Showing posts with label Norfolk Southern Railway. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Norfolk Southern Railway. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

This Week in Amtrak

ViewlinerImage by Madbuster75 via Flickr
From the Editors…
And now a (highly) condensed look at the year past through the eyes of This Week at Amtrak.

2010, A.D. [Amtrak Defined]
As we enter our eighth year of publication, we find the world of passenger railroading in a greater-than-usual state of flux. Obviously, the biggest curveball thrown may be summed up in three little words: High- Speed Rail. After the “Vision for High-Speed Rail” and High-Speed Rail guidelines of 2009, we waited in expectation for January 28, when $8 billion worth of specific American Recovery and Reinvestment Act rail projects would be announced. It took months for the euphoria to subside. Then came reality; mid-term election candidates began to run on platforms advocating stoppage of HSR projects in their respective states. Freight railroads found the punitive federal guidelines “surprising” and “frightening.”

Then things got interesting.

On January 5, after an initial one-year term as President, Joseph H. Boardman was granted (by the Amtrak Board) a permanent position. On January 11, an Amtrak press release announced, “AMTRAK READY WITH BIG PLANS FOR 2010 -- New Year brings major projects and new initiatives.” This was hardly the first announcement heralding “big plans.” As with so many other forward-looking statements of years past, this was generally received with a sigh. As events would later prove, however, some rather big things did actually happen.

March 6 saw the first Town Hall meeting co-sponsored by Amtrak and Trains Magazine. Well-attended and featuring the presence of Amtrak Chairman Tom Carper, as well as Joe Boardman, there were those inside the corporation who decried this “foamers’ forum.” Even so, there was positive dialogue about photography and updates on equipment rebuilding at the Beech Grove Repair Facility, using stimulus money. A train of three cars and a locomotive were on display for all in attendance to tour (and photograph).

March 31 was the end of an era at Amtrak. Cliff Black, long-time (and long-suffering) Chief of Communications and employee since 1981, retired. For years, it had been his quotes, his voice which represented Amtrak to the general public. Through each change of leadership at Amtrak, and there were several, the one constant had been Black's deft handling of the news media. Any of us seeking good honest information knew Cliff Black was the man to see. While keeping on-message for his employer, he never led the news media astray; an amazing feat in today's world of journalism. Suffice it to say, this is a retirement well earned and richly deserved.

July 23 brought what was perhaps the biggest, most jaw-dropping initiative undertaken by Amtrak all year, and possibly all decade: The order for 130 new Viewliner 2 single level cars with an option for 70 more to replace the remaining Heritage baggage cars and diners. Was this shocking turn due to a previously-unrealized corporate need? No. As far back as 15 years ago, Amtrak's then-president Thomas Downs described the remaining Heritage cars in service as “junk.” Was this, then, as a result of a sudden jump in demand for sleeping car space on eastern trains? No. Sleeper space has been at a premium, especially in the East, since the retirement of the last Heritage sleepers in 2006. Ever since the 50-unit fleet of Viewliner sleeping cars entered service in 1995-96, we have been waiting for the rest of the Viewliner fleet to supplant the last of the Heritage fleet. We have waited… and waited… and waited. When Amtrak announced, on January 11, “a comprehensive and detailed plan to replace and expand its fleet of locomotives and passenger railcars” they could have warned us that this time they really meant it.

The Washington Times of September 12 reported on a Congressional probe of the sudden ouster of Amtrak Inspector General Fred Weiderhold, the previous year. Quoting from draft copy, “Because of his expertise, the [Amtrak] Board viewed Weiderhold as a threat.” Also found were “excessive fees” paid to outside law firms by Amtrak’s Law Department and, due to the circumstances surrounding Mr. Weiderhold’s departure, “It was not a truly voluntary resignation as Amtrak management had suggested in public statements.” There was some attention given in the Halls of Congress which, thus far, has amounted to nothing beyond lip service. But as Chicago Cubs fans are used to saying, “maybe next year.”

