to age. Amtrak’s existing fleet of bi-level Superliner cars is insufficient to meet equipment requirements on the nine long distance trains that currently use Superliner equipment, and Amtrak has only a small number of repairable “wreck status” Superliner cars. In addition, if Amtrak is to continue to provide existing services on long distance routes, it must in the very near future replace nearly 100 remaining “Heritage” cars that are now more than half a century old.



Amtrak has recently issued a request for proposals for the acquisition of 130 single-level long distance cars, primarily to replace the remaining Heritage cars (although funding for this purchase has not yet been identified). Purchasing additional single-level cars to equip a restored Pioneer would not be an optimal solution. Single level cars would accommodate fewer passengers, and operation of single-level Pioneer cars to/from Chicago on the bi-level California Zephyr would trigger a need for additional Superliner “transition” cars (which are in particularly short supply) equipped with a high-level door one end and a single-level door on the other.

A purchase of new bi-level equipment for the Pioneer, which would take approximately four years for design, procurement and construction, would have to be part of a larger equipment order. The high upfront design and tooling costs associated with building passenger rail cars make it uneconomic to construct them in small quantities. Amtrak is preparing a comprehensive equipment fleet strategy that will, among other things, address the existing shortage of bi-level Superliner cars that limits capacity on Western long distance trains. An order for new bi-level equipment, which would be subject to funding availability, could provide the means to acquire additional equipment for new services such as a restored Pioneer.



[End quote]



What is Amtrak saying, here? Has Amtrak actually said – in writing, in an official document, no less – it has demand for long distance trains that is not being met? (Gasp!) Could this be true? Amtrak has unmet demand on trains which are not corridor trains? Could this be a whole line of revenue Amtrak is ignoring? What about taking more cars out of the wreck line and storage yard and putting them into service? Would that imperil Amtrak’s ongoing business plan which is to mainly request government subsidies instead of generating revenue inhouse?



And, take a look at the line, “Amtrak is preparing a comprehensive equipment fleet strategy that will, among other things, address the existing shortage of bi-level Superliner cars that limits capacity on Western long distance trains. An order for new bi-level equipment, which would be subject to funding availability, could provide the means to acquire additional equipment for new services as a restored Pioneer.”



(Gasp! again) NEW SERVICES? Our Amtrak? Is someone actually preparing a vision for the future for Amtrak? Inquiring minds want to know.



3) While you’re trying to wrap your mind around that concept just above, here’s an editorial which is appearing in the October 2009 issue of RAILPACE Newsmagazine, which is appearing on news stands today. This commentary is by Tom Nemeth, Editor-in-Chief of RAILPACE, and is used with his permission.



[Begin quote]



EDITORIAL



By Tom Nemeth



Amtrak: Getting the Lead Out



Now that Amtrak has adequate funding for operations and growth, while enjoying unprecedented public and political support, it is time for a management makeover. Amtrak service today, with a few exceptions on some western long-hauls and the Acelas, is beginning to look like the final days of Penn Central. While top management obsesses about photographers, on-time performance continues to lag, trains are dirty, shopworn, and overcrowded. What is the meaning of a “reserved train” when passengers are required to stand between Wilmington and Washington, as a friend did on Train 94 on a recent Friday. This editor endured a Business Class coach from Trenton to Newport News on Train 99 on March 28 with reeking toilets. A round trip on the Texas Eagle on June 15 and June 23 last year, in addition to being 8 hours late each way, revealed shopworn Superliners badly in need of a facelift. Another colleague, writing Amtrak in protest of a rather rude trainman, was advised that Amtrak management is not responsible for the behavior of its crews. Granted that working a crowded train is not easy, but there must be recognition that the company (and Federal funding) exists for the benefit of Amtrak’s customers, the riding public. In short, it appears that top management just doesn’t care.



There are other Amtrak customers too. The commuter railroads whose spine is the Northeast Corridor, are not treated any better by Amtrak’s insular management.The faulty design of the ARC rail tunnel now being built under the Hudson River, which will not connect to Penn Station in Manhattan, is partly the fault of Amtrak, which did not want a seat at the table when the project was in initial design, a fatal flaw that will haunt regional rail advocates for generations. Amtrak management just didn’t care about “NJ Transit’s tunnel.” New York’s MTA continues to struggle with Amtrak’s inability to execute its responsibility for the Long Island Rail Road East Side Access project. This represents a lack of accountability by Amtrak management, who are in a unique position to influence the outcome of these multi-billion dollar investments. Amtrak’s own engineering department continues to lack competent leadership, allowing substandard quality concrete ties onto the Northeast Corridor (now being replaced at great expense), and serious structural cracks in a bridge in Elizabeth, NJ, to go unnoticed by inadequately trained maintenance workers.