On October 16, a Norfolk Southern freight train departing Enola Yard across the river from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, en route to Hagerstown, Maryland and points South, derailed in downtown Harrisburg. The rear of the train was still west of the Amtrak station, precluding the eastbound Pennsylvanian from entering. Many will use such an incident to demonize the freight railroads and to call for building separate tracks. Ironically, that is exactly what NS has been attempting to accomplish in the area for a number of years. Currently, when freight trains to or from the south enter or depart Enola Yard, they are required to cross the Susquehanna River twice (and pass the Amtrak station), a process which adds hours to transit times. NS has been working with the State to rebuild a former connection on the south side of Enola Yard at Lemoyne. The process has been held up for the usual political reasons (concerning which a boxcar could not care less). Until this has resolution, efficiency will suffer. Passenger rail will suffer. Egos will continue to be stroked. A similar incident occurred July 2, and for what? For less than 1,300 feet of track. Sometimes the answer really is that simple.

Also in October came an admission of the obvious. One year earlier, the contract to run the Virginia Railway Express commuter service, held by Amtrak for 18 years, was awarded to the French company Keolis. Amtrak did not like this intrusion into its turf. As documented by veteran reporter Don Phillips, “The battle then turned bitter, and Amtrak and its unions turned nasty. Union officials made it clear to employees that if they signed with Keolis, they would be fired immediately by Amtrak and permanently blacklisted. Crews who agreed to stay with Amtrak not only received a $5,000 bonus but were guaranteed a job. Amtrak, meanwhile, even tried to hire crews laid off from New Jersey Transit who had been approached by Keolis. The idea was to prevent Keolis from hiring enough crews to run the system by takeover day, June 28.” Yet, in spite of all the chicanery and dirty tricks Keolis did begin service (albeit delayed) and continues to operate. By October of 2010, Amtrak President Joe Boardman finally admitted, “We know we did not provide the right answers,” and “I see a lot more competition coming forward.” Amtrak considers itself to be the sole keeper of American passenger railroading. Considering its isolationist history, this is understandable; however, the word is getting around that there are others willing to ante up to the table. Amtrak has promised to behave. Will it?

Finally, on December 20, Norfolk Southern and the Commonwealth of Virginia entered an agreement to reintroduce passenger service to Norfolk. This is funded by “an $87 million Rail Enhancement Fund grant” which, when translated into English, means these are state monies, not Federal or ARRA grant. Yes Virginia, there really are states who take the initiative in their passenger rail programs.

2010 promised to be the year of “High-Speed Rail.” Ultimately, it came in like a lion and went out like a lamb. HSR was touted as the savior of our economy; an engine for creating jobs in much the same way as the Interstate Highway System of two generations ago. Rhetoric was thick. Substance was lacking. The proposed fast trains look sleek and sexy, but where is the business case to justify them? No one is against creating jobs, but with at least $8 billion in the offing, the question is begged: Is this a good, sustainable transportation policy?

Perhaps the biggest story in passenger rail is the one that did not happen.

Amtrak’s manifesto of January 11 predicted, in part, “the purchase of several hundred single-level and bi-level long distance passenger railcars and more than a hundred locomotives.” New Viewliners were ordered in July, followed by a contract for new electrics in October. Unlike many of the HSR initiatives, these orders have had no political opposition. Yet as 2010 wrapped up, there were no “bi-level long distance passenger railcars” on the horizon. As pointed out by Andrew Selden, URPA Vice President, “This is the one application of capital available to Amtrak that promises a quick and positive return on incremental invested capital. No other investment opportunity, honestly accounted for using GAAP measures, offers anything even close to this. Yet Amtrak refuses to pursue it.”

As the year has drawn to a close, the same basic route map remains in place. Apologists are grateful the map has not shrunk any further. Advocates wonder why, in an era of so much talk of rail, the map is not growing. The Sunset Limited still does not venture any further East than New Orleans, and is carried on Amtrak’s daily status as "Hurricane`Katrina' Aftermath & Service Adjustments - Sunset Limited: Normal service resumed 03Nov05, with the exception of Trains 1 and 2 between Orlando and New Orleans."

True, there was much more talk about passenger rail this past year than in recent memory. The small order for equipment was positive, yet after so many years of benign neglect, this can hardly be counted as a fresh start. “What is needed most in 2011, following what happened in 2010, is a better, more rigid plan for creating new trains which have a higher guarantee of success and financial reward, instead of becoming yet another burden on the overburdened taxpayers,” said Bruce Richardson, URPA President.

As the afterglow of the latest surge in HSR interest fades into memory, it is clear that sleek, fast trains do not exist in a vacuum. Around the real high-speed world, fast trains succeed as part of a vast integrated network; the trains, by themselves, would be nothing more than pricey tourist attractions. Amtrak would appear to have figured this out, as evidenced by its current equipment orders, and wish list from last January. Unless projects of this type are embraced, to build upon the few successes of this past year, then the whole enterprise is for naught; hopefully, it will not be too little, too late.

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Tuesday, September 29, 2009

This Week In Amtrak

WASHINGTON - JUNE 23:  Joseph Boardman, presid...Image by Getty Images via Daylife

This Week at Amtrak; September 11, 2009



A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org





Volume 6, Number 37



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.



URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.



1) You never know what is to be found on the private United Rail Passenger Alliance Intranet. Here is one of the offerings from Labor Day weekend.



[Begin quote]



Today was the first of the two day "Railfest 2009" held at Steamtown NPS in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Amtrak sent along one of each: P42 locomotive, Amfleet I coach, Amfleet I lounge, Viewliner sleeping car.



In the lounge was an Amtrak intern; an astute young man with hope in his soul that has yet to be crushed. I discovered – as I suspected – the current Viewliner RFP is more an exercise of purging the last of the Heritage cars than an expansion of service. But, I asked why there hasn't been a push for more Superliners. The thought process is looking toward HSR and not buying "slow trains".



Does Amtrak understand it is in the fight of its life? There is no doubt in my mind something will be built in this country. Perhaps there will be a fleet of Talgo designed trains running to and through various places in the Midwest. Talgo already performs its own maintenance. It's not much of a stretch for someone other than Amtrak to run the trains.



If the Midwest does succeed in obtaining the requested 31 trainsets it wants through stimulus money and necessary motive power, that would be quite the interconnected network. A network of such size would probably warrant the attention of a larger player such as Sir Richard's Virgin Rail. How does Amtrak intend to compete with that? Point to the fab job they have done with the Northeast Corridor?



I may now say that from the inside to the outside, no one knows what's going on with Amtrak. Stay tuned ...



[End quote]



As they say, from the mouth of babes ...



And, as with most topics on the URPA Intranet, there was follow-up discussion.



[Begin quote]



Amtrak says they don't want to buy any slow trains? Then that pretty much leaves them with no place to go. Any TGV-style fast trains would have to be a new start.



Leaving aside the lessons we learned from the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX), we here in Central Florida have also learned to avoid any new start project that involves Amtrak. So Amtrak is left with 79 MPH trains on freight railroad tracks, which is theirs only because of their statutory access to the tracks.



If they don't want that, and they've made it abundantly clear that they don't want it, then they have no purpose at all. They will end up like the proverbial lazy man who dies with his hand in a banquet bowl.



[End quote]



Plus ...



[Begin quote]



I think the answer to your last question about Amtrak’s vulnerability to, and refusal to respond to competition lies partly in its reliance on its compulsory track access privileges, but mainly in a related conundrum — liability exposure. The freights cannot refuse Amtrak access, and must rely on the combination of Amtrak’s $200 million/occurrence compulsory liability insurance requirement and the federal $200 million/accident liability cap (49 USC 28103). (We will skip over the evidence Amtrak maintains no self-insurance reserve/deductible funds below the usual $25-$50 million policy minimum as required by the federal law.)



When it comes to an alternative operator, the freights remain free to indulge their most paranoid liability scenarios — effectively ignoring the existence of the federal cap. This is what produced demands aimed at North Carolina and Virginia for liability coverage in the $300 million to $600 million range.

[End quote]



And ...



[Begin quote]]



His report certainly explains why Amtrak has produced no vision for the future – because it chooses not to have one, based on the assumption it will be the high speed rail operator. Considering how many European companies have said they are going to jump in with lots of expertise, well, Amtrak is very, very wrong if it thinks its few buddies in Congress are going to protect it.



[End quote]



Add this interesting observation ...



[Begin quote]



At the height of the Battle of Britain when RAF Fighter pilots were barely holding their own against the Luftwaffe, guess what the Air Marshals of the RAF wanted as the priority construction: Bombers. At this time most British Bombs rarely got closer than five miles of the target. The peace time RAF was dominated by Bomber Pilots. Even in war they couldn't give up their ideology. This is true of most large organizations.



[End quote]



And, finally ...