But where IS management? Corporate culture on Norfolk Southern and other successful railroads dictates that Division Superintendents and Engineering Department officers are not to be found sitting in their offices; rather they get out and ride the trains regularly and observe the property firsthand. On Amtrak, they sequester themselves behind desks and await their long-sought retirement day.



Then there’s the issue of Amtrak operations. Shrinking consists in an era of growing ridership hardly makes sense. Amtrak’s “One Size Fits All” policy for its long-distance trainsets is also bizarre. One would expect that Western train consists would swell in the summer months, while Florida bound consists would lengthen significantly in the winter season.



Amtrak’s culture is one of meetings and seminars, and hiring consultants to produce “studies” for a laissez-faire management that doesn’t want to work to resolve the issues themselves.



Meanwhile, Amtrak’s lethargic bureaucracy continues to balloon. The agency continues to be a dumping ground for failed bureaucrats and retirees from other government agencies eagerly awaiting retirement. In fact, many already seem to be there.



This is not a Democratic or Republican partisan issue, rather, it concerns the willingness of elected officials to finally purge Amtrak’s management ranks of Bush-era minions and install new, energetic top leaders who are committed to growth and expansion; whose actions speak louder than words (and their consultants’ reports.)

Nearly a year after the U.S. election, Amtrak still does not have a corporate Strategic Plan for growth. As of this writing, management still does not have a Fleet Plan in place, nor new equipment on order. Management has become so moribund that Joe Szabo, the recently-appointed Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, recently had to direct Amtrak Acting President Joe Boardman to come up with a Fleet Plan. Hello.



Amtrak’s Bush-era management team has become more insular and combative, and dismissive of its long term supporters and customers; witness Amtrak’s illegal Photography Ban, perhaps the Boardman Administration’s only “accomplishment” this year. Boardman, a career bureaucrat, disdains individual discussions with media editors and freelance photojournalists concerning Amtrak’s strategic plans and initiatives, and has refused to acknowledge communications from citizens and customers regarding Amtrak’s Photo Ban.



Change must start from the top, and there are a number of great rail executives who stand ready to lead Amtrak out of its chaos this fall, when Acting President Joseph Boardman’s term is finished. These luminaries include Gene Skoropowski, managing director for California’s Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority, the agency responsible for intercity passenger rail service linking Sacramento with the Bay Area. Skoropowski has spearheaded growth and development of intercity and corridor passenger rail in California, including implementation of CalTrain’s “Baby Bullet” trains. Peter Cannito, former Executive Vice President of Engineering at Amtrak, and retired president of Metro North Railroad, brings a wealth of engineering expertise. Dennis F. Sullivan, former Amtrak Executive Vice President, is a seasoned Operations railroader who will bring customer focus to Amtrak. These three individuals form the backbone of a team that will inspire performance among Amtrak employees and get the company moving forward.



While politics is a necessary aspect of Amtrak’s presidency, it cannot be the only aspect. It is essential now to rebuild Amtrak’s management team, to run the company as a railroad and as a business, to achieve a vibrant and growing national system.



The U.S. had an extensive passenger rail system until the 1960s, when financial losses caused for-profit railroads to jettison their passenger services. Now that Federal and State governments have begun to accept responsibility for funding a national passenger rail system, there is growing support for breaking the 38-year old Amtrak monopoly on intercity passenger service, and allowing freight railroads and/or private operators to take over Amtrak routes, or even launch new services. This may be the Amtrak Board’s last chance to install competent, growth– and customer– oriented management, or the current groundswell of public and political support for passenger rail— and Amtrak’s monopoly of it— may soon come to an end.



[End quote]



Okay, Amtrak, more and more people in the non-Amworld are wondering what you’re up to; the “business as usual” status quo is no longer acceptable. Do something. The days of laying around and whining about the world being so terribly unfair are over. You’re expected to perform, just like everyone else.





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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org

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