[Begin quote]



There's a perfectly logical explanation. Amtrak, from deep in its corporate DNA, doesn't want to change and grow, and its congressional and executive branch enablers will continue to let it get away with it. Therefore, it's perfectly happy to limit its equipment orders to deep-sixing the last of the Heritage fleet: the dining cars and baggage cars. Status quo maintained. I think, as long as the NEC gets its cut of the HSR largess, Amtrak will be perfectly happy on that front, as well. And, many a few more states will step up with operating subsidy handouts.



With true HSR on the European and Asian models (on separate, non-freight and presumably publicly-owned right of way), Amtrak's historic and statutory advantages mean very little. Amtrak brings little to the table in terms of expertise or competence.



So, Amtrak's "drift," while blinkered and execrable, is completely rational, from Amtrak's point of view, given the history. Amtrak has its own inertial guidance system that many have tried, and failed, to correct.



[End quote]



Perhaps this explains why we hear no vision statements from Amtrak; they have none, other than to glom onto more government money for high speed rail in the future. In the mean time, Amtrak’s current fleet just keeps shrinking and shrinking, no matter how much money it pours into passenger car and locomotive rehabs. Until a substantial order is placed for new equipment, no real, long term growth is possible.



As the late Austin Coates, founder of URPA used to say, “It’s just business as usual.”



If Amtrak does plan to not grow its existing system, or, eventually exit the “slow train” business, then it needs to let us know that, right now, so other people – with a true entrepreneurial bent – can step in and run Amtrak’s existing system properly. If Amtrak doesn’t like what it’s doing now, let someone else do it, and probably do it better.



2) Norfolk, Virginia’s Virginia-Pilot daily newspaper reported on Wednesday Norfolk Southern Railway projects the cost of putting conventional passenger trains on its freight tracks between Petersburg, Virginia and Norfolk at $75 million, much less than the Commonwealth of Virginia’s estimate of $262 million.



A spokesman for the Commonwealth said the figure included costs for stations and other costs not included in the NS figure, but it’s hard to visualize the few, small stations along that mostly rural route costing tens of millions of dollars. Towns along that former Norfolk & Western mail line south of Petersburg include (north to south) Disputana, Waverly, Wakefield, Ivor, Zuni, and Windsor, before you arrive in the larger area of Suffolk.



If you’re not completely familiar with those Virginia towns (Even though Zuni was the town where the Planter’s Peanuts silo burned back in the mid-1960s, and Wakefield is home to the Virginia Diner restaurant.), understand these are mostly tiny towns with four and five building “downtowns” spread on each side of four lane highway Route 460, serving nearby peanut, soybean, cotton, and hog farms. So, it’s unlikely an expensive station infrastructure is necessary for any of these locations, other than Suffolk, or Norfolk itself.



A spokeswoman for NS said the $75 million figure for improving the corridor is half the company’s early estimate.



Deborah H. Butler, NS vice president of planning and chief information officer, said Norfolk Southern supports sharing its railroad right of way with passenger trains, but the company would only help pay for infrastructure improvements if there are benefits to their freight service.



That stance is not unreasonable; if a railroad has all of the capacity it needs for its own customers, then any incremental improvements have to come from a source outside of the railroad. That’s only good business and good public policy.



3) William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona has some further thoughts.



[Begin quote]



By William Lindley



In recent weeks we have looked at how a nationwide matrix of passenger trains would work effectively. Some of our readers have asked about timetables. This is natural, because in recent decades many advocates have obsessed over how Amtrak's skeletal system could be tweaked by adding a single train here, or adding one stop there. Contrariwise, the whole point of the late Dr. Adrian Herzog's proposal was a proper grid – a matrix – of trains, with multiple daily departures, largely removes the need for clever scheduling and obsession over microscopic details.



But, hark! In a sufficient network, small changes can make huge differences: let's look at an historic timetable that was a pinnacle of efficiency.



In the autumn of 1965, the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway (Better known as the Frisco.) had reduced its passenger fleet to the principal two of its mainlines, these being arranged in a large X and centered on Springfield, Missouri. Frisco ran one daily train from St. Louis to Oklahoma City, as well as daily departures from Kansas City to Birmingham, Alabama.



Train 1, The Oklahoman, departed St. Louis at 8:55 A.M., arrived Springfield at 2:35 P.M., departing there at 3:10 P.M., and arriving Oklahoma City at 11 P.M. The next morning, that same set of equipment departed Oklahoma City as Train 2 at 5:45 A.M., to Springfield arriving 1:40 P.M., and departing at 2:35 P.M., and returning to St. Louis at 8 P.M. This is 542 miles each way, with daily departures, requiring two sets of equipment.



Train 101, the Southland, departed Kansas City at 9:40 A.M., arrived Springfield 2 P.M., and departed there 2:45 P.M., called at Memphis 9:45 P.M., and arrived Birmingham 6:15 A.M. the next morning. That equipment departed as Train 102 at 10:30 P.M., called at Memphis at 6 A.M., arriving at Springfield 2:15 P.M., with a 3:20 P.M. departure for Kansas City where it arrived at 7:40 P.M., ... in plenty of time to turn for the next morning's departure. That's 737 miles each way, with daily departures, requiring three sets of equipment.



In total, the five trainsets together averaged over 500 miles per 24-hour period, including even sitting still overnight at the ends of the line.



Returning briefly to today, compare this to the Piedmont train in North Carolina, which Amtrak operates on behalf of the State of North Carolina.



The Piedmont makes a single 173-mile daily round trip, or 346 miles per 24-hour period, running between Charlotte and Raleigh. The same trainset could travel 90 minutes and a total of 244 miles further east of Raleigh to serve Selma, Wilson, and Rocky Mount – making connections in both directions with the Silver Meteor to and from New York City... at only the incremental cost of miles and hours; more on that in a minute.



Crucially, all the Frisco trains converged at Springfield with connections possible in every direction. If even one of those connections were inconvenient or broken, the usability of the trains would have collapsed.



To see why, let's look at the matrix effect. As described in Dr. Adrian Herzog's paper "An Introduction to Matrix Theory for Passenger Trains,” for each of 'N' stations, there are 'N-minus-one' destination stations.



So, absent the matrix effect, as two disconnected routes, the 18 stations on the St. Louis-Oklahoma City line, and the 25 stations on the Kansas City-Birmingham line, would have given (18*17)+(25*24) = 906 possible origin-destination pairs.



But, with that connection at Springfield, the number of stations becomes 18+25-1 (Springfield being common to both routes) and the number of travel pairs becomes 1,722 – almost twice as many! If you moved the times of any train by a few hours, your revenue would drop by half. Or, if you think of each connection you can restore – your revenue would double!



This applies equally to, say, the connection at Memphis to the Illinois Central – where the eastbound Southland easily connected to the southbound Panama Limited for New Orleans, with another good connection in the reverse direction.



Again in the present, Amtrak, either on its own or convincing the State of North Carolina to extend the Piedmont to Rocky Mount – adding three stations to the current nine – changes that train's matrix from (9*8) = 72, to (12*11) = 132 ... nearly double.



Counting the connection to the Silver Meteor and its twelve stations to New York, the number of potential travel pairs rises to (24*23) = 552. That's nearly eight times the usefulness, for the cost of a 90 minute ride. And, many of those would be lucrative trips of several hundred miles.



Yes, we lapsed for a moment into fine detail we said could almost be ignored. Why? Because once you have a sufficient matrix, each little improvement builds the system far more than "linearly" – meaning each time you "add one" you might "get three or four more." That's why the concept of trains dubbed locals, expresses, and limiteds will work together toward a successful passenger rail system.



[End quote]



4) We note today’s date, September 11th, the anniversary of the unspeakable horror inflicted on our country and countrymen by those who don’t cherish freedom.



September 11, 2001 was the day so many Americans, trying to go about their normal lives, needed a passenger rail system to step into the chasm caused by a grounded airline passenger system, and it almost wasn’t there. For many places in the country, it already wasn’t; there simply was no reasonable surface transportation alternative to the thousands of grounded airliners.



What have we learned these eight years since 2001? Not much. Amtrak is carrying a few more passengers than it did then, but it still represents less than a half of a percent of our country’s domestic transportation marketplace. Very little new equipment has come online in the past eight years, and Amtrak’s route system has taken dramatic hits, such as the loss of the Sunset Limited east of New Orleans into Florida.



Since 2001, Amtrak has replaced its president and chief executive officer three times, with the current officeholder working under just an interim appointment. There have been no substantial changes to Amtrak’s board of directors, and it remains dangerously under-populated.



A rational person would have thought we would have learned something in the past eight years.



Apparently, not.





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Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA’s web site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be found.



URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.



J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org

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